Disability, sport and the limits of law by Condry, Samuel Nicholas
 1 
University of Stirling 
 
 
School of Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disability, Sport and the Limits of Law 
 
 
by 
 
Samuel Nicholas Condry 
 
Student Number 
1525125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of Philosophy 
 
May 2008 
 2 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am very grateful to the Jean Clark Foundation for funding a studentship for the 
research project from which this thesis was drawn. The purpose of the project was to 
address specific knowledge-gaps and advance the study of Scots law through 
comparative analysis of both disability discrimination legislation and the wider legal 
issues relevant to sports participation in Scotland and beyond. I am also indebted to 
my supervisor, David McArdle, whose advice has been patient, thoughtful and 
supportive throughout. 
 3 
Contents 
 
Forward 
 
Abstract 
 
Introduction – disability, sport and the limits of law 
 
Chapter 1 – Sport and Disability in Scotland – the regulatory framework 
 
Chapter 2 – Models of Disability – aims and definitions  
 
Chapter 3 – A Right to Sport – the impact of human rights  
 
Chapter 4 – Equal Participation – disability discrimination legislation and sport 
 
Chapter 5 – Learning Participation – disability, sport and education law  
 
Chapter 6 – A Safe Environment – rights, planning and health and safety  
 
Conclusion  
 
References 
 
Appendix  – The sportscotland Single Equity Scheme 
 4 
Forward 
 
This thesis has resulted from a graduate research project undertaken at the School of 
Law, University of Stirling, in 2007. The starting point for the project was to note 
research that has been conducted into the relationship between disability 
discrimination law and sports participation from a North American perspective. 
Secondly, it was notable that there has been an absence of comparative discussion and 
critique into the broader range of disability discrimination law issues identified in that 
research, and very little analysis outwith North America of how either disability 
discrimination legislation or other areas of law have impacted upon sport 
organisations and athletes with disabilities. The purpose of the project was therefore 
to address specific knowledge-gaps and advance the study of Scots law through 
comparative analysis of both disability discrimination legislation and the wider legal 
issues relevant to sports participation in Scotland and beyond. The aims and 
objectives of this thesis reflect the purpose of the project. 
 
The thesis considers disabled people’s participation in sport at both the recreational 
and elite level; however it covers ‘participation’ in a wide sense, which encompasses 
playing competitive sport, but also sport as leisure and as a spectating activity. 
Although sporting activity at recreational and elite level may seem ostensibly ‘worlds 
apart’, the legal issues arising have much in common. The aim is to consider these 
issues together, by identifying and exploring common themes. Common to all levels 
of sport for disabled people is the theme of how barriers are created and broken down, 
on the one hand technological and physical barriers, and on the other, social barriers, 
including eligibility criteria and the rules of competitive play.      
 
 The thesis focuses on the rights of disabled people to participate in sport, examining 
various aspects of human rights law and disability discrimination law, as well as 
sports governance issues. One of the primary objectives is to identify how rights 
arguments might be utilised to improve participation in sport, in the wide sense 
described above.        
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Abstract 
 
Disability, sport and the law are three concepts which have rarely been linked in 
academic research. This thesis attempts to fill a gap by drawing these concepts 
together, in relation to public law and human rights, discrimination, education, 
planning and health and safety. Chapter 1 establishes frames of reference for the 
ensuing analysis of how the law can be applied to the participation of disabled people 
in sport. Some reasons for focussing the study of disability rights law on sport are 
provided; and different legal issues arising in the context of ‘mainstream’ and 
‘disability specific’ sport are explored. The chapter then considers the framework of 
sports governance, and the powers of the courts in relation to sports organisations. 
Chapter 2 examines models and definitions of disability and the fundamental purpose 
of discrimination law, as it relates to sport. It concludes that current law insufficiently 
interprets progressive models of disability. It also concludes that the political and 
legal purpose of discrimination law in this context may be better understood in terms 
of ‘social inclusion’, rather than the more orthodox concept of ‘equality’.  Chapter 3 
considers rights which indirectly impact on participation in sport and it also 
considers the possible evolution of a ‘new’ right to sport. To facilitate this, a 
comparative examination is made of three different ‘models’: 1) bills of rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, as adopted into the Law of Scotland; 2) the 
Treaty of Lisbon and the constitutional model; 3) international human rights law and 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The chapter 
concludes that it is probably too early to posit a legal right to sport for disabled 
people, but that the combined impact of other human rights have some force – in 
particular the right to be free from discrimination. Chapter 4 then explores the 
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fundamental characteristics of disability discrimination rights contained in domestic 
legislation, in the context of sports services. Enforcement mechanisms and ‘fourth 
generation’ equality law are considered. The chapter ends by noting how this area of 
the law may evolve in the light of current reforms. Chapter 5 considers disability 
education law, discussing judicial interpretation of debates about integration in, or 
segregation from, mainstream and ‘special’ sport in education. The courts may be 
justified in hesitating when they are asked to consider matters which are traditionally 
regarded as areas of public policy rather than of law. Lastly, Chapter 6 considers 
physical barriers to participation in sport by disabled people, focussing on 
discrimination issues in terms of planning and health and safety. The perception of 
the disabled athlete as a ‘threat’ to sport has influenced the way that the law has 
largely failed to protect disabled participants, specifically in relation to the ‘health 
and safety justification’ defence, which allows organisations to exclude disabled 
people from participating. 
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Introduction: disability, sport and the limits of law 
 
 
In the first decade of the new millennium, two high-profile events have drawn 
attention to legal issues that arise through disabled people’s involvement in sports. On 
29 May 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided in PGA Tour Inc. v Martin1 
that the professional golfer, Casey Martin, was entitled to use a golf cart during 
competitions, in order to accommodate the effects of his impairment, and that this 
accommodation would not ‘fundamentally alter the nature’ of the sport. On 14 
January 2008, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) 
announced its decision that it would not permit the South African sprinter Oscar 
Pistorius to compete in the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games on the grounds that his 
prosthetic limbs give him an unfair advantage over able-bodied athletes.2 
 
Casey Martin and Oscar Pistorius are both elite athletes whose physical impairments 
have required adjustments to be made to their chosen sports in order for them to 
participate in competitions with able-bodied athletes, and their circumstances are 
exceptional; nonetheless, the legal issues to which their cases give rise may apply well 
beyond their specific circumstances. Whilst the greater commercial interests involved 
in, and public focus on, elite sports tend to give rise to more contentious scenarios 
than in amateur settings, there are parallel issues identifiable within amateur sport for 
                                                          
1
 (2001) 532 U.S. 661. Casey Martin received significant media attention around the turn of the 
century, even featuring in Alistair Cook’s ‘Letter from America’ for the BBC: BBC News online, 8 
June 1999, ‘Laws doomed from the start’. 
2
 ‘Oscar Pistorius banned from Olympics’ Times Online, 14 January 2008. Pistorius has now 
successfully appealed the decision. The appeal was heard in the Court of Arbitration for Sport on 29 
and 30 April, CAS 2008/A/1480 Oscar Pistorius v/IAAF, and the decision was issued on 16 May.  
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disabled people and these issues potentially affect us all.3 In fact, the issues arising 
around disability, enhancements and other types of adjustments may extend to many 
other areas of life, leading one academic commentator to observe that: 
“Sports…highlight the importance of thinking clearly about basic goals for 
understanding how to deal with issues of disability and enhancement, of the normal 
and of the exceptional”.4      
 
The issues highlighted by Casey Martin and Oscar Pistorius allow the debate to be 
framed both for competitive and elite level sport, but also for amateur and recreational 
sport, at the other end of the spectrum. The discussion of sports governance in 
Chapter 1 demonstrates the powers to regulate participation in sport that different 
decision making bodies have, from public authorities, to sports governing bodies, 
international organisations and private clubs. However, these cases have demonstrated 
that the courts also have a new found role to play in defining and regulating different 
aspects of disabled people’s rights to participate in sport. These aspects are 
underpinned by social issues of equality and social inclusion, and they have their 
expression in legal debate about the legitimacy of technological enhancements, which 
can be seen as a specific form of ‘reasonable adjustment’ or ‘accommodation’. These 
aspects are inextricably linked to the formal social elements of sport, such as 
eligibility criteria to participate and the rules of competition. These social elements 
are found in varying degrees at all levels of sport.   
 
                                                          
3
 See chapter 1.  
4
 Greely, H T (2004) ‘Disabilities, Enhancements, and the Meaning of Sports’ 15 Stanford Law and 
Policy Review 99, at p. 132. 
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Different impairments are of course manifest very differently. As shall be seen, legal 
definitions of disability include a wide variety of impairments. There is also a 
corresponding variety of adjustments that could be made to accommodate different 
disabilities. These include adjustments to sports rules, equipment and technology, 
various aspects of the social and physical environment, eligibility criteria, and a 
variety of types of enhancement.5 Some examples of relevant cases which have been 
heard in Scottish courts have reflected this diversity, both in terms of disability and 
sports settings.   
 
The first case in Scotland involving the education provisions of Part IV of the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA), Parent A as parent and legal 
representative of the Child (Assisted Person) v East Ayrshire Council,6 concerned the 
exclusion from school of an eight-year-old child with complex needs arising from his 
being diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), oppositional 
defiance disorder (ODD) and, subsequently, Asperger’s Syndrome. During a game of 
football with other children, the child became violent and physically attacked first 
another child, and then several teachers who tried to calm him down. Based on this 
incident, the school made the decision to exclude him. The pursuer, the child’s father 
on behalf of the child, brought an action in Kilmarnock Sheriff Court7 for various 
declarators, reduction and orders for specific implement against the defenders, East 
Ayrshire Council (being the education authority which oversees the school in 
question). The pursuer’s contention was that the defenders unlawfully discriminated 
against him in terms of sections 28A and 28B of the DDA and that in failing to take 
                                                          
5
 Ibid.  
6
 (2006) SC B152/04. The pursuer has indicated his intention to appeal to the Sheriff Principal. 
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reasonable steps in accordance with their duties under section 28C, they further 
unlawfully discriminated against him in terms of section 28B (2).8 
 
This case raised a number of questions: whether the child had a disability for the 
purposes of section 1, DDA; whether the defenders discriminated against the pursuer 
by treating him less favourably than non-disabled children, contrary to section 28B 
(1) and/or in failing to draw up either/or both of a School Health Plan or a Risk 
Assessment Plan;9 and whether the defenders’ behaviour could be justified either by 
lack of knowledge of the child’s disability or by the treatment being “material” or 
“substantial”.10  
 
Sheriff Ireland’s findings were that the child was disabled at the time of his exclusion 
and that the defenders did not know, but could reasonably have been expected to 
know that he was disabled. The child’s behaviour which caused the exclusion was 
related to his disability. He was treated less favourably than other pupils to whom the 
exclusion did not apply, but that treatment was justified by a reason that was both 
“material” and “substantial” and the child was therefore not placed at a substantial 
disadvantage. Thus, the Sheriff found that there had been no unlawful discrimination 
contrary to the terms of section 28A.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7
 Section 28N, DDA, determines that Part IV cases are heard in the Sheriff Court in Scotland (and in 
the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal (SENDIST) in England and Wales. 
8
 See Chapter 5 for a fuller explanation of these sections of the DDA. 
9
 These are particular educational examples of the concept of ‘reasonable adjustments’, which is central 
to the ensuing discussion. 
10
 Section 28B (7), DDA: the school had to show that the action it took was “material to the 
circumstances of the particular case and substantial”.  
 11 
According to his note, Sheriff Ireland took account of and accepted a consensus view 
in the expert evidence that a child suffering from Asperger’s Syndrome (or being 
otherwise ‘on the autistic spectrum’) would be expected to fail to understand the 
normal rules of football and other team games. This finding is indeed backed up by 
research in the field of sports medicine which has demonstrated that children with 
Asperger’s Syndrome rarely participate in group or team sports, and that this 
observation can even be used as a means of diagnosis;11 although, conversely, team 
sports can be used as a means to teach social skills to children with Asperger’s 
Syndrome.12 
 
In assessing whether the child’s behaviour was related to his disability, and 
consequently whether there was unlawful discrimination on the part of the defenders, 
the Sheriff revealed in his note his view as to the correct question to consider: “The 
question is, was the behaviour on [the date in question] related to his disability 
namely the ability to learn and understand social matters in this case in particular 
relation to the football match”. The answer to this question was found to be ‘yes’. 
 
This approach demonstrates that Scottish courts may be willing to accept that an 
inability on the part of a disabled child to learn and understand social matters such as 
the rules of a team sport is a relevant consideration in assessing whether unlawful 
discrimination has taken place. This in turn raises the prospect that the rules in 
competitive sports might be a factor that acts to treat less favourably a disabled child 
                                                          
11
 Haney, K (2002) ‘Team Sports as a Diagnostic Measure’ 29(2) Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 
121. 
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who is participating in such sports. It should, however, be noted that this case did not 
involve competitive, fully organised football, though staff were supervising the 
activity (which appears to have been organised to a degree).  
 
As it happens, Sheriff Ireland accepted the defence that the extent to which the child’s 
behaviour posed a health and safety risk to those at the school meant that his 
exclusion from school (and, as a by-product, from participation in the sport) was 
material and substantial. In a hypothetical case, however, which did not involve 
violence and the resulting health and safety risks would the school be found to have 
unlawfully discriminated against the child?  
 
At first sight this begs the question what manner of behaviour would be sufficiently 
serious to cause the child to be excluded from school and yet insufficiently serious to 
meet the “material” and “substantial” test? All this then shows is that the justifications 
of “material” and “substantial” are relatively widely construed, and perhaps justifiably 
so. Well, perhaps that is true where exclusions from school altogether are concerned, 
but what if a disabled child broke the rules of the school sport she was playing so as to 
seriously disturb and interrupt the game, but not so as to endanger any person? It is 
conceivable that she would then be excluded from participating. It would then seem 
that the school would no longer have available the material or substantial defence, 
since there would be no health and safety issue, and accordingly the school would 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12
 Groft, M and Block, M E (2003) ‘Children with Asperger Syndrome: Implications for General 
Physical Education and Youth Sports’ 74(3) The Journal of Physical Education, Recreation and Dance’ 
38. 
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have unlawfully discriminated against the child.13 Whilst the adjustments that Casey 
Martin and Oscar Pistorius require are relatively apparent technological aids, or 
enhancements – a golf cart and prosthetic limbs, respectively – the nature of the 
adjustments required for the child in A v East Ayrshire Council may be less clear, 
reflecting the different demands of his impairments. One sort of adjustment or 
accommodation that can be made in order to enable people with learning difficulties 
to engage in sports is to provide human assistance in the form of either a support 
worker or an access worker, but it is by no means easy to see how such a worker 
would be involved and would fit in with the rules of the game.14  
 
The considerations in A v East Ayrshire Council in fact give rise to the same central 
question which has been the subject of debate in the USA since Martin, and which 
have resurfaced with Oscar Pistorius’ appearance on the world stage: to what extent 
does the law require the rules, or even the playing culture, of any sport to be changed 
in order to accommodate a disabled participant?15 The natural extension of this is the 
question as to whether it is the sport itself that is regarded as ‘problematic’ or whether 
the disabled person is legitimately seen to be the ‘problem’.  
 
Although the disabilities concerned in these three cases differ, and the required 
adjustments similarly differ, they all result in the exclusion or restriction of a disabled 
person from participating in sport in circumstances that may amount to unlawful 
                                                          
13
 Of course, other characteristics of the child are surely also relevant. For example, it is not clear that 
any eight-year old child should necessarily be expected to fully understand the rules of a complex team 
game like football, whether or not he or she is disabled. 
14
 See Devas, M (2003) ‘Support and Access in Sports and Leisure Provision’ 18(2) Disability and 
Society 231. 
15
 See Chapter 4. 
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discrimination. In determining whether or not unlawful discrimination has taken 
place, it will be necessary to establish when exclusion from participation is justified. 
Later on, it will be argued that disabled people may sometimes be perceived by 
society, and consequently by the law, as a ‘threat’ both to sport itself and to the 
interests and involvement of non-disabled participants.  
 
What is less clear is the extent to which, and the sense in which, disabled people may 
have a right to participate in sports – are such rights sufficiently strong so as to entail 
that adjustments must be made; what sorts of legal rights are applicable and how do 
they relate to sport; what sorts of reasons are there not to take account of these rights? 
Questions of definition must also be addressed – what is the legal meaning of 
‘disability’ in the context of sport; what counts as ‘sport’; and what counts as 
unlawful discrimination? These questions will be addressed in the following chapters. 
 
This thesis seeks to show that the legal controversies raised by Martin and Pistorius’ 
case are applicable to the domestic Scottish setting, which is demonstrable in such 
cases as A v East Ayrshire Council. This serves to highlight that such controversies 
are not remote and are not restricted to extraordinary individuals such as elite athletes. 
In terms of public policy, sports opportunities for disabled children and adults within 
education may be far more important than elite sport opportunities in establishing an 
overarching culture of equal access and opportunities to participate.16 Access to sport 
in education is inextricably linked to debates about segregation and integration, social 
                                                          
16
 Elite participation and opportunities for sport in education are, nonetheless, inextricably linked. A 
recent example of these issues arising was when the disability charity Mencap, and other organisations, 
successfully campaigned for the rules to be changed to permit children with learning disabilities to take 
 15 
exclusion and social inclusion and it will be necessary to venture into these debates in 
Chapter 5 in order to understand some of the deeper issues which pervade this area of 
the law.  
 
On 9 November 2007 it was announced that Glasgow had been awarded the 2014 
Commonwealth Games.17 As Scotland gears up to play host to such a large-scale, 
international sporting event, it is likely that there will be an increasing need to address 
equity in sport for disabled participants at both elite and amateur levels. Whether or 
not Oscar Pistorius is eligible to compete in the Games, the interaction between 
disability, sport and those laws contained in sources such as disability discrimination 
legislation, international human rights law and European law will continue.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
part in the UK School Games, which are regarded as a precursor to the Olympics. See BBC News 
online, 7th February 2008, ‘Youth games exclusion ‘unlawful’’.   
17
 See http://www.glasgow2014.com/. 
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Chapter 1: Sports and Disability in Scotland – the 
regulatory framework 
 
 
Introduction – Disabled People and Participation in Sport 
 
The broad topic of this thesis is disability rights law.18 Following chapters will unpack 
the law to demonstrate how rights ‘work’ in relation to participation in sport for 
disabled people, focussing in turn on several aspects of the right to be free from 
discrimination. First, however, there are two words to define: ‘participation’ and 
‘sport’. Both words will be used fairly flexibly. People participate in sport in a wide 
variety of ways: from playing sport; to spectating; to working in the sports industry; 
sports administration or in sports education. The thesis will primarily examine direct 
participation, in terms of either playing or watching sport, but that emphasis is not 
intended to exclude indirect means of participation such as employment in the sports 
industry, which share many of the issues arising.19 The second word, sport, has been 
variously defined.20 It is not necessary for the purposes of this discussion to attempt to 
arrive at a precise definition, partly because that would pre-empt the debate, since one 
                                                          
18
 Throughout this chapter, and the chapters that follow, there will be a slight focus on people with 
mental, intellectual or learning disabilities. This is partly in order to escape a common conflation of 
different sorts of disability, whether mental or physical. It is also an attempt to transcend the strictures 
of a single concept of ‘disability’. Lastly, without wishing to diminish the importance of considering 
purely physical disabilities, the characteristics of mental disabilities raise especially uncomfortable and 
challenging questions about the coherence of social and legal values and structures; as well as 
ultimately prompting us to consider what it means to be human. 
19
 Disability employment rights and discrimination law in particular is a discrete topic, which already 
has a substantial literature and history of case law devoted to it, so this topic will only be addressed 
indirectly.  
20
 For a cogent summary of what constitutes ‘sport’ see Savulescu, J (2006) ‘Justice, Fairness and 
Enhancement’ 1093 New York Academy of Sciences 321, pp.326-330. 
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of the themes is how the law grapples with the concept of sport.21 The working 
definition will, however, include both recreational and competitive sport, and will not 
enter into finer debates about whether, for example, a particular activity constitutes a 
‘game’ or ‘physical education’ (PE), rather than sport.22    
 
Focus on sport 
 
Why focus on sport? In both disability rights thinking and practice, there is very often 
an emphasis on the basics of living – shelter, food and mobility/transport. 
Consequently, the other needs of disabled people are often overlooked. Sport is often 
overlooked as a critical area of participation in society, even in the context of medico-
legal analyses of issues for disabled people.23 A similar oversight occurs in analyses 
of medico-legal sports issues, in which the topic of disability often only arises 
indirectly.24  
 
                                                          
21
 In terms of asking questions such as: how, and if, adjustments should be made for disabled people to 
the rules or the sporting environment; how inclusive sport is for disabled people; to what extent it is 
part of education; and whether there is a right to sport. This loose approach to the definition is also 
useful because it will be essential to draw on cases which may not involve sport in a material sense, but 
will involve legal principles which may be applicable in the context of sport.   
22
 An example of a suitably broad and inclusive working definition for this purpose is: “Sport means all 
forms of physical activity which, through casual and organised participation, aim at expressing or 
improving physical fitness and mental well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in 
competition at all levels” (Council of Europe (2001) European Sports Charter Brussels: Council of 
Europe.  
23
 See, for example Rich, R F, Erb, C T and Rich R A (2002) ‘Critical Legal and Policy Issues for 
People with Disabilities’ 6 DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 1. There is a good summary of ‘critical 
legal and policy issues’ at pp. 11-18 – yet there is no mention of sport. 
24
 See, for example Opie, H (2002) ‘Australian Medico-Legal Issues in Sport: The View from the 
Grandstand’ 13 Marquette Sports Law Review 113, which does mention the issue of HIV and sport, 
but from the perspective of ‘disease’, rather than disability. 
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There are a number of possible reasons for this apparent oversight. Firstly, it is only in 
very recent years that civil rights and human rights traditions have relocated from 
occupying a niche to their current position at the centre of legal debate. 
Discrimination law, as a function of civil and human rights, is even newer.25 
Disability discrimination law is newer still.26 These areas of law have yet to discover 
the extent of their possible social influence and much of the discrimination case law 
so far has centred exclusively on employment issues.27 Secondly, sports law as a 
‘serious’ discipline in its own right is also relatively new.28 Hence, the point at which 
sports law and disability rights law intersect may simply be at the vanguards of both 
disciplines.29  
                                                          
25
 In illustration of this historical point, see generally the sketch of the history of human rights in 
Shelton, D (2007) ‘An Introduction to the History of International Human Rights Law’ The George 
Washington University Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 346, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010489 (last checked December 2007). For an up to date assessment of 
disability human rights law, see Stein, M A (2007) ‘Disability Human Rights’ 95 California Law 
Review 75. For an overview of the development of discrimination law in Europe and Britain, see Bell, 
M (2004) ‘A Patchwork of Protection: the New Anti-Discrimination Law Framework’ 67 Modern Law 
Review 3. More recently, the British Government has reviewed discrimination legislation and proposes 
to create a Single Equality Bill, incorporating disability discrimination provisions – see Department for 
Communities and Local Government (2007) Discrimination Law Review: A Framework for Fairness: 
Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain London: HMSO, (available at 
www.communities.gov.uk). 
26
 The primary disability discrimination legislation under consideration (the Americans with 
Disabilities Act 1990; the Australian Disability Discrimination Act 1992; the British Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995, as amended by the Disability Discrimination Act 2005) was slowly 
formulated through the 1970s and ‘80s but did not come into force till the ‘90s. 
27
 There are a number of possible reasons for this focus. Weak enforcement mechanisms and poor 
access to justice in goods, facilities and services cases are two. 
28
 This is the case even in the USA, where the sheer size of the legal system can lead to the 
development of specialisations earlier than in other jurisdictions. See generally Lazaroff, D E (2001) 
‘The Influence of Sports Law on American Jurisprudence’ 1 Virginia Sports and Entertainment Journal 
1.  
29
 As the introduction suggests, in terms of legal history it was in 2001 that the high-profile Supreme 
Court case of PGA Tour, Inc. v Martin 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (discussed in more detail in later chapters)  
 19 
 
So should these vanguards of sports and disability rights law be permitted to reach as 
far as, and hold any influence over, this intersection between them? That is a question 
of political and legal theory which must ultimately depend on deeper questions about 
the philosophy of law, which there is not enough space to consider here.30 
Nonetheless, the following three arguments need to be considered due to the extent to 
which they inform the debates in the rest of the thesis.  
 
The first argument is premised with three simple observations. 1) Disability 
discrimination legislation has been constructed with political aims in mind.31 2) There 
is a high probability in the case of every individual that he or she will encounter 
disability first-hand at some stage in his or her life (if only towards the end of his or 
her life).32 3) It is hardly necessary to produce evidence to support the observation 
                                                                                                                                                                      
propelled into the public consciousness in the USA the issues arising at the intersection of these areas 
of law. Although, to date, there has not been quite the same level of judicial, political and public 
interest in other jurisdictions, there have been cases which raise very similar questions, and these merit 
attention. These cases will be discussed throughout the text.   
30
 These questions, however, will be addressed indirectly throughout the thesis. By way of a brief 
example of the extent of these debates – the emergence in the USA of ‘critical legal studies’ (CLS) has 
emphasised the centrality of political and ideological purpose in law, an emphasis which could be 
applied to questions such as whether or not there is a political incentive for disability discrimination 
law to regulate sport (a classic exposition of CLS is found in Kennedy, D (1979) ‘The Structure of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries’ 28 Buffalo Law Review 209). The classic ‘public versus private’ debate 
is also of relevance to the question of whether or not the law should encroach on decisions as to 
whether and how disabled people should participate in sport (see later discussion of an aspect of this 
debate). 
31
 See Chapter 2. 
32
 The frequency of the occurrence of disability in a given population obviously depends on how 
‘disability’ is defined (see Chapter 2) but some sources estimate about twenty percent of the population 
is disabled or has a long-term illness at any given time. See, for example, the Scottish Executive Report 
(2004) Social Focus on Disability Edinburgh: Scottish Executive (available at 
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that participation in sport is an important feature in the lives of a considerable 
proportion of people in society.33 It seems fair to make at least an initial conclusion 
from these observations that this intersection between disability and sport is now 
governed by law.  
 
The second argument is ‘politico-legal’. By overlooking, and neglecting to provide 
adequate legal protection for, the importance to disabled people of activities such as 
sport, society may be denying them the benefits of mainstream political goals such as 
equality and social inclusion, which are increasingly expressed by means of the law.34 
It is arguably in light of our approach to providing ‘lesser’ legal rights to such areas of 
an active cultural life as participation in sport, that the true extent of equality and 
social inclusion for disabled people is revealed. Disability rights and sport can act as a 
prism through which to assess the spectrum of possible results which this area of the 
law effects (and to assess the extent to which the law can be used as a social 
determinant).  
 
The third argument is based on empirical research, and leads to a wider discussion. 
Public health research has been able to demonstrate that, in general terms, physically 
disabled people are less likely than the general population to take part in regular 
physical activity, even though they stand to achieve greater benefits from such 
                                                                                                                                                                      
www.scotland.gov.uk/socialfocusondisability), p.5 noting that older adults have a much higher 
probability of being disabled – forty-five percent of those seventy-five years or older are disabled.  
33
 This is, however, partly revealed through the economic impact of sport in Scotland, see sportscotland 
(2007) The Economic Importance of Sport in Scotland 2004 (Research Digest No.101) Edinburgh: 
sportscotland. Sportscotland reports that sport-related consumer expenditure was 2.7% of total 
consumer expenditure in Scotland (£1.6 billion) in 2004; value added to the Scottish economy was 
1.9% of gross value added (£1.5 billion), p.3.  
34
 See further discussion of these political goals of the law in Chapter 2. 
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activity than do non-disabled people.35 Such activity includes doing sport. 
Unfortunately, this precedent seems to be set early on in life as there is also evidence 
that children with physical disabilities are at increased risk of limitations to 
participation in everyday activities such as sport.36  
 
What are the reasons for this lower level of participation amongst physically disabled 
people? One reason may be that, as sport becomes increasingly regarded as a 
commodity, disabled people are under threat of exclusion if they cannot find a way to 
fit into the consumer model.37 The ‘corporitization’ of sport and the contemporary 
obsession with high-earning elite sports stars38 means that if disabled people cannot 
reasonably aspire to take part in competitive, or even elite, sport they may be frozen 
out of the action.39 It is not enough to want to take part in sports; you have to be a 
potential sports star. This emphasis on ability begins early and some educationalists 
have pointed out that in schools the focus is invariably upon who is able, or ‘more 
suited’ to taking part in sport, and that this creates a situation where many young 
people are discriminated against on the ground of their bodily performances rather 
than upon their willingness to take part.40 If such discrimination exists, and if it causes 
                                                          
35
 Spivock, M (2007) ‘Promoting Physical Activity Among Persons with Physical Disabilities: Steps 
Towards a Population-based Perspective’ 5 International Journal of Disability, Community & 
Rehabilitation 1. 
36
 Law, M (2006) ‘Patterns of Participation in Recreational and Leisure Activities Among Children 
With Complex Needs’ 48 Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology 337. 
37
 See discussion of the ‘commodification’ of sport in Walsh, A J and Giulianotti, R (2001) ‘This 
Sporting Mammon: A Normative Critique of the Commodification of Sport 28 Journal of the 
Philosophy of Sport 53. 
38
 Ibid. p.59. 
39
 At least in the sense that coaching resources are heavily weighted towards non-disabled elite athletes, 
to the detriment of disabled sports participants at all levels and abilities. 
40
 Wellard, I (2006) ‘Re-Thinking Abilities’ 11 Sport, Education and Society 3. 
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such a ‘disparate impact’ on disabled people, it seems prima facie reasonable to 
expect the appropriate existing rights and discrimination law to be able to tackle it.  
 
The benefits of sport 
 
By way of wider discussion, why should such inequality and discrimination be 
tackled through law? It is uncontroversial to say that law must benefit society in some 
way. It is also uncontroversial to say that improving the health of humanity is a social 
‘good’, which benefits society. If sport can be linked to the social good of improving 
the health of disabled people, then it would also seem relatively uncontroversial if law 
were to help facilitate this.  
 
The health of people with intellectual disabilities is relatively undeveloped as a topic 
of study.41 Despite this, there is evidence to suggest that people with intellectual 
disabilities benefit their health through taking part in sport to an extent at least equal 
to those without such disabilities. In fact, limited access to sports activities and other 
strenuous exercise has been identified as a lifestyle-related health threat which 
particularly affects this group.42  
 
Even when their participation in sport is assured, disabled athletes with intellectual 
disabilities suffer the same problems with accessing a good standard of health that 
disabled people often experience in general. For example, research has shown that a 
                                                          
41
 See van Schrojenstein Lantman-de Valk, H M J (2005) ‘Health in People with Intellectual 
Disabilities: Current Knowledge and Gaps in Knowledge’ 18 Journal of Applied Research in 
Intellectual Disabilities 325. 
42
 Ibid. p.327. 
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high proportion of athletes with intellectual disabilities suffer from ocular and visual 
defects and often fail sufficiently to access appropriate treatment.43 Hence, there are 
two layers of inequalities the law may be equipped to address: a health threat arising 
from reduced access to sport itself; and a health threat arising from the quality of 
service and care provided once access to sport has been achieved.44 
 
In terms of physical disabilities, and musculoskeletal disabilities in particular, it has 
been demonstrated that at all levels of the main causes of disability it is possible by 
regular physical activity and exercise to prevent disease and the further consequences 
of disease.45 One example of the potential therapeutic effects of sport on people with 
physical disabilities is horseback riding in children with cerebral palsy, which some 
medical research has demonstrated may improve gross motor function.46 
  
The benefits of sport do not amount simply to a public health project to increase 
physical fitness. Sport also has potential psychological benefits for disabled people in 
terms of the sense of empowerment and self-efficacy achievable through 
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 Woodhouse, J M, Adler, P and Duignan, A (2004) ‘Vision in Athletes with Intellectual Disabilities: 
the Need for Improved Eyecare’ 48 Journal of Intellectual Disability Research 8. 
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 There should be recognition of the fact that an individual participant may experience multiple 
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 Schroll, M (1994) ‘The Main Pathway to Musculoskeletal Disability’ 4 Scandinavian Journal of 
Medicine & Science in Sports 3. 
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 See Sterba, J A (2007) ‘Does Horseback Riding Therapy or Therapy-Directed Hippotherapy 
Rehabilitate Children with Cerebral Palsy?’ 68 Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology 49; 
Sterba, J A et al (2002) ‘Horseback Riding in Children with Cerebral Palsy: Effect on Gross Motor 
Function’ 44 Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology 301. In Scotland, there is a national centre 
for therapeutic riding based at the Highland Riding Centre, Borlum Farm, by Drumnadrochit.  
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participation,47 as well as a possible improved sense of ‘body-consciousness’.48 
Lastly, in terms of social relationships, sport has an enormous capacity to unite people 
and to increase their quality of life.49 It has knock-on benefits for those close to 
disabled people who may not necessarily be disabled themselves. For example, 
participation in sport by their children has been demonstrated as decreasing the stress-
levels in parents with children who are disabled.50   
 
It could be argued that these largely utilitarian concerns should be the subject of, for 
example, public policy and educational measures, rather than of law.51 This study is, 
however, mainly an examination of the law as it stands and, as Chapter 4 suggests, 
there is evidence that disability rights law owes its existence to such concerns and that 
it should be interpreted accordingly. (If that point is not accepted, Chapter 2 also 
considers the possibility of a legal ‘right to sport’, in and of itself, irrespective of 
normative foundations of the law, or of political intent.)    
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worst off are as well off as they can be).    
 25 
 
‘Mainstream’ and disability sport 
 
The next question is: what manner of sport for disabled people should the law 
facilitate? One of the underlying themes in disability rights discourse is the question 
of what is the best approach to integrating disabled people (both individuals and 
disabled ‘communities’) into society.52 One aspect of this debate is whether, and in 
what circumstances, disabled people should participate in ‘mainstream sport’ (i.e. 
with non-disabled people) or ‘disability sport’ (with other disabled people).53 This sort 
of policy question is at the boundaries of the courts’ jurisdiction, as Casey Martin and 
Oscar Pistorius illustrate, but as will be seen in later chapters, courts have to a certain 
extent been called on to overcome their natural reluctance to answer it. There are at 
least two reasons why this question is difficult. 
 
One reason is that the comparative psychological and social effect on disabled people 
participating in sport, whether with other disabled people or with non-disabled people, 
is complex and difficult to determine. For example, the effect for people with 
intellectual disabilities on their perceived physical capacity for participating in 
integrated sport with non-disabled people, can be initially negative, but can then lead 
to greater performance and opportunities for them to participate.54    
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 For a general review of this debate, see Cummins, R A and Lau, A L D (2003) ‘Community 
Integration or Community Exposure? A Review and Discussion in Relation to People with an 
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 Varying definitions of ‘mainstream’ and ‘disability sport’ are used in the literature. The 
straightforward division outlined above, between the two types of sports participation, will be used in 
this thesis for the sake of simplicity, given the wide sense of ‘participation’ which is used. 
54
 Ninot, G, Bilard, J and Delignieres, D (2005) ‘Effects of Integrated or Segregated Sport Participation 
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Another reason is to do with a series of related questions about identity. Is it better for 
disabled athletes to take part in their own sport with specific recognition, or to be 
subsumed into a sport with wider access, including non-disabled people? Does literal 
equality of access with non-disabled athletes (rather than parallel equality of access 
with other disabled athletes) also mean loss of identity as ‘athletes with disabilities’ – 
and would that have a positive or negative impact? Although in the case of equal 
access to mainstream sport, disabled athletes would still be identifiable as disabled, 
there may be less of a beneficial emphasis on disability type than in the case of 
parallel disability sport provisions.55 The uncertainty of possible outcomes inherent in 
the weighing up of these possible advantages or disadvantages makes any decision 
about integration harder. 
 
Elite sport and enhancements  
 
There is one further distinction to make. The term ‘elite sport’ is no more than a way 
of describing high-level, competitive sport. Some disabled athletes participate in elite 
mainstream sport, whether at professional or amateur level.56 Other disabled athletes 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Research 9. See also, Dykens, E (1996) ‘Effects of Special Olympics International on Social 
Competence in Persons with Intellectual Disability’ 35 Journal of the Academy of Child and 
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 Examples of elite disabled athletes competing in mainstream competitions will be given in further 
chapters, including ‘Magic’ Johnson, Casey Martin and Oscar Pistorius. For further examples, see 
Ham, E L (1998) ‘Disabled Athletes: A Last Vestige of Court Tolerated Discrimination?’ 8 Seton Hall 
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participate in elite disability sport, which is almost invariably amateur.57 These two 
different forms of participation each give rise to their own sets of legal problems, 
which can be drawn out by considering issues surrounding the use of 
‘enhancements’.58 Enhancements in sport can take a variety of forms, some of which 
are deemed to be illegitimate and some of which are not. These include the use of 
drugs,59 sports equipment60 or artificial limbs.61 This last example is very close to the 
concept of ‘reasonable adjustment’/‘accommodation’ which is a feature of disability 
discrimination law.62 In some cases, such an enhancement or adjustment is necessary 
in order for a disabled athlete to compete in elite mainstream sport, whether it consists 
of an artificial limb or a golf cart.63 Very soon a conflict can arise between the 
athlete’s right to be free from unlawful discrimination, and the rules of the sport in 
question. This was the conflict arising in Martin, as shall be seen.  
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In elite disability sport it is generally more accepted that enhancements, beyond those 
used in mainstream equivalent sports, should be accommodated. An obvious example 
of this would be the use of wheelchairs in wheelchair basketball or tennis.64 Specific 
categories of disabilities lead to specific categories of competitive disability sport, 
such as swimming events for people with impairments to their limbs. Issues arising in 
relation to these types of sports are consequently usually to do with general rights of 
access and the availability and provision of enhancements or adjustments.65 
 
Sports Organisations and Disabled People 
 
Who makes the decision as to whom can participate in a particular sport, and how that 
decision is made, are crucial questions for disabled sportsmen and women. Very often 
in the case of organised sport, these decisions are not made by the disabled person. 
This is not only an issue within professional sports, but also within amateur sports.66 
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The regulation of the decision to include or exclude disabled people in sport is often 
made by private bodies, sports organisations, associations, clubs, etc;67 other relevant 
decision-making bodies include public authorities such as councils and education 
authorities. 
 
The influence of sports organisations for disabled people  
 
Although this thesis is primarily concerned with national and international law, rather 
than regulation at the level of sports governance, given the fundamental influence of 
sports organisations involved with sport for disabled people, the study would be 
incomplete without considering their relationship with the law (comparative reference 
will be made throughout to various sports governing bodies and other organisations).  
 
The inclusion of disabled people’s interests in the regulation of sport is very often 
lacking, although in the USA it is possible to identify a limited framework of 
disability sports governance.68 For example, the Stevens Amendment 1998 to the 
Amateur Sports Act 1978 introduced provisions for the governance of Paralympic 
sport69 in the USA, also changing the name of the legislation to the Olympic and 
Amateur Sport Act (OASA). The OASA designates the United States Olympic 
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Committee (USOC) as the ‘umbrella’ organisation for Paralympic sport; USOC can 
delegate its authority by designating in turn (where feasible and where such 
designation would serve the best interest of the sport) a national governing body for 
particular sports; and where that would be unfeasible or against the interest of the 
sport, USOC is authorized to recognise another amateur sports organisation as a 
Paralympic sports organisation.70 At the level of sports in education, there are a 
number of mainstream governing bodies which have had a significant impact on the 
participation of disabled people in sport. Prominent among these is the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), which is a voluntary organisation by which 
colleges and universities govern their athletics programmes.71 The NCAA is a 
powerful organisation, in part because of the very significant revenue which it 
generates, mainly from television and marketing rights fees.72 
 
The framework of sports governance in Scotland, and indeed in the rest of the UK, is 
typically less statutory by nature and is certainly less commercially-orientated than in 
the USA.73 Scottish Disability Sport (SDS)74 is the governing and coordinating body 
of sport and physical recreation for all people with a disability in Scotland.75 The 
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Scottish Government and the National Lottery76 fund SDS, via the non-departmental 
public body (NDPB), sportscotland (see below).77 (SDS is also a member organisation 
of the British Paralympic Association and it works closely with Scottish Local 
Authorities and Scottish sports governing bodies (SGBs)). The strategy of SDS 
consists mainly of a mixture of policy goals to promote the participation of disabled 
people in sport.78  
 
The integration debate, outlined above, necessarily plays an important part in how the 
framework of disability sports governance in Scotland is established. SDS reported in 
2006 that “[a]s a national association, [it] has fewer young people, (particularly those 
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with physical disabilities), involved in its squads and programmes than ever before”.79 
This becomes an acute debate at the level of schools and education.80  
 
The overall governing body is sportscotland, which in turn acts to regulate other 
SGBs.81 One of sportscotland’s main roles is to invest in sport development, mainly 
through the development of sporting infrastructure.82 It also decides whether or not 
something constitutes a ‘sporting activity’ based on specific criteria.83 These include 
the requirement to meet the terms of the definition of sport in the European Sports 
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Charter;84 and an established structure defined by rules and where appropriate, 
organised or international competition. The criteria also require that a sport “…must 
also demonstrate that there are no barriers to participation that could be viewed as 
creating inequity of access”.85 This latter criterion raises the interesting possibility that 
an activity could be ‘de-recognised’86 by what is the main statutory governing body 
(with all the funding and other implications that might entail) if it failed to show that 
there were no barriers to participation that could be viewed as creating ‘inequity of 
access’ for disabled people. The following chapters consider a number of instances 
which might constitute unequal access to sports for disabled people, caused by 
barriers to participation. This criterion might be worth bearing in mind for any 
disabled athlete who felt she was unlawfully discriminated against by a SGB, as she 
might also have recourse for action via a complaint to sportscotland on the grounds of 
unequal treatment.   
 
sportscotland also publishes criteria for the recognition of an SGB.87 In terms of the 
governance structure, this requires that an “…appropriate constitution and statement 
on… equity [is] in place”. This reflects the requirements of the disability equality 
duty, under the Disability Discrimination Act 2005.88 It also publishes an Equity 
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Policy, which details its policy on equality and its compliance with the statutory 
equality duties.89 SDS likewise publishes its own Equity Policy.90 
 
In England, the umbrella organisation, which acts as the equivalent of SDS, is the 
English Federation of Disability Sports (EFDS). The EFDS encompasses seven 
National Governing Bodies (NGBs) for Impairment Specific Sports.91 These are also 
important to take account of for Scottish disabled sportsmen and women, because 
some of these NGBs act across the jurisdictions.92 From a legal perspective, this 
potentially entails an element of ‘forum shopping’ – should a dispute arise over a 
decision made by an NGB, the Scottish courts are traditionally a better forum than the 
courts in England and Wales in which to obtain judicial review of a sports 
organisation’s decision-making (see below).  
 
Organisations which provide sports for disabled people and potential disputes 
 
Other than the SGBs, organisations in Scotland which provide sports services include 
local authorities (of which Scottish Education Authorities are part, governing school-
level public education);93 private educational establishments; colleges and 
universities; and of course private clubs and commercial sports organisations. All of 
these are potential defendants or respondents, should a disabled sportsperson wish to 
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raise a court action against them for an alleged wrongdoing, such as an illegal 
decision to exclude them, which has been based on discriminatory practices. 
Historically, and in broad terms, Scottish public organisations providing sports 
services and facilities have been liable to judicial review (usually in relation to 
disciplinary decisions), but the utility of purely judicial review principles, as a means 
of obtaining a remedy, in the sorts of discriminatory situations that disabled 
sportsmen and women might find themselves in, has largely been overtaken by the 
impact of human rights and discrimination law, which will be the main subject of this 
thesis.94   
 
As part of their function, sports governing bodies are often able to act as dispensers of 
alternative dispute resolution. For example, SDS provides both a code of conduct and 
disciplinary procedures.95 The code of conduct covers specific roles such as SDS 
athletes and coaches, management committee members, sports co-ordinators, and 
sport team managers.96 Complaints about the conduct of any of these can be made to 
SDS, which operates a complaints committee structure and an appeal structure.97 
 
If an appellant has his appeal dismissed, the matter may be referred to the Sports 
Dispute Resolution Panel, which is an independent body established to provide a UK-
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wide dispute resolution service to sport.98 Matters relating to international sport can 
be dealt with by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, outlined below. 
 
The Law and the Regulatory Framework 
 
The role of the courts 
 
How does the law relate to the regulatory framework outlined above? For example, 
what happens when sports organisations make the ‘wrong’ decision? Like many other 
common law countries, it is possible to judicially review the decisions of sports 
governing bodies in Scotland.99 (This is not, however, the position in England and 
Wales, where the courts have proved reluctant to recognise sports organisations as 
public bodies, amenable to judicial review.)100 What follows is a very brief review of 
the current position of judicial review in Scotland, which is designed to demonstrate 
the relation to human rights and discrimination actions, which, it will become 
apparent, are the most powerful elements of Scots law in the context of sport for 
disabled people.101 
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The status of judicial review in Scotland was summarised by Lord Hope in West v 
Secretary of State for Scotland,102  which established that, in bringing an action for 
judicial review, a party must prove the existence of a ‘tri-partite relationship’ 
“between the person or body to whom the jurisdiction, power or authority has been 
delegated or entrusted, the person or body by whom it has been delegated or entrusted 
and the person or persons in respect of or for whose benefit that jurisdiction, power or 
authority is to be exercised”.103 Hence, applying this to the framework of Scottish 
sports governance above, a disabled sportsperson who wished to have judicially 
reviewed a decision by an organisation providing sports services or facilities, such as 
a club, an SGO, or a public body such as a school, would need to demonstrate the 
existence of a tri-partite relationship within the sports governance framework. An 
example might be where the relevant decision maker is a committee of a sports club 
which has been authorised by the members of the club to take a decision to exclude an 
individual participant.104    
 
The utility of access to judicial review for the disabled sports participant is broadly 
equal to the utility of any other participant, but how likely is it that disabled people 
will wish to, or be able to, use judicial review to influence their opportunities to 
participate in sport?105 As noted above, most of the cases which involve the judicial 
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review of the decisions of governing bodies involve disciplinary procedures, and of 
course these could apply to disabled participants as much as to non-disabled 
participants.106 In some cases, however, a sports body may be found to be exercising 
its powers in an unfair or discriminatory manner and this could form the basis of 
review.107 Recently, judicial review has been used in courts in the UK in diverse 
circumstances of alleged discrimination and related human rights violations. 
Examples include reviews on the basis of: freedom to manifest one’s religious belief 
in school;108 freedom of assembly and association in fox hunting;109 and, in R (on the 
application of T) v Independent Appeal Panel for Devon County Council, alleged 
disability discrimination in the decision of a school to exclude an autistic child.110 
There is a growing body of case law which utilises both human rights and 
discrimination legislation as the basis for review, and this provides a potential 
opportunity to use the law to influence decisions made within a context of sports for 
disabled people. In R v Devon County Council, a school’s appeal panel was found not 
to have engaged with a number of key questions which it was bound to consider under 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and on that basis its decision-making process 
was unlawful. It is also possible for individuals or organisations to judicially review 
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decisions by public bodies where they have been made in breach of the positive duties 
contained in the Disability Discrimination Act 2005.  In R (on the application of 
Chavda and others) v London Borough of Harrow111 it was held that a public 
authority’s decision-making process had failed to comply with the disability equality 
duty contained in the 2005 Act. Crucially, the implications of the duty had 
insufficiently been brought to the attention of the decision makers concerned.  
 
There have been a number of recent Scottish judicial reviews of the decisions of 
sports organisations, the leading case being Crockett v Tantallon Golf Club,112 which 
concerned a review relating to the rules of a sports club and the exclusion of one of its 
members.113   Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club (and others)114 concerned the 
liability of a sports club in the context of serious injury to the pursuer. Taking the 
above issues together, these demonstrate that there may be some scope within the 
judicial review mechanism for disability human rights and discrimination arguments 
about issues arising in respect of sport for disabled people.  
 
From judicial review to human rights 
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The rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) have the 
potential to significantly impact on the regulation of sport.115 Section 6, Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) requires that UK public authorities must act in accordance 
with the ECHR and the Scotland Act 1998 also incorporates the ECHR into domestic 
law in Scotland.116 It is possible to identify two ways in which the Convention rights, 
incorporated into the law of Scotland, are likely to impact upon the activities of sports 
governing bodies.117 Firstly, by means of what can be described as the ‘horizontal 
effect’ of the HRA. Although the HRA does not explicitly extend to relationships 
between private parties, it is arguable that it can have an indirect influence on them, 
by virtue of the way in which the courts must interpret and develop pre-existing law 
in accordance with the Act.118 (By virtue of section 6(3)(a), HRA, courts count as 
public bodies which are required, by section 6(1), to act in accordance with the other 
rights in the Act.) One way of approaching this is, provided individuals can identify a 
cause of action against a SGB, or another sports organisation, they can tack on a 
Convention right to that cause of action, reminding the court of its duty to take the 
ECHR into account in interpreting all law.119  
 
Secondly, there are a number of Convention rights which could impact on the 
provision of sport for disabled people,120 and as has just been seen, the mechanism of 
judicial review is potentially amenable to enforcing those rights. How exactly does 
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that mechanism work? As noted above, section (6)(1) applies Convention rights to 
public bodies and makes it unlawful for a public authority to behave in a way contrary 
to a Convention right. The question then becomes – do sports organisations count as 
public bodies for the purposes of the HRA? In answering in the affirmative, Anderson 
says, “…it appears that the key battleground as to the public nature of the functional 
and decision-making competencies of sports organizations has been subsumed within 
an understanding of the Human Rights Act 1998, s.6.”121 
 
As noted above, whereas English courts have been reluctant to construe sports 
organisations as public bodies for the purposes of judicial review, Scottish cases such 
as Tantallon have established that they are considered to be public bodies in Scotland, 
and hence amenable to judicial review. This would suggest that the Scottish courts 
might follow a similar line with the cases under the HRA. The distinction between 
private and public functions, for human rights purposes, has been the subject of 
considerable debate during recent years, however,122 and it was only very recently that 
the House of Lords was able to decide this matter in YL v Birmingham City 
Council.123 In this case, Mance, LJ decided that the issue turned on whether functions 
performed by the body in question were such as to engage the liability of the UK 
under the Convention and it was held that the key question was whether the body was 
undertaking a ‘governmental’ function.124 It will be interesting to see how courts in 
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England and Wales, and Scotland interpret this judgment in the context of sports 
organisations.125 Palmer has argued that the House of Lords has adopted an 
unacceptably narrow approach to the meaning of public authority, but she also notes 
that there was significant dissent in the judgments, which betrays the extent to which 
this debate is a deep one about fundamentally competing ideologies.126  
 
The Court of Arbitration for Sport 
  
It is not only the domestic courts that are available for disabled athletes to pursue their 
rights. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), based in Lausanne Switzerland, is 
increasingly recognised as an emerging leader in international sports dispute 
resolution.127 Many of the cases heard in CAS have concerned drugs in elite sport 
since Rule 13.2.1 Appeals Involving International Level Athletes of the 2003 World 
Anti-Doping Code determines that such cases, involving international-level athletes 
and sports events, can be appealed there.128 Notably, Oscar Pistorius is pursuing his 
appeal against his Olympic ban by the IAAF in the CAS.129 It may become the case 
that disabled athletes who are competing internationally will increasingly make use of 
this forum when disputes arise. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
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Disabilities has now entered force and international provisions such as this may 
become increasingly relevant to CAS’s developing body of decisions.130  
 
Private sports clubs – an aside 
 
So far, there have been several indications in this chapter about the importance of 
disability discrimination law. Chapter 3 begins to look in detail at the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) and related provisions. A superficial look at the 
DDA might suggest that issues in relation to sport for disabled people would 
concentrate on the liability of sports clubs. From what has just been discussed, 
however, it may be seen that this issue is a ‘red herring’ because there are so many 
different providers of sports services, many of which are public by nature. 
Furthermore, sports ‘clubs’ which provide a service to the public, such as health or 
fitness clubs, despite being private in other respects, are subject to the less favourable 
treatment provisions and the reasonable adjustment duty under Part 3, DDA.131 
Nonetheless, regarding disabled people who wish to be involved in private sports 
clubs, the changes brought about by the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 are 
important. Section 12 inserts a new section 21F into the DDA, which entails that clubs 
with twenty-five or more members, and by which admission is regulated by a 
constitution cannot discriminate against a disabled person in the terms on which it is 
prepared to admit him to membership; or by refusing or deliberately omitting to 
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accept his application for membership.132 When a disabled person is a member of a 
club, it must not discriminate against him by depriving him of membership, or by 
varying the terms on which he is a member.133 Comparable provisions also exist for 
club associates. There has yet to be a body of case law on these provisions, but it is 
reasonable to expect that cases will generally follow some of the approaches in 
relation to the goods, facilities and services provisions.134 
 
Sports governance to human rights – from micro to macro regulation 
 
Although this chapter has been primarily concerned with establishing how the law 
interacts with the framework of sports governance, the link to human rights hopefully 
has become clearer and chapter 3 follows this lead, taking a large ‘step back’ from 
micro regulation to macro regulation issues, in order to consider in more depth human 
rights in the context of sport for disabled people.135  
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Chapter 2: Models of Disability – aims and definitions 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The first part of this chapter examines the relative merits of the medical and social 
models of disability in the context of sport. Whilst the social model of disability has 
had a significant impact on discrimination law, its primary worth is in the observation 
that external factors are what create disability. The chapter explores the argument that 
there is no necessary connection between this empirical aspect of the theory and 
normative moral or political concerns. (It is a theory about what ‘is’ and does not 
necessarily tell us what ‘ought’ to be.) Whilst it is important to acknowledge the 
social model’s contribution in relation to understanding disability as a result of 
stigma, and how that acts on the social environment – to a certain extent this may be a 
result of ignorance of the medical implications and limitations of disabled people.  
 
The second part of the chapter considers the underlying purpose of disability 
discrimination legislation in terms of three formulations of the meaning of ‘equality’, 
concluding that the concept of ‘social inclusion’ might better suit the context of sport. 
 
The medical and the social models of disability 
 
The ‘social model’ of disability has its origins in the disability rights movement of the 
1960s and 70s, although it was popularized through the work of Michael Oliver in the 
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1980s and ‘90s.136 In part, the model arose as a reaction to the medical approach to 
disability, sometimes referred to as the ‘medical model’, which was regarded as 
placing an over reliance on individual medical remedies to specific impairments. It 
also reflected a new mood of activism amongst disabled communities, which were 
casting off the traditional reliance on charitable and welfare provisions organised by 
non-disabled sectors of society. Since then, the social model has had a considerable 
impact on policy and legislation in common law countries, including the UK, the 
USA, Canada and Australia.  
 
By the 1970s, American sociologists were beginning to form a conception of 
disability that concentrated on the impact on disabled people of the social and wider 
environment, for example taking account of the effect of stigma. Yet even in 
sociological research it was still possible to note at this time that one of the 
shortcomings of sociologists working in the area of disability was their tendency to 
accept the medical model as the legitimate framework upon which to build their 
research.137  
 
A shift in thinking came when it was realised that the crucial disabling factor in the 
lives of many people with impairments was not the ‘internal’ factors to do with 
personal mental or physical ability, but the ‘external’ factors to do with how society 
treats impaired individuals, by virtue of both the socio-political structures and the 
man-made physical environment. Disability was then seen to arise through the 
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limitations imposed by society’s failure to remove barriers, whether those are 
discriminatory rules, social attitudes or architectural designs limiting accessibility. 
Thus, disability was no longer seen as the medical model sees it, simply as a 
‘problem’ for the individual, stemming from the functional limitations or 
psychological losses as a result of ‘personal tragedy’.138  
 
The social model can be placed in the wider context of the disability rights movement 
and its recognition of the social stigma experienced by disabled individuals (see 
below).139 The model helps to recognise the view of disabled activists and social 
scientists that individual and institutional behaviour towards people with disabilities is 
shaped by historical and cultural presuppositions about disability and social norms.140 
 
Hence, according to this view, the ‘disabling’ experience of an athlete with a mental 
or physical impairment might arise as a result of inadequate access to sports grounds, 
through discriminatory architectural design, or it might arise as a result of the social 
perceptions and attitudes of other athletes or sports officials leading to discriminatory 
exclusion from team games.  Each of these reasons is independent of the athlete and 
instead depends to a large degree on external factors that are under the control of 
wider society. 
 
Disability, sport and stigma 
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The observations of the social model are inextricably linked with the central impact of 
social ‘stigma’ in the lives of disabled people, which was developed as a theory by 
Goffman in the 1960s.141 Stigma arises in the case of a disabled person when negative 
assumptions are made about his characteristics so as to create a ‘virtual social 
identity’ that is different from his ‘actual social identity’. For example, in noticing her 
impaired speech patterns, society might create a virtual social identity for an athlete 
with cerebral palsy as an individual who is less capable of understanding the rules of a 
team sport; whereas in fact her normal intelligence means that her actual social 
identity entails a perfect understanding of those rules. Hence, society notices an 
attribute about the disabled person that apparently makes him different from others in 
the category of persons available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind – “in the 
extreme, a person who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak. He is thus 
reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one. 
Such an attribute is a stigma…”142 Goffman further wrote: 
 
…even while the stigmatized individual is told that he is a human being like 
everyone else, he is being told that it would be unwise to pass or to let down 
‘his’ group. In brief, he is told he is like everyone else and that he isn’t – 
although there is little agreement among spokesmen as to how much of each 
he should claim to be. This contradiction this, joke is his fate and his 
destiny.143 
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The analysis of the disability discrimination legislation in Chapter 3 revealed what 
may now be seen to be a disturbing parallel between this passage by Goffman and the 
indecisive and contradictory passages in the legislation. Disabled people are 
simultaneously treated as being the same as and different from non-disabled people, 
both by society and by the law. 
 
To what extent does the social model have implications for policy and law? 
 
The chapter now turns to a comparative look at the impact of the social model on 
disability policy and legislation in Scotland and further afield.  
 
Some of the relevant legislative provisions have been framed in terms that respond to 
the key observations of the social model. One aspect of the Australian legislation that 
highlights this is the positive action element.144 For example, section 10(5) of the 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Queensland) provides that:  
 
in determining whether a person treats, or proposes to treat a person with an 
impairment less favourably than another person is or would be treated in 
circumstances that are the same or not materially different, the fact that the 
person with the impairment may require special services or facilities is 
irrelevant. 
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Thus, the Act recognises that the responsibility for managing the impairment does not 
rest solely with the individual but is a responsibility for all in society, and that positive 
action may be required.  
 
Another example of the model’s impact is the UK’s Disability Discrimination Act 
2005, where a fundamental concern is the need for relevant public authorities to 
anticipate the specific requirements of individuals and to act to minimize their 
effective disability.145 This means that the impact on individuals of the social and 
physical environment is statutorily required to be at the forefront of the minds of 
public authority officials, and that they must act according to a ‘disability equality 
duty’. Thus, in terms of sports facilities design and management within the public 
sector, officials are statutorily required to take account of the impact on disabled 
people of everything they do and may be held liable if they do not observe these 
duties.  
 
Despite the influence of the social model in legislation, research into the 
jurisprudence of the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 suggests that the judiciary 
of the Supreme Court in the USA appears not to be fully engaging with the social 
model and are instead by and large preserving a medical model approach.146 There is 
also research to suggest that the medical model prevails in the USA at the level of 
Federal Judiciary.147 In spite of this, there are clear instances of senior judicial 
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engagement with the model in other jurisdictions – for example, the case of 
Granovsky v Canada148 in which the Supreme Court of Canada stated that: 
 
[The focus of anti-discrimination law] is not on the impairment as such, nor 
even any associated functional limitations, but is on the problematic response 
of the state to either or both of these circumstances. It is the state action that 
stigmatizes the impairment, or which attributes false or exaggerated 
importance to the functional limitations (if any), or which fails to take into 
account the [remedial and ameliorative purposes of the anti-discrimination 
provision] that creates the legally relevant human rights dimension to what 
might otherwise be a straightforward biomedical condition.149 
 
As has been seen in Chapter 3, central to both the UK’s Disability Discrimination Act 
1995 (DDA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 (ADA) is the concept of 
the need to make reasonable changes to the social and physical environment in order 
to facilitate the participation of disabled people (generally termed ‘reasonable 
adjustment’ and ‘reasonable accommodation’ respectively).150 To recap, in Martin the 
concept of reasonable accommodation could be seen in action and the key question 
was whether or not a disabled contestant should be denied the use of a golf cart on 
grounds that it would ‘fundamentally alter the nature’ of the tournaments in question 
to allow him to ride when all other contestants must walk. In Martin the use of the 
social model was evident in the examination of the social and environmental 
structures, which failed to accommodate his physical impairment and the Rules of 
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Golf were a fundamental part of those structures. From the perspective of the social 
model, what was legally objectionable was the stigmatic assumption that it was fair 
for the Rules to reflect a norm in which all participants could walk and that the Rules 
should not be altered to accommodate a disabled person who was unable to walk. 
 
This short discussion has provided some evidence to demonstrate the impact of the 
social model on law; however it would be misleading to suggest that the legislation 
completely follows this model. For example, the ADA prescribes that an individual 
has a disability if he or she has an impairment that substantially limits a major life 
activity (Sec. 12102 (2) (A)). Most of the examples given of major life activities, 
however, focus on personal, physical functioning (for example, walking, breathing, 
seeing and hearing), rather than in relation to the social environment.151 This 
corresponds better with the medical or personal model. 
 
To what extent should the social model influence policy and law? 
 
Despite its ability to describe how disability discrimination occurs in the context of 
society, and its observable impact on policy and law, the usefulness of the social 
model may have been exaggerated. There are a number of criticisms which can be 
made in this vein. 
 
One recent criticism, by Samaha, is that the social model of disability is merely an 
empirical observation and in fact it has no policy implications.152 Throughout the 
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academic literature there has been little analysis of the moral connotations of the 
social model and instead it appears simply to have been assumed that the model 
necessitates a particular set of policies.153 The mere observation that disability is to a 
large extent caused by external environmental factors does not automatically provide 
us with a set of moral norms.  
 
If this criticism is correct, what it entails is significant. This is because the increasing 
entrenchment of the social model in sociology, and academic law in more recent 
years, appears to have carried through to the world of government and policy, which 
means that policy decisions are being made without due regard to any underlying 
philosophy.154 The model is arguably so entrenched in current policy-making that the 
prospect that there may be an alternative theory is sometimes not even challenged. 
Hence, in the recent report of the Equal Opportunities Committee of the Scottish 
Parliament, it was possible merely to assert that: “The Committee acknowledges the 
differing views with regard to the definition of disability.  However, the Committee, 
throughout the inquiry, has worked to the social model of disability and is pleased to 
see it being adopted by many employers and service providers”.155   
 
The social model and moral theory 
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In order to frame a theoretical discussion about disability it is useful to ask two 
questions. 156 First, what is it to have a disability? Second, what should be done to 
address disability? Although these questions are self-evidently closely linked, the 
social model seems mainly to answer the first question, but, according to Samaha’s 
view, it does not seem to answer the second. This is not to say that there is no answer 
to the second question, but it is to ask for a further, or underlying, philosophy, which 
justifies a particular set of normative policy decisions.  
 
Most subscribers to the social model might also be expected to follow one of a 
number of moral approaches or normative frameworks. These might include 
libertarian, utilitarian and egalitarian theories.157 Whichever normative framework one 
subscribes to, in relation to disability that approach will have to address strategies to 
overcome disadvantage and to provide opportunities to participate in sport. It is at this 
juncture that, contrary to Samaha, the social model could in fact have a bearing on 
answering the second, moral question.  
 
The social model and sport 
 
Wolff uses the terminology ‘personal enhancement’ to capture those changes made to 
the person through surgery or medicine, and ‘status enhancement’ to capture changes 
to technology or laws, the built environment or public understandings.158 These 
phrases correspond to the two broadly different techniques, used to address disability, 
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of the medical and social models, respectively. In Wolff’s analysis, a varying 
combination of these enhancements constitutes strategies to combat disadvantage and 
to provide worthwhile opportunities for what he calls ‘securing social functionings’, 
in which security is understood in terms of risk. In this way, sport could be seen as a 
‘social functioning’ and the matter of securely participating in sport would depend on 
a number of specific risk factors. Following Wolff, these might be: the real possibility 
of physical harm; the fear of and anxiety about that harm; the ‘planning blight’ of 
living with uncertainty in terms of the difficulty of planning one’s life under such 
conditions; steps taken to mitigate risks; and the mere fact of being subject to risks 
that others are not.159 To these might be added the risk of experiencing a negative, 
stigmatic response from other sports participants; and the fear and anxiety triggered in 
the disabled person. 
 
Returning to the choice of enhancements, in favouring status enhancement as a 
strategy to combat disadvantage – that is, the strategy corresponding to the social 
model – one is in fact aiming at a definable moral goal – creating a society in which 
people stand as equals to one another.160 The choice of strategy should be based on its 
effectiveness in pursuing this goal. This is one possible way in which the social model 
of disability sport could be seen to have a moral underpinning and to contribute to 
moral norms. 
 
Some advantages of the medical model 
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It seems an acceptable interim conclusion that the social model is at least of some use 
in emphasising the environmental barriers which act to counter the opportunities of 
disabled people to participation in sport. It is not, however, the whole story and it is 
possibly not even the most important part of the story. In several respects, it is the 
personal or medical model which is most relevant to participation in sport. In White v 
Clitheroe Royal Grammar School,161 a boy brought a claim against his school on the 
grounds that he suffered discrimination in not being permitted to go on a planned 
water sports holiday. Part of the reason Tom was excluded from the holiday was that 
his teachers did not understand the implications of his medical condition. The teachers 
did not take advice from Tom’s doctor, despite opportunities to do so. The slight 
deference shown by the court to medical authority, in that the doctor’s opinion (or 
lack of it) was taken to be one of the key material facts in establishing unlawful 
discrimination, partly demonstrates how a medical analysis can benefit a disabled 
person, rather than hinder him.   
 
As noted above, the medical model focuses on the impairment, or the personal aspect 
of disability, and medical or technological solutions to that. In achieving full access to 
participation in sport, this is sometimes undeniably the most significant aspect. An 
example of this from the world of elite sport is the progress of the South African 
runner Oscar Pistorius.162 His prosthetic limb is a personal solution to the limitations 
of his disability, which is largely medical or technological in nature. In this way his 
disability is addressed through the use of personal enhancement. This also serves to 
highlight one of the fundamental shortcomings of the social model – an inability to 
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tackle limitations inherent in bodily impairments.163 This criticism may also be 
applied to the language of discrimination law itself – the concept of reasonable 
adjustments/accommodations may be insufficient to fully capture the subtleties of 
such inherent limitations. 
 
Leading on from this, a second possible advantage is that, because the medical model 
focuses on the personal aspect – the individual addressing his or her disability – there 
is also less of a need to identify an artificial minority group of ‘disabled’ sportspeople. 
This is not necessarily a criticism of the social model specifically, but of an aspect of 
the interpretation of the model by the disability movement in which disability 
advocates have argued that people with disabilities form a ‘discrete and insular 
minority’.164 In the case of sport, this is patently untrue. One example of this is the 
very different nature of the Paralympics (for physically disabled people) and the 
Special Olympics (for people with learning difficulties); and also the Deaflympics 
(for people with hearing impairments).165 Of course, that does not exclude the 
possibility to construe a series of discrete and insular minorities (rather than one 
disability minority) as deaf culture sometimes appears to prescribe.166 Another aspect 
of this approach to avoiding such a grouping is in the understanding that everybody is 
likely to experience disability in their lives and the idea that there is an identifiably 
discrete group of disabled people is simply wrong.  
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On the other hand, there may be political advantages in recognising a minority 
grouping, however artificial. Some disability theorists have advocated that ‘disabled 
culture’ should be encouraged and celebrated and that a person’s ‘disabled identity’ 
should be reaffirmed – that this is crucial to ensure society acknowledges people with 
disabilities.167 It seems intuitive, however, that there should be more motivation to, 
and reason for, a grouping than public relations and in this respect the medical model 
seems to have greater potential than the social model to avoid the shortcomings of a 
single classification. This is a question of purpose. In a scientific or factual meaning 
of classification it may not make sense to generalise disabled people into an artificial 
minority grouping, but it is still possible to argue that the use of generalizations in 
such a context as disability is an inevitable process in a complex society, as well as a 
useful tool in mediating social reality. (This general argument has been made by 
Schauer, and his argument is cited and applied to the context of discrimination under 
the ADA by Stein.)168  
 
Nonetheless, according to a compelling argument by MacIntyre, dependency is a 
fundamental concept in disability and we are all dependent rational animals.169 There 
is therefore no such thing as full independence as it is a matter of degree and not of 
kind. On this interpretation it does not make sense to divide individuals into the 
dependent and the independent and, likewise, to divide them into the disabled and 
non-disabled. In Chapter 3, the discussion of the future development of enhancements 
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in the field of sport for disabled people was designed to show how the disability 
discrimination legislation may turn out to be inadequate in aspects of its fundamental 
design. What such examples demonstrate is that the law may require in due course to 
re-align itself in parallel with a necessary re-alignment in the way that disability may 
come to be perceived. Central to MacIntyre’s thesis is the need to put stronger “… 
emphasis upon the vulnerability and disability that pervade human life, in early 
childhood, in old age and during those periods when we are injured or physically or 
mentally ill, and the extent of our consequent dependence on others”.170   
 
A third reason why the medical model should not be too hastily jettisoned is to do 
with stigma. As was noted above, it is important to take account of stigmatic attitudes 
held towards disabled people by society, in understanding the context of the social 
model. Much of this stigma, however, may arise less as a result of ignorance about the 
effect of the social environment and more as a result of ignorance of the medical and 
physiological limitations of specific impairments. Examples of this are to be found in 
the US instances to do with HIV-positive sportsmen.171 Wolohan argues that, in 
relation to HIV infection in the boxing ring, “[t]he question is not whether there is a 
statistically small chance that someone can transmit HIV in the boxing ring, but 
whether the fear of transmission is reasonable. If the fear is not reasonable, then the 
fighters are being denied the opportunity to box because of the unreasonable fear of 
others”.172 His point reveals the impact of the public’s misunderstanding of 
impairments and the resulting stigma, which can in turn lead to discrimination. 
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Readjusting the balance to achieve a better understanding of disability in medical 
terms may be useful in countering such stigma; whereas, if disability is regarded as 
purely the product of the environment, one risk is that society will fail to try to 
achieve a better understanding of the genuine medical implications of impairments.    
 
It has also been argued by Areheart that the fixation with the definition of disability 
itself by the courts is demonstrative of a medical model approach.173 In fact, however, 
if the medical model is about an individualised, medical, solution-based approach to 
disability, it need not be the case that the model entails a strict examination of whether 
or not somebody is disabled. After all, non-disabled people receive medical and 
technological attention. Once it is determined that a claimant qualifies for protection 
under the relevant statute, the medical model could be brought into play in helping to 
understand the discrimination element, perhaps in terms of stigma (as above). 
 
Unifying the models? 
 
Having discussed advantages and criticisms of both the social and medical models of 
disability, which are arguably the two most persistent models, it would seem to be 
time to judge between them, in respect of framing the law governing participation in 
sport. In making such an assessment, it is important to say that the models should not 
be mutually exclusive. Depending on the purpose of the law in question, aspects of 
the medical and the social model may be used.174 
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 One conclusion is that it could be helpful to fracture models of disability in order to 
piece together a more complex theoretical structure, taking account of different 
models of disability for different circumstances – for example, a social model might 
be more appropriate in an education setting;175 whereas the health and safety aspects 
of the legislation may better suit a medical model.176 Whilst the social model 
contributes an invaluable observation about the impact of the social environment, 
there are also aspects of the medical model which are suited to the application of 
discrimination law to participation in sport.   
 
The purpose behind antidiscrimination legislation 
 
The consideration of theories of ‘disability’ in turn leads to the fundamental question: 
what is disability discrimination law trying to achieve? For example, is the goal of 
antidiscrimination law to promote substantive ideals of equality between different, 
identifiable ‘minorities’; or is it limited to remedying wrongful acts of discrimination 
at the level of the individual?177 The answer to this question is usually couched in 
terms of ‘equality’.178 There is, however, a wider philosophical debate to be had about 
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where the pursuit of sport and leisure lies in our hierarchy of normative priorities,179 
and within that context it is valuable to examine discrimination law for alternative 
underlying political or moral concepts, such as ‘social inclusion’.180 Despite being 
grouped within the same statutes in Britain, Australia and America, disability 
discrimination provisions relating to participation in sport do not necessarily serve the 
same purpose as applications of discrimination law relating to other areas, such as 
employment.  
 
This section considers the relative merits of three formulations of equality: ‘formal 
equality’, ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘substantive equality’,181 and whether these 
are compatible with participation in sport, before going on to consider other 
underlying aims of discrimination law. It may be possible to identify a composite 
purpose to the legislation, depending on which aspect of life the provisions in 
question relate to. Different concepts of ‘equality’ may be postulated as underpinning 
normative values applicable to certain aspects, however, the purpose of the legislation 
as it applies to sport may be best characterised by the concept of ‘social inclusion’ 
rather than equality.  
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Formal equality 
 
The concept of ‘formal equality’ is commonly attributed to the Aristotelian premise 
that ‘likes should be treated alike’.182 Whatever its origin, the concept is firmly 
established as a maxim in contemporary British case law.183 The DDA is to a 
significant extent based on a formal conception of equality – particularly in its 
antidiscrimination provisions, which determine that disabled people should be given 
consistent, equal treatment to non-disabled people; disregarding their impairments so 
far as they are irrelevant.184 Even taking into account ‘adjustments', which is the 
second concept in the legislation examined above, the fundamental purpose of the law 
is to neutralise the effects of impairment and place the disabled person at a 
comparable starting point to a non-disabled person. As a liberal concept,185 formal 
equality requires a level of State neutrality in that what is required is simply for all 
individuals to be treated consistently.  
 
If it is assumed for the moment that formal equality is indeed the ‘be all and end all’ 
of disability discrimination law, it should now seem available to ensure that disabled 
sports participants are treated so far as possible in a fashion consistent with that to 
which non-disabled participants are treated. So, for example, public authorities could 
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provide funding for a range of sports facilities and services which are comparable to, 
although they need not be exactly the same as, those available to non-disabled 
people.186 At first this seems like a reasonable relationship between purpose and 
effect, yet formal equality suffers significant problems and limitations on a closer 
examination. 
 
One of these problems demonstrates that formal equality creates weak law, and ends 
up demanding very little for disabled people. If all that the law requires is consistent 
treatment in cases where non-disabled people are provided with an inadequate service, 
it would nonetheless still be consistent, and hence on this conception non-
discriminatory, to provide disabled people with an equally inadequate service. This 
problem was highlighted, in the context of race discrimination, by the notorious US 
case of Palmer v Thompson,187 in which the requirement under race laws to open 
swimming pools to black people simply resulted in the civic decision to close the 
pools altogether. Following a narrow conception of formal equality, the court held 
that, since both whites and blacks were now identically (badly) provided for, no 
discrimination had in fact occurred. Thus, if their requirement is to achieve formal 
equality, there is nothing to stop organisations reducing the level of service provided 
for non-disabled people until it is consistent with a previously lower level which was 
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provided for disabled people. This result, by any account, would be a perverse effect 
of the law, benefiting nobody.188    
 
A further significant limitation of formal equality is that it is inconsistent with reverse 
discrimination, which many commentators believe is an essential tool to be utilised if 
unwarranted discrimination is to be meaningfully combated.189 As soon as an 
individual or group receives discriminatory treatment in their favour, there can no 
longer be a claim to consistent treatment or formal equality. There has been 
substantial debate and judicial disagreement in the US Supreme Court, held over a 
series of prominent cases in recent decades, as to whether formal equality, or whether 
reverse discrimination should hold sway when interpreting the law.190 This argument 
has been set against several different backdrops, including: hiring policy,191 public 
procurement,192 and voting rights.193 It does not seem clear, however, that it is a 
necessary debate to be had when set against the backdrop of sport.  
 
At least in those cases where significant or costly adjustments are required in order for 
a disabled person to participate, a form of reverse discrimination appears to be the 
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only logical, and just, solution. Imagine, for example, that proportionately greater 
resources than those spent on non-disabled people, need to be spent on purchasing a 
portable pool lift for disabled swimmers.194 In terms of policy, surely few people 
would openly begrudge such spending. The reason this example seems intuitively 
unlike the case of employment is that it cannot reasonably be perceived as an instance 
of reverse discrimination which directly impacts on the ongoing competition for 
resources;195 whereas the greater intensity of competition found in the job market 
leads to a more aggressive perception that any reverse discrimination is akin to 
illegitimate favouritism. So, if it is accepted that reverse discrimination is a legitimate 
tool of disability discrimination law, it becomes apparent that since it is incompatible 
with reverse discrimination, the concept of formal equality is insufficient to describe 
what must be the aim of the law, at least in the context of sport. 
 
Equality of opportunity 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the evidence suggests that there are reasons why in general 
disabled people have fewer opportunities to take part in sport than do non-disabled 
people. It has been seen that a conception of formal equality allows only consistent 
treatment and stops short of validating reverse discrimination, both limitations 
constricting any real expansion of the opportunities available for disabled people to do 
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sport; yet how far should discrimination law be used to create such opportunities? 
Talk of ‘equality of opportunity’ is perennially popular in the realm of contemporary 
social policy,196 yet it is not clear that, for current purposes the concept of equality 
adds anything to the concept of opportunity.197 
 
Fredman characterises the aims of equality of opportunity in terms of achieving an 
equal starting point in a race to access particular social goods (which might be 
assumed for present purposes to include access to sport).198 The point of this concept 
is not to determine an outcome in which disabled people are necessarily equally 
represented in whichever area of life is at issue; instead, it may be said that “equality 
of opportunity implies that equal representation should not be precluded by social 
disadvantage.”199 Unless the background of historical disadvantage suffered by 
disabled people is taken into account and suitably neutralized, they will not be 
provided with an equal starting point. Such neutralization may even involve positive 
measures such as providing sports training opportunities sufficient to raise the skill 
level of a disabled participant to that of a non-disabled participant. Under the social 
model, could such a participant still be regarded as ‘disabled’? A relevant example of 
an impaired athlete who outperforms non-disabled athletes is the paralympian Natalie 
Du Toit who lost her left leg in an accident in 2001. Unlike Pistorius, she uses no 
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prosthetics, yet she has qualified to compete in the Beijing 2008 Olympics, preferring 
to compete against non-disabled athletes, rather than other paralympians.200 
 
To a degree, this approach accords with recent decisions by the Law Lords, who have 
shown some signs of moving beyond a traditional, formal equality approach to a more 
purposive approach to the legislation, in recognising the need to enhance protection 
against discrimination.201 In the case of Archibald v Fife County Council,202 the Lords 
held that the obligation in the DDA on employers to make reasonable adjustments 
could require them to waive standard selection procedures in order to accommodate a 
disabled job applicant.203 This judicial recognition of the positive, anticipatory 
element in the provisions, which in some instances can require the alteration of a 
policy, practice or procedure,204 suggests that the law might accommodate the concept 
that, in setting the starting point from which disabled people can strive to access 
sports, service providers should anticipate the specific needs of disabled people, 
arising from their backgrounds of past and structural discrimination, and that they 
should work to neutralize these.  
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Returning for a moment, however, to the portable pool lift example above, the point 
there was that, unlike the job market, there is no direct competition between the 
disabled swimmer and the non-disabled swimmer in accessing the social good of 
swimming (although, admittedly, there may be indirect competition concerning the 
allocation of resources). So, if there is no competition for the concept of equality of 
opportunity to regulate,205 then does the concept retain any application? In other 
words, there might well be a ‘race’ between a disabled person and a non-disabled 
person to get the job of customer services assistant, or even lifeguard, but there is 
unlikely to be a race to get into the pool. If this is the case, it no longer seems as 
important to determine an equal starting point. True, there remains the question of 
how much of the pool’s resources are spent on purchasing and maintaining the lift, as 
opposed to say extra swimming classes, but that is really a different issue. That is an 
issue about the fair or equal allocation of social goods, which is arguably a 
straightforward question of welfare and not of equal opportunities.206  
 
What is attractive about equality of opportunity is arguably more to do with the 
‘opportunity’ part of the concept, rather than the ‘equality’ part. It seems fair to both 
disabled and non-disabled people alike to think that they have the opportunity to 
participate in sport, and crucially that their level of participation is dictated by their 
personal choices rather than their circumstances.207 So long as it is possible, however, 
for discrimination law to be used to ensure that there are genuine opportunities for 
disabled people, this does not entail that those opportunities also have to be equal.       
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‘Substantive’ equality 
 
What the formal equality and equal opportunities approaches share is a disinterest in 
the end result of the various ways of treating individuals and groups that they 
advocate. Their emphasis is on fair procedures rather than fair results. In rejecting this 
disinterest in results, those liberal egalitarians who are politically committed to seeing 
through a diverse and equal representation in society across ‘minority groups’ tend to 
argue that the law must in some way reach further in attempting to achieve 
substantive social change.208  This ‘substantive’ approach to equality requires the 
State to act positively to influence change and correct the results of discrimination.209 
Whereas the underlying approaches of British and US disability discrimination 
legislation have tended to follow the concept of formal equality,210 there are aspects of 
the provisions where this substantive approach has evidently come to the fore.  
 
In the US, both affirmative action programmes and contract compliance have been 
demonstrated at times to be effective mechanisms for achieving substantive 
equality;211 and although these mechanisms have only had restricted use in Great 
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Britain outside of Northern Ireland,212 it is the substantive approach on which the 
general and specific equality duties under the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 are 
founded.213 These aspects of the law have nonetheless proved to be very contentious 
across academic, judicial and political debate (and consequently their future may be 
uncertain).214 
 
One of the main political reasons against substantive equality, argued by the concept’s 
detractors, is that what it amounts to is no more than a quota system, and that this in 
turn is an undesirable form of ‘social engineering’.215 It is true that substantive 
equality does seem to share the features of distributive justice, rather than merely 
corrective justice: the emphasis is on achieving a fair distribution of benefits for a 
disadvantaged group, rather than on compensating individuals for wrongs. Arguably 
though, all law acts as a social determinant in one way or another – in fact all law 
engineers society. To single out disability discrimination as constituting undesirable 
social engineering merely begs the question – what is desirable social engineering?   
 
The discussion about the purpose of disability discrimination legislation has now 
arrived at what might be described as a ‘no man’s land’. On one side, lie entrenched 
the conservative faction, keen to retain a procedural, formal approach to the law; on 
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the other side lie the more progressive or radical faction, aiming at a results-based, 
substantive approach.216  
 
Disability discrimination, sport and social inclusion 
 
There is a further distinction to be made between two moral and political norms which 
might be used to underpin disability discrimination law. There is, on the one hand, the 
concept of (broadly egalitarian) redistribution, as expressed by theorists such as 
Fredman and Dworkin.217 Equality of opportunity and substantive equality are, 
arguably, two versions of redistribution theory.218 Hence, it is along this redistributive 
theme that Wolff has argued that the real purpose of making ‘reasonable adjustments’ 
is to increase ‘targeted resource enhancement’ (see above).  
 
On the other hand, there is the norm of social inclusion, which, as expressed by 
Collins, has subtle differences to redistribution.219 At a nominal level, there is a 
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the major modern egalitarian approaches to equality in relation to redistribution of resources. See also 
Cohen, G A (1989) ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’ 99(4) Ethics 906.  
219
 Collins, H (2003) ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion… (p. 22 distinguishes 
redistribution and social inclusion.) See also Holmes, E (2005) ‘Anti-Discrimination Rights Without 
Equality’ 68(2) Modern Law Review 175, which also seeks to distance discrimination law from 
egalitarian distributive equality principles. 
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political argument underlying this concept, in that society should be compelled to rid 
itself of highly damaging, irrational conceptions of disability, based on stigma, 
prejudice and ignorance, in order to counter social exclusion.220 The current political 
emphasis placed on social inclusion may appear to justify this approach, but what 
exactly is meant by social inclusion?221 
 
According to Collins, social inclusion, taken as a norm which underpins disability 
discrimination law, does not have as its objective a notion of equality of welfare, but 
instead it aims at securing a minimum level of welfare for every citizen.222 Thus, the 
idea is not that the law should be used as a redistributive tool in creating entirely equal 
access to sport for disabled people, yet it still allows positive discrimination or 
favourable treatment of disabled people, at least to a certain extent.223 The concept 
therefore fits, just as well as the concept of redistributive equality does, with the aims 
of the disability equality duties, discussed in Chapter 3. So, what are its advantages? 
 
By following the principle of social inclusion, the law can be used to provide disabled 
people with at least a minimum level of participation in sport. One advantage of this 
concept over ‘equality’ is that it accords better with the idea of individual autonomy 
and integrity in choosing the extent to which people participate in sport.224 A second 
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 In Scotland, this political aim currently has wide support among disability organisations. See, for 
example, Inclusion Scotland (http://www.inclusionscotland.org/), which is a consortium of 
organisations of disabled people and disabled individuals. See Inclusion Scotland (2007) Manifesto for 
Inclusion (available on the Inclusion Scotland website).  
221
 In other words, does it have any value beyond political assertions? 
222
 Collins, H (2003) ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion… p. 22. 
223
 Ibid., p.23. 
224
 Concepts which Chapter 4 has demonstrated to be increasingly recognised in international human 
rights law. 
 74 
advantage is that, unlike a substantive, redistributive project to create participation in 
sport by disabled people on an entirely equal basis with non-disabled people, social 
inclusion does not have the same controversial resource allocation or economic 
implications. Both these advantages help to side-step the criticism of substantive 
equality that it amounts to (undesirable) social engineering. 
 
Ultimately, the root of the difficulties encountered in trying to uncover the purpose, or 
aim, behind disability discrimination law is that any aim depends on much wider 
political choices that need to be made. This is apparent in the criticism of the social 
inclusion approach made by O’Cinneide. He argues that a possible disadvantage of 
this approach is that, as a conceptual framework, it may not adequately capture the 
potential transformative effect of equality law, whereas “…the advantage of 
Fredman’s substantive equality approach is that it places the transformation of social 
structures front and centre in its account of what a coherent equality approach should 
aim to achieve”. 225 The ultimate question which society must somehow decide is to 
what extent it is desirable to transform the social structures of sport to enable greater 
(and better quality) participation in sport by disabled people. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Lastly, by way of some brief comparative academic evidence that identifying some 
sort of normative moral basis, or at least an identifiable social aim, is vital to the 
effectiveness of disability discrimination legislation – consider the position in 
Australia, as expressed by Tucker. She argues that, because there has been an absence 
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of a civil rights consciousness in Australia, this has meant that the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 was produced with very little attention from the media and 
the public of Australia and this in turn has caused the Act to have a relatively low 
impact.226 In support of this point, Harris argues that the Australian federal legislation 
grew up in a completely different climate to that of the UK or the USA.227 
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 O’Cinneide, C (2006) ‘Fumbling Towards Coherence: The Slow Evolution of Equality and Anti-
Discrimination Law in Britain’ 57 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 102, p. 108. 
226
 Tucker, B P (1995) ‘The Disability Discrimination Act: Ensuring Rights of Australians with 
Disabilities, Particularly Hearing Impairments’ 21 Monash University Law Review 15. 
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 Harris, L J (1999) ‘The Americans with Disabilities Act and Australia’s Disability Discrimination 
Act: Overcoming the Inadequacies’ 22 Loyola Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review 52. 
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Chapter 3: A Right to Sport – the impact of human rights  
 
Introduction 
 
Minority or disadvantaged groups,228 and the ethics and human rights concerning their 
participation in sport, have been the subject of recent academic discussion: including 
racial and ethnic minorities;229 women;230 and more recently, sexual-orientation 
minorities;231 and transgender individuals.232 The rights of disabled people to 
participate in sport have likewise been considered,233 but that consideration has been 
almost invariably to do with domestic discrimination law,234 which may be regarded 
as a specific application or controlling principle of particular rights, namely those of 
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 The concept of ‘minority groups’ used in association with disabled people is arguably part of the 
American civil rights tradition, whereas British theorists have more often used the concept of 
‘oppression’. Many disabled people do not identify themselves as belonging to a minority group. See 
Shakespeare, T (2006) Disability Rights and Wrongs London: Routledge (Chapter 5 in particular).  
229
 Anderson, P M (1996) ‘Racism in Sport: A Question of Ethics’ 6 Marquette Sports Law Journal 
357. 
230
 Orleans, J H (1996) ‘An End to the Odyssey: Equal Athletic Opportunities for Women’ 3 Duke 
Journal of Gender Law & Policy 131.  
231
 Osborne, B (2007) ‘“No Drinking, No Drugs, No Lesbians”: Sexual Orientation Discrimination in 
Intercollegiate Athletics’ 17 Marquette Sports Law Review 481. 
232
 McArdle, D (2008) ‘Swallows and Amazons: Or the Sporting Exception to the Gender Recognition 
Act’ 17 Social and Legal Studies 1. 
233
 Ham, E L (1998) ‘Disabled Athletes: A Last Vestige of Court Tolerated Discrimination?’ 8 Seton 
Hall Journal of Sport Law 741. 
234
 The recent expansion of American scholarship in this area can be traced to the Supreme Court 
having considered the right, under the Americans With Disabilities Act 1990, of the disabled 
professional golfer Casey Martin to use a golf cart in competition: PGA Tour Inc. v Martin (2001) 532 
U.S. 661. Amongst a multitude of papers on this case, one of the best analyses of its impact on sport is 
contained in Waterstone, M (2000) ‘Let’s Be Reasonable Here: Why the ADA Will Not Ruin 
Professional Sports’ 2000 Brigham Young University Law Review 1490 (also comparing Olinger v 
United States Golf Association 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000). For an interesting discussion of the 
impact on judicial decision-making of the expansion of law, via Martin, into the realms of rights and 
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equality and freedom from discrimination. The recent inclusion, however, of a 
provision relating to sport in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (‘the Disabilities Convention’) has contributed to what may in time 
herald a change of focus in scholarship and the study of the rights in this area.235 The 
increasing, international recognition of the concept of a general right to sport has 
recently found cautious expression in Europe, within the Treaty of Lisbon which 
contains explicit reference to the Union’s constitutional competencies, contributions 
and objectives in relation to sport, including the protection of the physical and moral 
integrity of sports participants.236  
  
Such changes in focus are evidence of what may soon prove to be a shift in thinking 
away from a reliance on the widely construed group of equality and antidiscrimination 
rights to fundamental or substantive rights for disabled sportsmen and 
sportswomen.237 These changes are also symptomatic of an expansion of rights into 
areas of life such as sport which have not previously been considered to be part of 
rights discourse, yet arguably have equally competent claims to be part of that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
sport see Schauer, F (2002) ‘The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v Casey Martin’ 2001 The 
Supreme Court Review. (See further discussion of this case in Chapter 4.)         
235
 See for example, Roy, E C (2007) ‘Aiming for Inclusive Sport: The Legal and Practical Implications 
of the United Nations’ Disability Convention for Sport, Recreation and Leisure for People with 
Disabilities’ 5 Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 1. 
236
 Prior to this, the EU has given some more meagre indications that it regarded sport as an integral 
part of social, educational and cultural considerations: these indications have included Declaration 29 
on Sport, annexed to the final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam [1997] OJ C340/136; and a Declaration, 
annexed to the Conclusions of the Nice European Council, Bulletin EU, 12-2000, on the specific 
characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe. 
237
 In this context, ‘fundamental or substantive rights’ means direct rights such as a right to sport in and 
of itself, rather than indirect rights, such as a right to sport by virtue of the right to equality or freedom 
from discrimination in, for example, the provision of sports facilities and services. 
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discourse.238 In one sense, all that is essentially meant by ‘new’ human rights in the 
modern context is those rights that were not part of the original formulation of rights 
by the UN in the early 1950s. This more recent set of rights includes the right to 
development, which was the subject of a UN Declaration in 1986.239 Without fully 
exploring the philosophical foundations of rights, but rather taking them as found in 
contemporary legal sources, it has been argued strongly that there is no inherent 
reason why new human rights should not be recognized along with existing rights in 
the overall body of international human rights law.240     
 
The cultural and historic divorce of disabled people from many aspects of non-
disabled society raises questions as to whether or not they are privy to the same rights 
as those belonging to the rest of humanity;241 and whether this divorce necessitates a 
separate claim to disability-specific rights.242 Similarly, if human rights to sport do 
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 Naturally, the ‘creation’ of new human rights is a controversial endeavour. See discussion in Alston, 
P (1984) ‘Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control’ 78 American Journal of 
International Law 607.  
239
 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 
December 1986. 
240
 See Alston, P (1988) ‘Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to 
Development’ 1 Harvard Human Rights Yearbook, p. 39.  
241
 In fact, of course, this is a profound and expansive, philosophical question, most of the content of 
which is beyond the scope of this discussion. For the ‘cutting edge’ of philosophical debate in this area 
see Nussbaum, M C and Faralli, C (2007) ‘On the New Frontiers of Justice. A Dialogue’ 20(2) Ratio 
Juris 145. A major part of Martha Nussbaum’s project is to attempt to interpret John Rawls’ theory of 
justice in a way that extends legal rights to disabled people.    
242
 The political need to recognise fundamental rights specifically for disabled people was 
demonstrated by the very fact that the UN, prior to its new Disabilities Convention, deemed it 
necessary to create a Declaration on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 1975, specifically 
declaring that persons with disabilities enjoyed all the same rights as others (General Assembly 
Resolution 3447 of 9 December 1975) (see Quinn, G (2004) Disability Rights: An American Invention 
– A Global Challenge 11th Annual Valerie Gordon Human Rights Lecture at Northeastern University, 
p.14). 
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exist, disabled people are perhaps one of the last groups to claim them, which may be 
in part due to the enduring misperception of them as individuals with impairments 
which inevitably act to limit their ability to take part in physical activities.243 
Compared to other social groups recognised by law to suffer harmful discrimination 
in this context, disabled people may experience a different type of disadvantage 
because they are regarded from the outset as illegitimate claimants to any right people 
may otherwise have to participate in sport.244 Society seems to ask: how can it make 
sense for an individual to be granted a right to do something which they are incapable 
of? Of course this makes no worldly sense, but since the question is founded on a 
gross misperception245 it merely acts as a smokescreen, hiding what must be the 
correct approach. Hence, although freedom from discrimination is not the only right, 
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 This is a misperception which arguably has its origins in the ‘individual’ or ‘medical’ model of 
disability, against which the sociology of disability of recent decades has reacted. For the classic 
account of this, see Oliver, M (1990) The Politics of Disablement Basingstoke: Macmillan and St 
Martin’s Press. 
244
 Compare, for example, transgender individuals who are misperceived as prizewinning ‘amazons’, 
whose physical performance outperforms others (McArdle, D (2007) ‘Swallows and Amazons…’, p.9); 
there is evidence that gay people are discriminated against in sport because of homophobia and a belief 
that they will tarnish the ‘image’ of the sport in question, not because they are believed to be physically 
incapable (Osborne, B (2007) ‘“No Drinking, No Drugs, No Lesbians”…’, p.486) ; racism against 
black athletes commonly involves the belief that they are physically more capable than whites (see 
Duru, N J (2007) ‘‘Friday Night ‘Lite’: How De-Racialization in the Motion Picture Friday Night 
Lights Disserves the Movement to Eradicate Racial Discrimination from American Sport’ 25 Cardozo 
Arts & Entertainment Law Journal). Perhaps the closest analogous group to disabled athletes is that of 
sportswomen who have also, at least in the past, suffered from the misperception that they are 
insufficiently robust to play sport. This may result more from the belief that women are ‘delicate, 
private and passive creatures’ (see Brake, D and Elizabeth Catlin (1996) ‘The Path of Most Resistance: 
The Long Road to Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics’ 3 Duke Journal of Gender Law 
and Policy 51) and should not subject themselves to the physical rigours of sport, rather than that they 
cannot do so.      
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 Needless to say that, any right to sport could not be an absolute right to any sport, so as to transcend 
all physical and economic limitations, but that would apply to any individual, disabled or non-disabled, 
since we are all subject to physical and economic limitations to varying degrees. 
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or part of a right, to sport that it is necessary to consider at the primary level, even at a 
secondary level disabled people may suffer discrimination in the very positing of that 
right. 
 
This chapter makes a comparative examination of the respective strengths and 
weaknesses of some human rights that may have the potential to impact on 
participation in sport by disabled people, within three overlapping legal sources of 
rights, all of which contribute to the body of law in Scotland. The first source is bills 
of rights, exemplified by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); the 
second is a constitutional model exemplified by the Treaty of Lisbon and other 
provisions such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and the third is the 
model of international public law, focussing on the UN Disabilities Convention.246 
 
Comparative Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Unlike a right to a fair trial, a right to life, or a right to free speech, a legal right to 
sport may seem intuitively less convincing. This may partly be because sport has not 
played a prominent part in the modern history of human rights. At most, sport has 
been added as a fairly trivial afterthought in the body of international human rights 
                                                          
246
 Two short points of clarification: firstly, the rights instruments under consideration in this chapter 
clearly do not fall under the traditional heading of ‘Scots law’ (primarily thought of as distinctively 
Scottish approaches to private and public law); nonetheless Scots law is best seen as a constantly 
evolving corpus, and historically it has regularly and consistently subsumed elements of the law of 
other jurisdictions; very soon these instruments may be regarded as much a part of Scots law as any 
other aspect. Secondly, the distinctions made between these different instruments, in construing them 
as separate ‘models’, is in many respects artificial and exaggerated for the purposes of the comparative 
discussion: all three models would be fairly regarded as an integral part of the law in Scotland, and 
probably as part of its modern-day constitution.   
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law which has grown up since the Second World War. The 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights does not specifically extend to sport, and this has set the 
trend which other provisions have followed.247 The European offspring of the 
Declaration, the ECHR, similarly contains no direct right to sport.248 It is only with 
the creation in 2007 of the UN Disabilities Convention249 and the EU Treaty of 
Lisbon250 that a direct right to sport (through a law which has the potential to be 
binding on states) has had any prospects of being realised. These provisions are 
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 (See further discussion below.) By way of a brief review, it should also be noted that the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) contains a right to rest and 
leisure and to take part in cultural life (which obviously relates indirectly to participation in sport); the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) contains 
antidiscrimination provisions to ensure that women are treated equally in relation to sport (Articles 10 
and 13); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) contains provisions to protect the rights of 
children to rest, leisure, play and recreational activities (Article 31), including recreation for disabled 
children with special requirements (Article 23). There are also non-binding international provisions 
such as the UNESCO Charter of Physical Education and Sport 1978 which specifies a ‘fundamental 
right’ to physical education and sport (Article 1); the Olympic Charter also claims that the practice of 
sport is a human right (Fundamental Principle 4). Although these provisions all relate to sport, they 
either refer indirectly, by virtue of sport being a subgroup of ‘leisure’, or via antidiscrimination; or they 
are non-binding. For these reasons, they are of less interest to the discussion, as they have less legal 
application than do the UN Disabilities Convention or the ECHR (or other, constitutional, law). 
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 Throughout this chapter, the term ‘direct right’ is used to refer to a specific right to participate in 
sport; and ‘indirect right’ to refer to rights which may be indirectly related to participation in sport, 
such as the right to education or the right to life. 
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 Eighty-one Member States of the United Nations and the European Community signed the 
Convention on 30 March 2007. Although the UK has signed the Convention, it has not signed the 
Optional Protocol. The Convention received its twentieth ratification on 3 April 2008, triggering its 
entry into force. (See discussion below on these two points.) 
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 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community was signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007 by representatives of the 27 
Member States. In accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty, it will have to be ratified by the Member 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements; subsequently it is expected to 
enter into force on 1 January 2009. 
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discussed later in the chapter. First, what other existing rights are applicable to the 
context of sport for disabled people (in the ECHR, in particular)?251   
 
Physical movement, development and personal integrity 
 
By contrast to a direct right to sport, a right to physical movement and physical 
development seems intuitively more akin to a fundamental right. Physical movement 
and physical development would be included in most definitions of sport – hence 
there may be a prima facie right to at least this element of sport. Botta v Italy252 
concerned a disabled man’s right to have physical barriers removed in order to access 
a beach and swim in the sea. Mr Botta argued that the barriers constituted an 
infringement of his right to respect for his private and family life, under Article 8 
ECHR.253 Although the court dismissed the application because Mr Botta resided far 
from the beach, and on these facts there was no conceivable direct link between the 
measures the state was urged to take and his private life, it held that ‘private life’ 
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 This part of the discussion will focus on the ECHR because of its applicability as a human rights 
convention in Scotland and the United Kingdom, through its incorporation via the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA) (and the Scotland Act 1998, in Scotland). The HRA applies in Scotland in the same way 
that it does in the rest of the UK but the Scotland Act creates some differences (see below).  For a 
general assessment of the impact of the ECHR in the Scottish courts, see Mullen, T et al (2005) 
‘Human Rights in the Scottish Courts’ 32 Journal of Law and Society 1. It is important not to 
overestimate the direct impact of the ECHR in the Scottish courts. According to this assessment, in 
respect of civil law actions in the ordinary courts “… there were large areas of public administration, 
including education, health care, and social security, which experienced little impact from human rights 
litigation either in terms of numbers or the nature of the issues raised, although there were some 
challenges in each of these areas” (p.157). That is not to say, however, that the only impact of human 
rights can be observed via compliance mechanisms in the courts.   
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 (1998) 26 EHRR 241; [1998] HRCD 301. 
253
 Article 8(1) states that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence”.  
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included a person’s physical and psychological integrity. According to the court, 
respect for such ‘integrity’ is due in order to ensure the development, without 
interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human 
beings.  
 
This expansive interpretation of Article 8 was affirmed by Mikulic v Croatia254 in 
which the court held that ‘private life’ includes aspects of an individual’s physical and 
social integrity which can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and 
social identity. It is surely this element of the development of personality and identity, 
within a social context, which is central to sport. Following such a line of argument 
should be approached with some amount of caution, however, as the Lord Justice 
Clerk (Gill) asserted, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Adams v Scottish 
Ministers,255 it is fallacious to argue that, because a certain activity establishes and 
develops relations with others, it is on that account within the scope of private life.256  
 
It is plausible that Article 8 forms the basis of a European human right, however 
embryonic, to benefit from the physical, psychological and social aspects of sport. 
There is scope for legal arguments to be made for the right of disabled people to 
participate in sport by appealing to the concepts of autonomy and physical (or even 
psychological) integrity. On the other hand, the application of Article 8 does seem to 
be restricted, as in Botta, by the likelihood that sport often takes place some distance 
from the home. In the recent case R (on the Application of Countryside Alliance and 
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 (2002) 46544/99; 26 February 2002. Mikulic concerned the right of the applicant to have her 
paternity established or refuted.  The court reiterated that Article 8 protects not only ‘family’ but also 
‘private’ life, which is seen as the domain of concepts including ‘integrity’. 
255
 2004 SC 665. 
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Others) v Attorney General and Another,257 the House of Lords considered whether 
the Hunting Act 2004258 was incompatible with the ECHR. It was decided that fox 
hunting, as a very public activity, was far removed from the values that Article 8 
existed to protect. Furthermore, the meaning of respect for ‘home’ in Article 8 could 
not cover land over which the owner permitted a sport to be conducted that would 
never in any ordinary usage be described as ‘home’.  Nonetheless, these aspects of the 
location and the public nature of the activity obviously depend on the sport in 
question – fox hunting has characteristics which could be distinguished from those of 
many other sports. Lord Bingham was dismissive of any material proximity between 
the activity of fox hunting and any notions, developed in decided cases, of privacy, 
personal autonomy and choice and the private sphere reserved to the individual.259 On 
the other hand, the Court in Adams was persuaded that “…certain aspects of 
foxhunting support the view that it forms part of private life; for example, the fact that 
it is the principal leisure pursuit for many people and is therefore an aspect of the 
development and fulfilment of their personalities; and the fact that it affords them the 
opportunity of forming social relationships…”260 There are, no doubt, many examples 
of disabled athletes, in a variety of disciplines, for whom their chosen sports form 
these aspects of their private lives, and this potentially opens up the possibility of 
utilising such arguments in establishing their rights.   
 
Almost simultaneously with the judgment in the Countryside Alliance case, the 
positive interpretation of the right to private life, as it might be applied to sport, 
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 Ibid. para 63.  
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 [2007] UKHL. 
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 This Act prohibits the hunting with dogs of certain wild mammals including foxes and hares. 
259
 Lord Bingham, para 15. 
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appears to have been reflected in the Treaty of Lisbon: the amended, ex Article 149 of 
the EC Treaty now provides a duty for Member States to protect “…the physical and 
moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen…” It remains to be seen exactly how 
this provision will be interpreted, but it does seem that both European Human Rights 
Law and European Community Law now contain a general duty to protect the rights 
of participants (including disabled participants) in sport, at least in terms of the 
concept of integrity (see below).261 
 
The right to education 
 
Perhaps a case could also be made that sport, as an integral part of standard school 
and college curricula, is included in the right to education. At first sight, this approach 
seems on firm ground, as the right to education is widely recognised in public 
international law, as well as constitutional and domestic law.262 On closer 
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 Lord Justice Clerk, para 65. 
261
 It may also be possible to combine the ‘integrity’ aspect of Article 8 with the right to freedom of 
association in Article 11, ECHR, for example in arguing for inclusive education and environmental 
accessibility in the context of sport. Though there does not yet appear to be disability rights case law 
which attempts this, the combination of these rights was included in the submissions in the Countryside 
Alliance case, above.  
262
 In terms of public law, Protocol 1, Article 2 ECHR states that “no person shall be denied the right to 
education”; see also the right to education in Articles 28 and 29 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC) (Article 28(1) requires States Parties to “recognize the right of the 
child to education”); Article 13 UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. In 
terms of constitutional law, a number of state courts in the USA have found a ‘fundamental right’ to 
education in state constitutions (for an analysis of the history of a state constitutional right to education, 
see Eastman, J C (2006) ‘Adequacy and the Rights Revolution: Reinterpreting the Education Clauses in 
State Constitutions’ in West, M R and Peters, P E (eds) School Money Trials: the Legal Pursuit of 
Educational Adequacy Washington DC: Brookings)). For rights to education in Scottish domestic law 
see the discussion in Chapter 6 (and for an interesting comparison of the rights in the CRC with 
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examination, however, the law hesitates to specify particular aspects of education, 
such as sport, as the subject of legal rights. 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, in the USA there is a uniquely highly-developed system of 
interscholastic sports, regulated at college-level by the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA). At high school level, State sports associations exercise 
individual control. In Mississippi High School Activities Association, Inc. v 
Coleman,263 one such association excluded a student athlete from participating in 
sport.264 The question arose as to whether there was a constitutional right to 
participate in athletics. It was held that there was no such right. Instead, the courts 
appear to view participation in interscholastic athletics as no more than a ‘unilateral 
expectation’ on the part of the student athlete.265 Accordingly, the details of 
participation in sport are often left to be worked out by the associations and other 
regulatory bodies. 
 
In Europe, where there is a much less well developed framework of sport in education 
through sports associations than there is in the USA, it also appears hard to extract an 
indirect right to sport from the right to education. The requirement under Article 2 
                                                                                                                                                                      
domestic provisions in the USA see American Bar Association (1998) ‘State Education Law Compared 
to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ 5 Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty 241).    
263
 631 So. 2d 768 (Miss. 1994). 
264
 The grounds for the exclusion were to do with the Association’s policy to prevent ‘school 
shopping’, in which a student athlete determines which school they will attend based on the positive 
effect the athletics programme at that school will have on his or her career. This helps create 
competition by ensuring sporting talent is spread across different schools.  
265
 See the earlier case, Mississippi High School Activities Association, Inc. v Farris 501 So. 2d 393 
(Miss. 1987). See further discussion of Coleman and Farris and the right to sport more generally in 
Chango, W N (1996) ‘The Right to Participate in Interscholastic High School Athletics’ 6 Seton Hall 
Journal of Sport Law 251. 
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Protocol 1, ECHR that “no person shall be denied the right to education”, has been 
construed broadly to ensure that there is wide discretion provided to EU Member 
States as to exactly how they provide education.266 Although the UK Government 
accepts that the right includes access to existing state educational institutions, 
McIntyre v UK267 demonstrated that it is not taken to be an absolute right, and does 
not require access to be made available to every classroom. This approach suggests 
that the right also stops short of requiring access to particular sports.268   
 
Healthcare and the right to life 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, policies and laws which control and regulate the 
participation of disabled people in sport are motivated by potential health benefits. 
The close link between sport and health suggests a possible connection between a 
legal right to life (which is often expressed in terms of right to ‘health’ or even 
‘healthcare’) and a right to sport, particularly in cases where participation in sport has 
been shown to be therapeutic (such as the case of therapeutic horse-riding for people 
with cerebral palsy, see Chapter 1), or where there is another strong public health or 
preventative aspect. Article 2, ECHR provides a right to life.269 This right is well 
established as including an obligation not simply to refrain from taking life, but to 
take appropriate steps to safeguard life.270 It may be possible to utilise Article 2 
arguments to support arguments for the provision of sport for disabled people. 
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 The ECHR is incorporated in UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
267
 (1995) 29046/95; 21 October 1998. 
268
 This will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5.  
269
 Article 2, ECHR provides that “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law”. 
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The extent of the Article 2 obligation to take preventative steps was recognised in 
Osman v UK271 to increase in relation to the immediacy of the risk to life. This 
relationship between the right to life and the risk to life is a potential stumbling block 
for any project to extend the right to sport, because (normally) the health benefits of 
sport are not especially immediate. A second potential stumbling block is that the 
scope of the positive obligation under Article 2 has been found, in the case of 
Edwards v UK,272  to require to be interpreted in a way which does not impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. It is not completely 
inconceivable that the immediacy of particular health benefits to a disabled person 
would be significant enough to satisfy the right to health (and given that the burden to 
the authorities of providing the sport was proportionate). For example, his or her 
doctor might advise an individual with a heart-related disability, or a stroke survivor, 
that they should urgently take part in an exercise-based risk reduction programme. 
This might lead to an argument for a right to access sports facilities. Nonetheless, in 
the majority of instances, it may be difficult to persuade the courts that both the 
immediacy of the risk to life through lack of participation, and the proportionality in 
terms of the costs of providing access to sport, is sufficient to give rise to a right to 
sport via the right to life under the ECHR. Furthermore, those in such a position are 
unlikely to absolutely require access to any specialist facilities in order to enjoy the 
immediate health benefits of exercise.   
 
One further point is that Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Civil Rights (ICESCR) states that the right to health includes “… the enjoyment 
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of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”.273 A possible line of 
argument following this provision is this. The ICESCR recognises a right to the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. It is generally considered 
that participation in sport (or at least physical exercise) plays an important part in 
raising and maintaining a high standard of health (and athletes are often considered 
amongst the healthiest people in society). Thus, there could be a claim to an indirect 
right to participate in sport, in the pursuit of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health. Of course, this is an inherently weaker right, because unlike the 
ECHR, the ICESCR is not enforceable either through ‘vertical’ or ‘horizontal’ effect 
in the Scottish courts, but it could be woven into a wider argument about access to 
sport.      
 
Social life, association and segregation 
 
One of the major social barriers faced by disabled people is created by the impact of 
segregation.274 Article 11, ECHR, provides that everyone has the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others.275 The Countryside 
Alliance case, however, does not provide much hope for an application to sport of the 
right to freedom of assembly, since the House of Lords made it clear that the 
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appellants’ position was the same as that of other people who wish to assemble in a 
public space for sporting or recreational purposes – it fell short of the kind of 
assembly whose protection was fundamental to the proper functioning of a modern 
democracy.276 Although the right to freedom of association with others has not been 
interpreted by the courts to include simply enjoying the company of others (at least in 
the setting of prisoners’ rights),277 it is qualified by the right to form or be affiliated 
with a group or organisation pursuing particular aims.278 Such groups or organisations 
would probably include sports organisations, which means that there is at least a 
limited right for disabled people to freely associate in that context. This is, however, 
more identifiable as a right to be free from state or other interference, rather than a 
right which imposes obligations to provide sport for disabled people (and as such it 
has more limited application). 
 
The right to be free from discrimination 
 
There are a variety of antidiscrimination provisions contained in public international 
law, constitutional law279 and domestic law (the major discrimination legislation will 
be considered in following chapters).280 In terms of the public law with the most 
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forceful application in Scotland, the antidiscrimination provision in Article 14, 
ECHR, can be utilised in conjunction with any of the other Convention rights.281 
Although Article 14 provides no freestanding protection of discrimination, it is 
important to recognise that it is not entirely unsubstantive and does not serve simply 
to ‘inform’ or ‘expand on’ the meaning of other ECHR rights.282 Hence, for example, 
if Scotland decided to promote one of the Convention rights, discussed above, beyond 
the requirements of the ECHR (perhaps to create a substantive right to participate in 
sport), it would still have to do so equally.283 In this way, any substantive right to 
sport at a primary level would entail a right, at the secondary level, not to be 
discriminated against. Another important point, which distinguishes the Article 14 
right from other, domestic, discrimination law, is that what constitutes unlawful 
discrimination is fundamentally defined by the European jurisprudential concept of 
‘proportionality’.284 One way of thinking of European antidiscrimination rights, as 
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‘paradigm’ (rather than within the framework of disability discrimination) (see the development of 
such a paradigm in Stein, M A (2007) ‘Disability Human Rights’ 95 California Law Review 75), this 
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opposed to the other, perhaps more substantive, rights also considered in this chapter, 
is in terms of a ‘controlling principle’.285 They act as a regulator, to ensure formal 
equality; they do not necessarily, however, recognise ‘positive discrimination’ rights 
or ‘reasonable adjustments’, stopping short of the rights in domestic legislation (see 
the next chapter).286 (Protocol 12, ECHR creates a ‘freestanding right’ to equality, but 
it has yet to be ratified by the UK.)287 
 
Lastly, it should be remembered that the antidiscrimination and other rights under the 
ECHR (and other conventions) do not exist in a ‘vacuum’. From the point of view of 
a potential litigant, there is no reason why human rights arguments cannot be 
combined with reference to, for example, the disability equality duty under the 
Disability Discrimination Act 2005288 in establishing rights for disabled people to take 
part in sport.289  
                                                                                                                                                                      
120/78, Rewe Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopoverwaltung fur Branntwein [1979] ECR 649 (“Cassis de 
Dijon”); and Article 5, EC Treaty, which contains a statement of the importance of proportionality. 
(Proportionality is also in some respects, and in different contexts, analogous to the US public law 
concepts of ‘rational basis’ and ‘strict scrutiny’ review. Strict scrutiny requires that a discriminatory 
law or administrative act has to further a compelling state interest, according to the most narrowly 
tailored means possible, see Korematsu v United States (1994) 323 US 214.) 
285
 See Quinn, G (2004) ‘Disability Rights – An American Invention – a Global Challenge’ 11th Annual 
Valerie Gordan Human Rights Lecture at Northeastern University Law School, USA, p.21. 
286
 The effect of Article 14, ECHR is generally recognised to be relatively weak (see Allen, R and 
Crasnow, R (2002) Employment Law and Human Rights Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.193).  
287
 Protocol 12 states: “(1) The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
(2) No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those 
mentioned in paragraph 1”. 
288
 See Chapter 4. 
289
 The greater use of combined disability human rights arguments in British courts has been advocated 
by the prominent human rights barrister Helen Mountfield of Matrix Chambers, London (Mountfield, 
H (2006) ‘Human Rights and Disability Discrimination’, presentation at the ‘DDA Masterclass’, 4 May 
 93 
 
 
 
Towards a British Bill of Rights 
 
Developments in recent years have given rise to demonstrable political support in the 
UK for the creation of a British Bill of Rights.290 It is not yet clear which rights this 
bill would encompass but there have been calls in some quarters to create further 
economic, social and cultural rights (similar to those contained in the ECHR) which 
may turn out to be a richer source of rights relevant to sport for disabled people.291 
 
As Allen argues, if it were easy to identify ‘fitting’ or ‘appropriate’ rights then there 
would be little cause to hesitate in casting them in stone.292 He observes: “Why not 
bind future legislatures and generations by an entrenched and overriding list of rights 
when the appropriateness of one list, over others, is evident?” For example, although 
it is admittedly unlikely that either the Scottish or UK Parliament will create such a 
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right in the near future, would it be possible for us to choose as appropriate an 
entrenched right to participate in sport for disabled people?293 This leads to further 
difficult questions. Are rights to participate in sport the sort of rights that we would 
wish to entrench? How would such a right, as entrenched in a constitution rank; and to 
who would it apply? (The difficulties experienced in answering these questions are 
also probably one of the reasons for the judicial caution exercised in interpreting the 
ECHR, which is noted above.) Judges may well be right to construe such rights 
narrowly – in terms of policy it is probably better to experience cautious judicial 
interpretation than create a binding right. 
 
But what lessons can be learned from other jurisdictions in this regard? Penney 
suggests that the worth of the constitutional approach encapsulated by the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms294 is in the saturating effect of provisions, such as the 
section 15 right to equality, in that they are able to soak into mainstream structural 
and institutional barriers, rather than make individual accommodations on a case-by-
case basis.295 Arguably, it is the general nature of these constitutional rights which 
allows them to have this effect – make the rights too specific and they lose this value.  
 
This is not mere futuristic speculation as the focus of the rights contained in the HRA 
on civil and political rights, to the neglect of economic, social and cultural rights, has 
led commentators to describe the Act as only ‘half built’.296 What sort of rights should 
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be included in a new bill of rights? It is by no means easy to obtain consensus in 
answering this question, even amongst disability rights organisations, and it is 
unlikely that such organisations would wish to include a right to sport in any shape or 
form.297 Disabled Scots may have to look further afield for such a right. 
 
Constitutional rights 
 
There is a strong historical link between the human rights tradition of economic, 
social and political rights and constitutional law.298 The Constitution of the United 
States (in particular, Article XIV) is an obvious example of this link.299 Although 
amended on a number of occasions over the years, the protections in the US 
Constitution are far from anything as specific as a right to sport. The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) is one of the key modern examples of the 
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constitutional protection of human rights.300 By this stage in the history of human 
rights, the impact of the American civil rights movement and the (then) recent 
emergence of discrimination law meant that the aspects of the Canadian model, which 
are most relevant to this discussion, were centred on the concept of ‘equality’.301 The 
political popularity of a constitutional approach has endured and, closer to home; the 
Scotland Act 1998 now ensures that all new legislation passed by the Scottish 
Ministers has to be compatible with the ECHR, and also compatible with rights 
contained in European Community law.302 Meanwhile, the Treaty of Lisbon was 
signed on 13 December 2007 and it arguably introduces what amounts to a new 
constitution for the European Union. There are specific provisions on sport which 
have implications for the law and sport for disabled people. In this brief narrative it 
may be possible to identify an evolution into a body of constitutional law that is 
increasingly receptive to the sort of rights under consideration.     
 
The Treaty of Lisbon and the European constitution 
 
Despite a strong degree of political reluctance in the UK, the European Union is 
forging ahead with the development of its own written constitution. The Treaty of 
Lisbon is the latest significant European development with particular implications for 
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equality rights;303 however the Treaty also introduces a number of constitutional 
policy provisions specifically relating to sport. Firstly, it should be noted that the EU 
has provided sport as one of its policy ‘competencies’, but in what sense can it be said 
that European constitutional law now contains a right to sport for disabled people?  
 
In political terms, it is possible to identify a shift over recent years in the EU’s 
approach to sport from what was a concentration on Single Market concerns, 
focussing almost exclusively on economic aspects of sport and the laws of the Single 
Market, to increased socio-cultural considerations.304 Some European institutions now 
look to sport as a tool for specific policy areas such as health or social inclusion.305 
This trend can be seen clearly in the Commission’s recent White Paper on Sport.306 
The Paper says that the “…European institutions have recognised the specificity of 
the role sport plays in European society, based on volunteer driven structures, in terms 
of health education, social integration, and culture”.307 The Action Plan 
accompanying the Commission’s White Paper on Sport specifically addresses action 
to be taken in respect of sport for disabled people under the heading “Social inclusion 
in and through sport”: “(16) In the Action Plan on the European Union Disability 
Strategy, take into account the importance of sport for disabled people and support 
                                                                                                                                                                      
legislation, or to do any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible with any of the 
Convention rights or with Community law”.  
303
 See discussion of equality rights in this context in Bell, M (2004) ‘Equality and the European Union 
Constitution’ 33 Industrial Law Journal 3. Also note that Bell was writing before political pressures 
meant that the constitution text was revised into a draft Reform Treaty, after signing now also known 
as the Treaty of Lisbon. 
304
 See Parrish, R (2003) ‘The Politics of Sports Regulation in the European Union’ 10(2) Journal of 
European Public Policy. 
305
 Garcia, B (2007) ‘From Regulation to Governance and Representation: Agenda-Setting and the 
EU’s Involvement in Sport’ 5(1) Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, paragraph 38.  
306
 Commission of the European Communities (2007) White Paper on Sport Brussels. 
 98 
Member State action in this field”.308 While these ‘soft law’ statements are perhaps 
little more than indications of the current direction of European sports policy, they are 
beginning to be ‘hardened’ into legally substantive treaty provisions which may be 
seen to contribute to the collection of rights to sport for disabled people.  The Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 2(6) states: “The Union shall have 
competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of 
the Member States. The areas of such action shall, at European level [include] 
education, vocational training, youth and sport…”  
 
Furthermore, there is a new set of insertions in ex Article 149 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, now Article 165 of the Consolidated Version 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which introduce the 
following policy duties:  
 
The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, 
while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on 
voluntary activity and its social and educational function… 
 
…Union action shall be aimed at… developing the European dimension in 
sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and 
cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the 
physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the 
youngest sportsmen and sportswomen. 
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These amendments, however, come under the heading: “Education, vocational 
training, youth and sport”. This suggests the legislative intention that, insofar as sport 
has a new socio-cultural, legal status identifiable in EU law, that status may be 
restricted to the learning environment and the development of young people.  
 
Perhaps crucially, Article 165 now imposes an obligation on the Union to aim to act 
to protect the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen. This 
positive obligation seems to parallel the emergence in European Human Rights case 
law of the concept of integrity, which has been applied to sports and leisure scenarios 
in cases such as Botta (above), although it does not amount to a human right in the 
traditional sense. It is hard to see how this provision alone might be justiciable, but 
reference to it may nonetheless help to add depth to a rights-based argument in a 
court, or in a campaigning or advocacy context.      
 
Van den Bogaert has argued that the potential importance of such Treaty provisions 
remains primarily in their usefulness in clarifying the ‘legal environment’ of sport, 
rather than providing specific protections.309 So far, the European Commission and 
the Court of First Instance have generally only dealt with sports cases on the grounds 
of aspects of competition law,310 it is however possible that the introduction of these 
new provisions will open up another dimension to sports litigation at European level, 
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at least in the context of education (once the Treaty’s amendments come into force in 
2009).311 It may be too early to tell what the impact of these constitutional provisions 
would be on sport for disabled people in Scotland, although it is likely to be a broad 
impact, in terms of EU-backed policy rather than readily accessible legal arguments. 
Nonetheless, in an admittedly limited way, sport is now enshrined as part of the 
European constitution, in provisions by which disabled sportsmen and sportswomen 
can claim a right to have their ‘physical and moral integrity’ protected.     
 
The Canadian perspective 
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms enshrines a number of ‘fundamental 
freedoms’ and ‘equality rights’ which extend to people with mental or physical 
disabilities.312 There is no specific right to sport; nevertheless, is such a constitutional 
structure, which involves an entrenched charter (or bill of rights), amenable to 
disability rights and participation in sport?  
 
There are two related characteristics of the Canadian Charter which are immediately 
noticeable. One characteristic is that it tends to be very general in the terms of its 
provisions, focussing on fundamental rights and not detailing how these rights should 
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work.313 Another characteristic is that the Charter effectively hands a massive amount 
of power over social policy to an unrepresentative judiciary.314 Allan has identified 
these characteristics as part of the ‘liberal’s quandary’ – how to entrench fundamental 
rights without surrendering crucial control over the content, scope and relative 
ranking of these rights.315 Even in cases where there is a relevant statutory process,316 
which governs the particular social, economic, or cultural rights at issue, the courts 
can exercise their control by utilising the constitutional rights in the Charter to 
override statute where there is conflict.317 A relevant example of this is Eaton v Brant 
Co. Board of Education,318 which concerned the decision of the Ontario Special 
Education Tribunal confirming the special education placement of a disabled child, 
contrary to the parents’ wishes. The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the 
equality guarantee in section 15 of the Charter overrides this decision.319 As will 
become apparent in subsequent chapters, ‘equality’ or discrimination law, as applied 
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to the issue of integration or segregation in education, is of significance to 
opportunities for Scottish disabled students to participate in sport, where analogous 
scenarios to the one in Eaton can occur.320 As noted above, if Scotland were to be 
subject to a constitutional bill of rights it is not at all clear that sport and disability 
rights would easily fit into such an instrument. 
 
The next point to make is that the most powerful provision for present purposes is the 
‘equality’ provision contained in section 15 of the Charter. Arguably, such guarantees 
can never be as useful as the equivalent domestic provisions, such as the DDA, 
because, due to the characteristics noted above, they are insufficiently specific. (In 
fact, this is also the argument the UK Government has used for failing to ratify 
Protocol 12, ECHR – see above.) 
 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
 
The United Kingdom is one of the first countries to have signed the UN Disabilities 
Convention in March 2007 (though not the Optional Protocol),321 although it is not yet 
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clear how soon the UK will ratify it.322 The Convention has reasonable prospects to be 
an effective legal tool at a national level. In spite of the existence of national 
legislation which is stronger than it, such as the DDA, the worth of the Convention 
may prove to be in non-traditional legal procedures which could be used as a catalyst 
for policy change and monitoring by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Unfortunately, the utility of the Convention may be limited by inherent difficulties of 
monitoring and enforcement, which are problems associated with other international 
instruments, and also by potential flaws in the way it is drafted. Nonetheless, through 
the creation of Article 30.5, the Convention has gone some way to creating a new 
right to sport for disabled people.323 
 
Why have another Convention? 
 
It might be asked why there needs to be a UN Convention specifically for disabled 
people – after all, disabled people’s rights have been protected by the previous seven 
UN treaties.324 One reason is that what has gone before has largely amounted to 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women 1979; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984; the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989; and the 
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indirect protection, by virtue of disabled people enjoying the universal rights 
applicable to all humanity. In fact, it is only the most recent of the UN treaties, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which contains a specific provision 
(Article 23) dealing with the rights of disabled people.325 The purpose of the 
Disability Convention is therefore not to grant new rights to disabled people as such; 
rather, its aim is to increase the likelihood of disabled people benefiting in practice 
from the rights which have already been conferred on them by existing UN human 
rights instruments.326 Two broad arguments have been advanced for creating the 
Convention. Firstly, it has been argued that its purpose is to increase the visibility of 
disabled people in the human rights arena.327 The Convention should encourage 
societies to associate disabled people with human rights and to disassociate them from 
the negative, demeaning stereotype of being the mere recipients of welfare or charity. 
Secondly, it has been argued that the Convention will provide necessary clarity and 
focus in relation to how existing international human rights are conferred in the 
context of disability. To a certain extent, the Convention consolidates the rights in the 
previous UN treaties, but it also goes further, by establishing disability-specific rights. 
One of these is Article 30.5. 
 
Does Article 30.5 contain a new right to sport for disabled people?  
                                                                                                                                                                      
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families 1990. 
325
 Disabled people are also specifically listed in the equality clause (Article 2) as a group who must not 
be discriminated against in their enjoyment of the rights in question. 
326
 See Lawson, A (2005) ‘The UN Draft Disability Convention: Turning Rights into Realities?’, p.7. 
(Presented at the Commonwealth Law Association Conference, 13 September 2005.) 
327
 Quinn, G and Degener, T et al (2002) Human Rights and Disability: The Current Use and Future 
Potential of UN Human Rights Instruments in the Context of Disability New York: United Nations, 
paragraph 13.2. 
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Although there are a number of Articles in the Convention which indirectly relate to 
rights to sport,328 Article 30.5 is specifically devoted to physical activity and makes 
explicit reference to sport. Its significance at national level is that countries which 
ratify the Convention will be obliged to ensure there are national measures taken to 
satisfy the terms of this Article, or to provide evidence that its requirements are 
already met. Article 30.5 reads as follows: 
 
5. With a view to enabling persons with disabilities to participate on 
an equal basis with others in recreational, leisure and sporting 
activities, States Parties shall take appropriate measures:  
(a) To encourage and promote the participation, to the fullest extent 
possible, of persons with disabilities in mainstream sporting activities 
at all levels; 
(b) To ensure that persons with disabilities have an opportunity to 
organize, develop and participate in disability-specific sporting and 
recreational activities and, to this end, encourage the provision, on an 
equal basis with others, of appropriate instruction, training and 
resources; 
(c) To ensure that persons with disabilities have access to sporting, 
recreational and tourism venues; 
                                                          
328
 Other relevant provisions include obligations on States Parties to recognise: “… the right of persons 
with disabilities to education” (Article 24); “… persons with disabilities have the right to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health without discrimination on the basis of disability” (Article 
25). (See the discussion above, which focuses on the equivalent rights in the ECHR.)     
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(d) To ensure that children with disabilities have equal access with 
other children to participation in play, recreation and leisure and 
sporting activities, including those activities in the school system; 
(e) To ensure that persons with disabilities have access to services 
from those involved in the organization of recreational, tourism, 
leisure and sporting activities. 
 
In relation to Article 30.5 (a) there is no further explanation of what the words 
‘encourage and promote’ mean in practice and this part of the Article could be 
immediately criticised for being indeterminate. How might it apply to Scotland? 
 
Firstly, one of the ways in which participation in sport could be encouraged and 
promoted in Scotland is through anticipating the specific needs of disabled individuals 
and translating those needs into practical steps. Two of the major barriers to 
participating in sport faced by people with a disability are the fear of suffering 
discrimination and the lack of appropriate facilities.329 These may be well-founded 
fears as research suggests that societies routinely stigmatise disabled sports 
participants, whereas, conversely, participation in sport can play an important role in 
overcoming social stigmas associated with disabilities.330 So long as sports providers 
successfully communicate that they have anticipated and met specific needs, they 
could potentially go some way to removing barriers and consequently act to 
encourage and promote participation.  
                                                          
329
 sportscotland (2001) Sport and People with a Disability: Aiming at Social Inclusion Edinburgh: 
sportscotland. See further discussion of barriers to participation in Chapter 6. 
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Secondly, the wording ‘…to the fullest extent possible,’ bears some comparison with 
the concepts of ‘reasonable adjustment’ or ‘reasonable accommodation’ found in the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, 
respectively.331 It allows the body making the changes and allowing participation, to 
act within reasonable parameters of cost, time and effort. However, the positive action 
element in the DED may even exceed this requirement of the Convention. The spirit 
of the underpinning principle in the DED is characterised by the need to make 
adjustments and to take steps which go beyond the ordinary provision of services.332 
The requirement to encourage and promote participation ‘to the fullest extent 
possible’ may be a weakness in the drafting of the Convention in that it could be used 
by States Parties as a ‘get-out clause’, who might plead, for example, lack of funding. 
By comparison, the wide application of the DED introduced by the 2005 Act helps 
meet this requirement by transferring responsibility to the sub-State level and placing 
it on a statutory footing. In terms of impact then, the Article 30.5 ‘right’ to sport may 
be weaker than these general statutory rights.  
 
Article 7(1) of the Convention determines that: “States Parties shall take all necessary 
measures to ensure the full enjoyment by children with disabilities of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children”. However, a 
question arises as to whether this covers participation in sport. As a result of a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
330
 See discussion in Taub D et al (1999) ‘Stigma Management Through Participation in Sport and 
Physical Activity: Experiences of Male College Students with Physical Disabilities’ 52 Human 
Relations 1469. Also, see further discussion of ‘stigma’ in Chapter 2. 
331
 See Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of these concepts, as they arise in domestic legislation. 
332
 See Disability Rights Commission The Duty to Promote Disability Equality: Code of Practice for 
Scotland, London: TSO, Paragraph 1.10. 
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comment made by the European Union during the Sixth Ad Hoc Session,333 the 
preamble to Article 30 was changed from “States Parties recognize the right of 
persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others…” to “With a view to enabling 
persons with disabilities to participate on an equal basis with others…”334 This 
suggests that it was the intention of the drafters to ensure that there is no fundamental 
‘right’ to participate in sport in the Convention. Thus, read in conjunction with each 
other, these articles entail, not only that States Parties are not under a fundamental 
obligation to provide sports, but that they need not even take all necessary measures 
to ensure that children participate in sport on an equal basis with others. 
 
Drafting Weaknesses in the Convention  
 
One weakness in the Convention is the possibility of States Parties to amend the 
Convention, under Article 47, and also to ‘opt out’ of certain provisions of the 
Convention, potentially enabling States to ‘pick and choose’.335 An example of this is 
                                                          
333
 See Roy, Elise C (2007) ‘The Legal and Practical…’, p.8 
334
 See the Report of the Sixth Adhoc Session, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc6docs/ahc6reporte.pdf. This records, at Paragraph 143: 
“143. There was general support to amend the chapeau to make it clear that the paragraph does not 
refer to an existing right to participate in sport and leisure activities. It now reads: “4. With a view to 
enabling persons with disabilities to participate on an equal basis as others in recreational, leisure and 
sporting activities, States Parties shall take appropriate measures to:” 
335
 On the one hand, this is a drawback, which is very hard to overcome, and may be seen as a generic 
difficulty encountered by most international conventions. For example, the UN Optional Protocol to the 
CRC requires States Parties to set a higher minimum age for recruitment than the age of fifteen set in 
the Convention and to "take all feasible measures to ensure that under 18s do not take a direct part in 
hostilities" (Article 1). On signing the Optional Protocol on 7 September 2000, the UK government 
entered a declaration that it would retain the right to send under eighteens into frontline battle where 
"there is a genuine military need," or if "it is not practicable to withdraw such persons before 
deployment” (see Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2003) Explanatory Memorandum on the 
Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child London: Foreign and 
 109
the ‘opt out’ by the UK of the Optional Protocol, which has some implications for 
enforcement (see above). 
 
Perhaps one of the greatest weaknesses in the Convention, however, resides in 
conceptual definitions. At the centre of any disability rights law is the question of how 
disability is defined. From a Scottish perspective, the definition of disability in the 
Convention is problematic and may even be seriously flawed. One aspect of this 
criticism is that the Convention fails to sufficiently recognise the distinction to be 
made between those disabled persons who have legal capacity and those who do not 
have legal capacity. Article 12(2) concerns equal recognition before the law and says 
that “States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity 
on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life”. This is discordant with domestic 
legislation – in fact Scotland has an entire Act devoted to implications of the 
distinction between adults who have legal capacity and those who do not: the Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. In Section 1(6) of the 2000 Act, “incapable” 
means incapable of acting; or making decisions; or communicating decisions; or 
understanding decisions; or retaining the memory of decisions. Article 12(2) of the 
Convention whitewashes this issue with a universal statement that all persons with 
disabilities enjoy legal capacity.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Commonwealth Office.) Arguably, this effectively amounts to a unilateral opt out to principles of the 
Protocol. On the other hand, it might be argued that providing a facility to opt out partially defeats the 
purpose of this particular Convention which is to provide a comprehensive set of disability rights and 
not a menu of options from which states may pick and choose. Once again, the impact of this can be 
related to the effective dissemination of information in terms of reports and would need to be 
considered in light of the relative impact of civil society in different states. If the Convention is 
administrated effectively by the UN, it should be apparent to all which parts of the Convention a state 
has opted out of and this could act as a deterrent through force of public opinion. 
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The terms of the 2000 Act apply to the essential administrative matters of an adult’s 
life (financial arrangements, welfare provisions, medical treatment etc.) rather than 
the current concern with participation in sport. Nonetheless, this inability to achieve a 
coherent definition of disability in the Convention betrays a further potential 
weakness – namely, that there is insufficient recognition that in reality there is not one 
type of disability but manifold disabilities discernible across the spectrum of 
individuals. All of these need be taken into account it is especially important to 
recognise that there are crucial differences in the needs and requirements of physically 
disabled individuals and those who have mental disabilities. The definition of 
disability is fundamental throughout all aspects of disability law – this is one area in 
which the Convention might have taken the opportunity to lay down one rule for all to 
follow – so, in that, it may have failed. One reason which might have influenced the 
decision not to include such a definition, is that it could be extremely difficult to reach 
sufficient consensus on what amounts to a disability. At its 8th Session, the Ad Hoc 
Committee considered a paper detailing different legal definitions of disability in 
some forty states and organisations.336 One option to deal with this would have been 
to include a relatively open definition of disability, but this option appears to have 
been rejected in favour of a more demanding definition, which does not accord with 
domestic law. It remains to be seen whether the UK will ratify the Convention in spite 
of these problems with the definition, although arguably Scotland should at least opt 
out of Article 12(2). 
 
                                                          
336
 Eighth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International 
Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities 14 - 25 
August and 5 December 2006 – Definition of Disability in Selected National Legislation 
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To what extent could disabled sports participants in Scotland make use of the 
Convention? 
 
The Convention is the first disability-specific international convention which is 
legally binding.337  The goals of such a human rights convention are, however, in 
many respects distinct from the formal legal systems of States Parties.338 The 
Convention is an example of an area of international law the effectiveness of which 
could be realised by ‘campaigning organisations’, such as disability rights NGOs and 
charities, rather than being limited to enforcement through national courts.339 
According to Moore, a characteristic of the international human rights system that is 
supported by the UN is its four-way relationship between individuals (whose interest 
the system protects), states, the UN, and NGOs.340  
 
The Convention as a catalyst 
 
                                                          
337
 There has, however, been a series of earlier international provisions concerning disability rights, 
dating from 1971 – most recently, The Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons 
with Disabilities (Standard Rules). In order of date, these include: The United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (1971); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Disabled 
Persons (1975); World Program for Action Concerning Disabled Persons (1982); Tallin Guidelines for 
Action on Human Resources Development in the Field of Disability (1990); Principles for the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (1991); and the 
Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (Standard Rules) 
(1993). 
338
 Roy, Elise C (2007) ‘The Legal and Practical Implications…’ 
339
 For example, the Edinburgh-based charity for physically disabled people, ‘ecas’, has been 
campaigning (since its foundation in 1902) for better rights and access to various areas of life, 
including sport. See its website http://www.ecas-edinburgh.org/. 
340
 This model is developed and explored further in Moore, D H (2004) ‘Agency Costs in International 
Human Rights’ 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 491. 
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One of the less formal ways in which a human rights Convention can be an effective 
legal tool is in acting as a catalyst to state action,341 for example in developing 
national ‘benchmarks’ – this involves building an awareness of disability sports 
participation practices in different countries, identifying best practice, and 
implementing change. This means that Scotland can both benefit from and contribute 
to the practices of other States Parties. For example, as detailed in Chapter 1, 
sportscotland342 is the government agency for sport in Scotland. Its Single Equity 
Scheme343 could be used as a benchmark for promoting the participation of disabled 
people in sport.  
 
Sportscotland’s Single Equity Scheme344 incorporates a disability equality policy, in 
accordance with the requirements of the Disability Discrimination Act 2005. The 
Scheme reports on how advisory groups of disabled persons have been set up to 
inform policy and procedural change. This is in accordance with the philosophy of the 
‘disability movement’ to involve disabled people in law reform and policy 
formulation, encapsulated by the slogan ‘nothing about us, without us’,345 which was 
reaffirmed throughout the drafting process of the Convention. It is this sort of 
                                                          
341
 For an explanation of the CRC can act as a ‘catalyst’ to state action, see Davis, M F and Powell, R 
(2003) ‘The International Convention on the Rights of the Child: a Catalyst for Innovative Childcare 
Policies’ 25 Human Rights Quarterly 689. 
342
 See an explanation of sportscotland in Chapter 1. 
343
 sportscotland (2006) Single Equity Scheme: Promoting Equality of Opportunity in Sport Edinburgh: 
sportscotland. Public authorities are required to produce and publish a Disability Equality Scheme 
under the Disability Discrimination (Public Authorities) (Statutory Duties) (Scotland) Regulations 
2005 SI No 565 (Regulations 2, 4 and 5).  
344
 See the Appendix. 
345
 See, for example, the Department of Health Strategy for Learning Disability 
<http://www.publications.doh.gov.uk/learningdisabilities/access/nothingabout/nothing2.htm> 
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document that could feasibly be referred to when, and if, the UK reports to the UN 
Committee (see below).  Although this policy ‘benchmark’ was in any event reached 
as a result of domestic legislation, the Convention, as another legal frame of 
reference, could also act as a catalyst to this type of national policy scheme.  
 
The reporting process 
 
Fundamental to the effectiveness of using the Convention as a catalyst, however, is 
the ability not only to easily share information but also to accurately report on and 
evaluate the current provisions for participation in sport in each of the States Parties. 
Like other UN instruments, the Convention can also hold states accountable at the 
international level through committee scrutiny of reports.346  
 
The UN has learnt from the experiences of other UN Committees such as the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) and has subsequently 
produced a handbook to States Party reporting.347 The CRC Committee’s 
effectiveness was initially plagued by severe problems of information management, 
                                                          
346
 Article 34 establishes a Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. At entry into force of 
the Convention (when it has been ratified by twenty states) the Committee is composed of twelve 
experts, and, when the Convention is ratified by a further sixty states, this number increases to 
eighteen. Under Article 34 (3), they “… shall be of high moral standing and recognized competence 
and experience in the field… ” and they are elected by States Parties for a term of four years. Of 
course, a Committee is only as effective as its membership composition permits – and allowing 
election of the members by States Parties could be a weakness as much as it could be one of its 
strengths – but this procedure is not without precedent in the UN, and has been used to enforce, for 
example, the CRC. 
347
 United Nations (1997) Manual on Human Rights Reporting (HRI/PUB/91/1 (Rev.1), Geneva.) 
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compounded by generic UN under-funding.348 Very large volumes of information 
were submitted by States Parties. These factors meant that the CRC Committee was 
limited to considering six or seven States Parties’ reports at any one session, with 
sessions initially scheduled merely twice annually. A slow rate of report analysis 
combined with inadequate information management obviously has the potential to 
hamstring the effectiveness of the reporting system. The answer to these difficulties 
may lie in the rapid and well-documented improvements in information technology 
over the intervening years and in particular the availability of information on the 
internet.349 Access to authoritative report information, by not just government bodies 
and NGOs but also members of the public of States Parties, is arguably one of the 
most powerful aspects of the Convention. Article 4.3 says that States Parties must 
closely consult with and actively involve persons with disabilities, including children 
with disabilities, through their representative organisations. Article 36(4) dictates that 
‘States Parties shall make their reports widely available to the public in their own 
countries and facilitate access to the suggestions and general recommendations 
relating to these reports’. Examples of relevant NGOs in Scotland, which might 
contribute to this process, include the disability charity Ecas, which campaigns for 
higher levels of participation for disabled people in activities such as sport. 350 
 
                                                          
348
 Cohen, C P, Hart, S N and Kosloske, S M (1996) ‘Monitoring the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: the Challenge of Information Management’ 18 Human Rights Quarterly 445. 
349
 See, for example, the United Nations website ‘enable’ http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/; and 
the International Disability and Development Consortium http://www.iddc.org.uk/cdrom/index.htm. 
350
 For further information see the organisation’s websites: http://www.ecas-edinburgh.org/. ecas 
sponsors research reports in a number of areas, which examine the ‘state of play’ in respect of, for 
example, service provision and access issues. 
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If the Committee does succeed in direct communication with NGOs and the wider 
public, the effectiveness of its reporting function in influencing the governments of 
States Parties could be substantially amplified. The reporting process of the CRC 
Committee has received criticism on this point. For example, Woll argues that “the 
process… has generally not been used as an opportunity to raise awareness about 
children and their rights, to further understanding of the responsibilities for 
implementation of the CRC, to create more ownership of the CRC throughout 
government, and to engage with civil society”.351 If governments consequently fail to 
make use of the concluding observations in the reports, opportunities for policy 
change will inevitably be lost. Therefore, promoting joint ownership of the reporting 
process between governments and non-governmental parties is one of the aims that 
the Committee must have.  
 
Non-governmental organisations 
 
The Committee will have to consider not only the submitted material itself but also 
the accuracy and honesty of the reports. NGOs should be given the opportunity to 
take part in the preparation of reports and may introduce a welcome element of 
independence in reporting. Article 36(5) concerns the consideration of reports and 
allows the Committee to transmit reports to other bodies such as specialized agencies 
for technical advice and assistance. Another tool with which the accuracy and or 
honesty of the reports may be ascertained, and through which the Convention may be 
                                                          
351
 Woll, Lisa (2002) ‘Reporting to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child A Catalyst for 
Domestic Debate and Policy Change’ 8 International Journal of Children’s Rights 73. 
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enforced, is the use of ‘shadow reports’.352 These are reports compiled and written by 
campaigning organisations and may be used to influence public opinion and instigate 
change in their own right. There are pitfalls, however, and NGOs should be aware of 
the potential to be “co-opted”.353 In order to preserve their voice independent of 
government, NGOs must avoid the danger of exchanging the opportunity to take part 
in compiling a government report for the ability to prepare their own report. To this 
extent, the effectiveness of the Convention depends on the presence and power of 
relevant NGOs in each country. 
 
In conclusion to this chapter, it is probably too early to posit an enforceable legal right 
to sport for disabled people, but the combined impact of other human rights may have 
some impact. One of these is the right to be free from discrimination, and it is to this 
particular right that the next chapter turns.  
                                                          
352
 For example, International Disability Rights Monitor (2003) International Disability Rights 
Compendium Washington DC: Center for International Rehabilitation. 
353
 Ibid. 
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Chapter 4: Equal Participation – disability 
discrimination legislation and sport 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As a detailed, domestic application of human rights law, antidiscrimination legislation 
is perhaps the most powerful aspect of the law in Scotland – and indeed in other 
jurisdictions – relating to disability and sport. The legislative provisions which are the 
focus of this chapter include the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA),354 as 
amended by the Disability Discrimination Act 2005, and, by way of comparison, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 (ADA).355 Unlike the majority of research on 
disability discrimination law, which deals with employment provisions, this chapter 
concentrates on the provision of facilities and services – a focus which has been 
dubbed ‘the untold story’ of disability discrimination legislation.356 
 
                                                          
354
 Part 3, DDA, concerns the provision of goods, facilities and services. It relates directly to 
opportunities, in terms of facilities such as sports grounds and services such as coaching, for disabled 
people to participate by doing sports. Part 1 concerns the meaning and definition of ‘disability’ (see 
Chapter 2). Part 2 concerns employment, which impacts on indirect participation in sport, through, for 
example, management or the provision of sports services, and direct participation in professional sport 
(see the distinctions in Chapter 1). Part 4 concerns education (the subject of Chapter 6). Part 5 concerns 
transport (the availability of adequate transport is certainly an issue which impacts on opportunities to 
play sport – it is, however, a general issue, arising in very many areas of the lives of disabled people, 
which raises limited questions that are specific to sport, and for these reasons is not considered in this 
thesis.) 
355
 Title II applies to ‘public programs’ and services; and Title III applies to private entities which 
constitute places of ‘public accommodation’. Between them, these two titles are roughly the equivalent 
of Part 3, DDA. 
356
 See Waterstone, M (2005) ‘The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans With Disabilities Act’ 58 
Vanderbilt Law Review 6. Waterstone notes the lack of American research in this area, compared to a 
large body of scholarship on the employment law aspects of disability discrimination law. 
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The chapter first reviews the fundamental characteristics of disability discrimination 
rights contained in domestic legislation.357 It examines the main concepts of 
‘discrimination’ and ‘adjustments’ (accommodations) in the context of sport. 
Enforcement mechanisms and ‘fourth generation’ equality law are then considered – 
specifically through a comparative analysis of the possible impact on sport of the 
disability equality duties, introduced by the 2005 Act. The chapter concludes by 
considering how this area of the law may evolve in the light of current reforms. 
 
Discrimination, reasonable adjustments and sport 
 
Two types of unlawful discrimination 
 
Firstly, it is possible to identify two main types of unlawful disability 
discrimination358 which are tackled by disability discrimination legislation – and it is 
helpful to separate these out conceptually.359 One type of unlawful discrimination 
                                                          
357
 Other important features of disability discrimination law are examined in the following chapters – 
including the definition of ‘disability’ (Chapter 2); the education provisions (Chapter 5); the impact on 
the physical environment and elements of the ‘health and safety justification’ defence (Chapter 6). 
358
 Note also that ‘victimisation’ is a special form of unlawful disability discrimination recognised by 
section 55, DDA, in the context of employment and in goods, facilities and services. Essentially, this 
provision entails that a service provider (or employer) unlawfully discriminates against a disabled 
person if he treats them less favourably due to that person having brought proceedings under the DDA 
against him (or having given evidence or information in connection with such proceedings; or done 
anything under the Act in relation to him; or alleged that he has contravened the Act; or that he believes 
or suspects that the disabled person has done or intends to do any of those things, section 55(2)).       
359
 Separating out these concepts has been a long-standing project in the literature on the ADA. With 
reference to the ensuing discussion, above, see: Karlan, P and Rutherglen, G (1996) ‘Disabilities, 
Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation’ 46 Duke Law Journal 1, p.9 (arguing that ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ (the American equivalent of ‘adjustments’) is a ‘separate species’ of discrimination); 
and Kelman, M (2001) ‘Market Discrimination and Groups’ 53 Stanford Law Review 833, p.852 
(arguing that it is appropriate to think that those seeking protection from simple discrimination possess 
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arises where, although there may be no adjustment necessary for a disabled person to 
be able to take part in sport, she suffers direct discrimination through being treated 
differently from a non-disabled person, for a reason related to her disability (and in 
circumstances where this treatment cannot be justified). A second type of unlawful 
discrimination occurs when the would-be sports participant requires reasonable 
adjustments to be made to the service or facilities in question and the provider of 
these has failed, without justification, to make them.  
 
Examples of these types of discrimination are most commonly revealed through 
litigation in the field of employment. The first sort is a form of ‘direct discrimination’ 
and claims can arise where a disabled employee is dismissed from work. Hence, in 
Goodwin v The Patent Office,360 the appellant had been dismissed following 
complaints from fellow employees about his behaviour (the appeal then turned on 
whether or not he was disabled for the purposes of the DDA). This act of excluding 
from employment, for a reason which may relate to a person’s disability, has its 
equivalent in the exclusion of disabled people from sport, which also may amount to 
unlawful discrimination.  
 
The second type of unlawful discrimination arose in Archibald v Fife Council,361 
where the Law Lords ruled that Fife Council had been under a duty to make 
reasonable adjustments to Mrs Archibald’s employment, when she could no longer 
                                                                                                                                                                      
‘rights’ claims, while those seeking accommodations are making ‘distributive’ claims). Note also that 
this project is inextricably linked to the theoretical purpose of discrimination law. Roughly speaking, 
discrimination can be aligned with more traditional ‘formal equality’ approaches; whereas adjustments 
can be aligned with more a more ‘substantive’ approach (see Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion). 
360
 [1999] ICR 302. 
361
 [2004] UKHL 32; [2004] 4 All ER 303. 
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perform the duties in her present job, on account of disability. A similar duty might 
arise in the context of sport, on the part of a service provider, to offer an alternative 
sports programme to a disabled athlete if his current programme were no longer 
suitable. More commonly, however, necessary adjustments may simply require 
physical alterations to the playing environment. 
   
It is also illustrative to fit these two types of discrimination into ‘sameness’ and 
‘difference’ models of discrimination.362 For a disabled sportsperson who has 
fundamentally the same requirements as a non-disabled sportsperson in order to take 
part in a specific sport, unlawful discrimination of the first type occurs when he is, 
unjustifiably, treated differently. (As in the case example below, this can occur when 
there is a misperception about the impact of his impairment.) Conversely, for a 
disabled sportsperson who has different requirements (an additional aid, for example) 
in order to participate in a specific sport, unlawful discrimination occurs when she is 
treated the same as a non-disabled person, but her difference is not taken account of 
by making adjustments.  
 
Whereas the layman and lawyer alike often find the sameness model relatively easy to 
comprehend – perhaps due to its simple appeal to the principle of treating ‘likes 
alike’363 – the difference model is much more controversial and some have argued 
that its requirement to provide ‘special treatment’ to disabled people marks it out as 
the antithesis of other discrimination statutes (such as those for race and sex).364 
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 Karlan, P and Rutherglen, G (1996) ‘Disabilities, Discrimination…’ p.10. 
363
 See the discussion of ‘formal equality’ in Chapter 2. 
364
 See discussion in Crossley, M (2004) ‘Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the 
Antidiscrimination Project’ 35 Rutgers Law Journal 861, pp.872-873. (Broadly speaking, 
 121
Nonetheless, there is judicial recognition of the difference model in both US and 
Scottish caselaw. In the US case Regents of California v Bakke, Blackmun, J said a 
difference model requires that “[i]n order to get beyond [an individual’s disability], 
we must first take account of [that disability]. There is no other way. And in order to 
treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.”365 In the Scottish case 
Archibald v Fife Council, Hale, LJ took this idea even further: 
 
The 1995 Act…does not regard the differences between disabled people and 
others as irrelevant. It does not expect each to be treated in the same way. It 
expects reasonable adjustments to be made to cater for the special needs of 
disabled people. It necessarily entails an element of more favourable 
treatment.366 
 
Hence, fully taking account of a disabled sportsperson’s ‘differences’, in order to treat 
her equally, involves not simply treating her differently from a non-disabled person, 
but also more favourably.367 As will become apparent, the disability discrimination 
legislation incorporates the two types of discrimination outlined above; and it 
embraces both the sameness and difference models.  
 
White v Clitheroe Royal Grammar School368 
                                                                                                                                                                      
discrimination based on other grounds, such as race or sex, is premised on the idea that difference 
should be ignored.) 
365
 (1978) 438 US 265, paragraph 407. (Quoted in Karlan, P and Rutherglen, G (1996) ‘Disabilities, 
Discrimination…’ p.10.) 
366
 Ibid. Paragraph 47. 
367
 The concept of more favourable treatment has since been incorporated into the DDA by the 
amending 2005 Act (see below). 
368
 (2002) in the Preston County Court, Claim No. BB 002640 (unreported). 
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The English county court case White v Clitheroe Royal Grammar School is an 
illustration of how the first type of unlawful discrimination can arise when a disabled 
person wishes to participate in sport (in this case, mainstream amateur sport) and is 
treated less favourably than a non-disabled person on grounds related to his disability.  
 
In this case it was held that Tom White was discriminated against by his school, for 
reasons related to his diabetes, in being refused permission to go on a water sports 
holiday. The school was unable to justify this treatment on grounds of health and 
safety.369 The facts were that Tom was an insulin dependent diabetic of Type 1; this 
meant that he was at continued risk of suffering a hypoglycaemic coma if the level of 
glucose in his blood fell too low.370 To ensure this did not happen, he had to regularly 
monitor his glucose levels. It was agreed by both sides that, on a previous sports trip 
organised by the school, Tom had irresponsibly failed to take proper readings and, his 
glucose level having lowered, had fallen into a coma.  
 
In terms of the school’s refusal to provide a service under section 20, DDA (see 
below), Ashton, J identified three questions to ask in this case: 
 
(a) was the decision to exclude Tom from the planned watersports holiday for 
a reason that related to his disability; and if so 
                                                          
369
 See the comparative discussion of health and safety justification defences in Chapter 6. 
370
 Insulin dependent diabetics control their condition by regularly injecting insulin which reduces the 
level of glucose in their blood stream (the diabetes being manifest in an imbalance in the level of 
glucose). Diabetics require to lower the level because if it is allowed to remain too high, there can be 
long-term damage to their health. 
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(b) was he treated less favourably than others without diabetes in the refusal 
to allow him to participate in that holiday; and if so 
(c) can the School show that this treatment was justified at the time the 
decision was made by the reasonably held opinion that it was necessary in 
order not to endanger the health or safety of Tom or any other person?371 
 
In relation to question (a), the school argued that they had based their decision to 
exclude Tom on his prior irresponsible behaviour, which provided evidence as to the 
level of risk posed, were he allowed on this latest trip; and that this decision was 
unrelated to his disability. Ashton, J was unconvinced by this argument – Tom’s 
irresponsibility only arose in the context of diabetes management and the feared 
consequence would be another coma, “…so the exclusion decision was inextricably 
related to the disability”.372     
 
The connection between an individual’s disability and the reason for his treatment has 
since been examined in detail in Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of 
Lewisham (Appellants) v Malcolm (Respondent).373 Although this case concerned the 
housing provisions in the DDA, it is also likely to stand as authority for interpreting 
other parts of the legislation, because the relevant provisions use virtually identical 
language. Mr Malcolm (M), who was schizophrenic, sublet his property, in breach of 
covenant, which would ordinarily entitle Lewisham (L) to take possession. The 
question was whether the DDA offered M a defence.  
 
                                                          
371
 Ashton, J at paragraph 34. 
372
 Ashton, J at paragraph 35. 
373
 [2008] UKHL 43. 
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Section 24(1), DDA provided that L would have unlawfully discriminated against M, 
on the basis that “for a reason which relates to the disabled person’s disability, he 
treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom that reason 
does not or would not apply”. The parallel provision for goods, facilities and services 
is contained in section 21(b) (set out below). The language of this section is 
ambiguous, because it can be read either one of two ways. Either, ‘the reason’ 
referred to means a reason for the treatment in question, which may or may not 
separately be related to disability (as argued by M); or, “that reason” refers back to the 
“reason which relates to the disabled person’s disability” (as argued by L).374 Those 
two options for interpretation can be transposed to the context of sport. Would a 
disabled person, who has been excluded from sport for a particular reason, be found to 
suffer unlawful discrimination only if the seemingly neutral reason for the exclusion 
happened to be sufficiently closely causally linked to his disability; or would unlawful 
discrimination only arise if the reason for exclusion was a reason that directly related 
to his disability? It was held in Malcolm that the latter interpretation was correct, and 
the Court subsequently found for the appellants. 
 
On the basis of this finding, White may have been incorrectly decided, as the reason 
Tom was excluded was his prior irresponsible behaviour, just as a non-disabled boy 
would have been excluded had he behaved in a similar way. Arguably, he was not 
excluded on account of a ‘reason which related to his disability’. It is immediately 
apparent that this turns on how the question in (b), above, is interpreted, therefore the 
task of identifying the correct ‘comparator’ was given close attention in Malcolm. 
 
                                                          
374
 Lady Hale, at paragraphs 136-139. 
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In common with the concept of a comparator in other areas of discrimination law, the 
test to establish disability discrimination involves a comparison with the treatment the 
disabled sportsperson receives with the treatment another person would receive. The 
question is – who is the correct comparator? In relation to question (b), it was held 
that the correct comparator in this case was a non-disabled schoolchild who was 
permitted to go on the holiday. This approach followed Clark v TDG Ltd (trading as 
Novacold).375 Thus a disabled sportsman or woman, in assessing whether or not they 
have received lawful treatment at the hands of providers of sports services, should be 
in a position to compare themselves with a non-disabled sportsman or woman, rather 
than, for instance, another disabled person. The practical significance of this approach 
to the appropriate comparator is that it is not necessary to undertake the difficult task 
of casting around for real or hypothetical disabled people in establishing what would 
be reasonable in terms of adjustments or accommodations required. Thus, in cases 
where disabled people are competing, or otherwise participating, in sport with non-
disabled people, they can use this latter class as a comparator. A similar line of 
argument contributed to the success of Casey Martin in arguing that his 
accommodations were reasonable.  
 
The decision in Malcolm, however, substantially changes the necessary approach and 
significantly restricts the use of a hypothetical comparator in disability discrimination 
cases. The Lords held that the phrase “others to whom that reason does not or would 
not apply”, i.e. referring to the relevant comparators, must be construed narrowly and 
                                                          
375
 [1999] 2 All ER 977; [1999] IRLR 318. In Clark v Novacold at issue was alleged employment 
discrimination but the court also considered the meaning of ‘that reason’ in section 20(1) (a), set out 
below (also finding that the wording in this section was similar enough to the ‘employment’ equivalent, 
section 5(1) make the same interpretation). 
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the appropriate hypothetical comparator, in that case, was a tenant who was not 
disabled, but who sublet the property, in breach of covenant. In White, therefore, the 
appropriate comparator might be a boy without diabetes who behaved similarly 
irresponsibly – it is likely he would also have been excluded from the trip. In light of 
this, could unlawful discrimination still be found to have existed? White can be 
distinguished from the facts in Malcolm because the teachers knew of Tom’s 
disability, whereas M’s disability was not known about, at least when the decision to 
repossess the property was taken. Malcolm has in effect established that the 
defendant’s knowledge of a complainant’s disability is inextricably linked with the 
causality of the reason for excluding a disabled person from participating in sport. 
Lord Scott stated in his opinion that:        
 
…a “reason” does not “relate to” a disability for section 24(1)(a) purposes 
unless the fact of the physical or mental condition in question has played some 
causative part in the decision-making process of the alleged discriminator. A 
“reason” could not, in my opinion, “relate to” a physical or mental condition 
of the person in question of which the alleged discriminator is unaware.376 
 
It is, however, possible that this knowledge requirement might affect sports claims 
less than other sorts of claims because the disabled sports participant might be more 
likely to have brought a disability to the attention of the defendant, especially if 
adjustments are required. Nonetheless, following this development in the law, it will 
be undoubtedly harder for claimants to establish that they have been subjected to 
unlawful disability discrimination – perhaps especially in cases of potential indirect 
                                                          
376
 Paragraph 28. 
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discrimination where the disabled sportsperson has been excluded as a result of 
seemingly ‘neutral’ criteria, as discussed below.    
  
PGA Tour, Inc. v Martin377 
 
The US Supreme Court case PGA Tour, Inc. v Martin illustrates how the concept of 
adjustments can arise when disabled people wish to participate in sport – in this case, 
professional mainstream sport. (This is a comparative illustration and it is important 
to note that this action involved the concept of ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the 
ADA, which is only approximately equivalent to the concept of ‘reasonable 
adjustment’ under the DDA, both concepts having been refined by subsequent 
caselaw.)378  
 
Casey Martin was a disabled professional golfer who was denied the opportunity to 
take part in golf competitions with the aid of a golf cart, which he required to use due 
to a degenerative circulatory disorder379 that prevented him from being able to walk 
the golf course on foot like other, non-disabled competitors. He sued the relevant 
regulatory body, the Professional Golf Association (PGA), which had made the 
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 (2001) 532 US 661.  
378
 See sections 20-21, DDA, detailed below. Note also that reasonable adjustments in goods, facilities 
and services, under Part 3 of the DDA, are different from in the Part 2 context of employment law, in a 
number of key respects. The Part 3 duty is to disabled people as a group, as opposed to individual 
disabled people in the context of employment; the Part 3 duty is anticipatory in nature, in employment 
it is merely responsive; it is also a continuing and evolving duty.   
379
 Martin suffered from Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome which leads to bone deterioration and 
atrophy. This put him at a heightened risk of fracturing his leg. 
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decision, alleging unlawful discrimination in its failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation in accordance with the ADA.380  
 
That Martin was disabled was never at issue. Instead, the PGA argued that the ADA 
does not apply to professional golf tournaments; its fall-back position being that 
walking is an essential, substantive element of golf and that any modification would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition. It was held that the ADA did apply 
to professional golf tournaments as they count as places of public accommodation.381 
Hence, the Court focussed on the question of whether modifying the no-cart rule 
during professional golf competitions was reasonable or would fundamentally alter 
the nature of the game. More specifically, the question was how far did the concept of 
‘reasonable accommodation’ extend to the rules of competitive play? It was held that 
the use of a golf cart was a reasonable accommodation and should be permitted as it 
would not fundamentally alter the nature of tour events, or give Martin an advantage 
over other golfers.  
 
In the case of the DDA, how is the extent of the duty to make ‘reasonable 
adjustments’ determined? For example, does this duty extend to making adjustments 
to the rules of a game? In employment law, the duty to make adjustments has been 
shown to be quite broad and often extends to matters such as altering a disabled 
employee’s responsibilities – there are also specific examples provided in the relevant 
guidance and codes of practice for employers. In determining the scope of this duty, a 
                                                          
380
 Title III, ADA, requires private entities that are considered places of public accommodation to 
provide reasonable modifications or accommodations for disabled persons (section 12182(b) (2) (A)).  
381
 In fact, the ADA specifically lists the private entities that count as places of public accommodations 
and these include “a…golf course…” (section 12181(7) (L)). 
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vital question to address is who is responsible for identifying which adjustments are 
required? Employment cases have established that employers must take a relatively 
proactive approach. In Mid Staffordshire General Hospital NHS Trust v 
Cambridge,382 the court held that the Trust was under a duty to make a proper 
assessment of what Mrs Cambridge’s disability required to be done by way of 
adjustments. It is likely that the courts would expect providers of sports facilities and 
services to take a similarly proactive approach. But, even assuming this proactive 
approach is followed – in practical terms, what is the likely result? 
 
In Roads v Central Trains,383the Court of Appeal considered the extent of the duty to 
make reasonable adjustments in relation to goods, facilities and services. Utilising a 
purposive approach, the court found that the DDA is intended to “provide access to a 
service as close as it is reasonably possible to get to the standard normally offered to 
the public at large”.384 In fact, service providers must strive to provide, as far as 
possible, parallel services, because the purpose of the legislation “is not a minimalist 
policy of simply ensuring that some access is available to the disabled: it is, so far as 
reasonably practicable, to approximate the access enjoyed by disabled persons to that 
enjoyed by the rest of the public”.385 This is a high bar to reach for service providers, 
yet it probably would not entail changes to the rules of mainstream sport, at least in 
the majority of cases. So long as there are disability specific facilities, sports and 
competitions, these may well be enough to ‘approximate’ equal access, without the 
need to ‘overburden’ mainstream sport with requirements to change rules. 
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 [2003] IRLR 566. 
383
 [2004] EWCA Civ 1541. 
384
 Sedley, LJ at paragraph 13. 
385
 Sedley, LJ at paragraph 30. 
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The cases of White and Martin compared 
 
As in White, the barrier to participation in Martin was not a physical one, but it 
effectively subsisted in the minds and cultural attitudes of the decision-makers, i.e. 
those in the PGA.386 In White, Tom was perceived as a threat to himself (in terms of 
the risk to his health), but he was also perceived as a threat to the smooth-running of 
the activity itself (presumably in terms of the potential worry, time, expense, and 
general disruption caused were he to suffer adverse effects of his impairment). In 
Martin it was also this latter perceived threat to sport itself which was considered 
problematic. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that this threat was non-existent, 
in part because the Rules of Golf did not even need to be altered for Martin to play.387 
It remains a moot point whether, and in what circumstances, disability discrimination 
law could demand that the rules of a sport should be changed. 
 
Another key difference between White and Martin is that, although in both cases the 
decisions taken by the respective service providers acted to exclude each individual 
from taking part in sport, in White the decision was taken due to a misconception 
about the medical implications of the individual’s disability; whereas in Martin, the 
                                                          
386
  In Chapter 6 the idea that the disabled athlete can be perceived as a ‘threat’ is developed, and the 
problems in both these cases may be seen to stem from different aspects of this societal attitude. 
387
 For a comparison with another case, closely analogous to Martin on the facts, see Tierney, C E 
(2001) ‘Casey Martin, Ford Olinger and the Struggle to Define the Limits of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act in Professional Golf’ 51 Catholic University Law Review 335. See also Olinger v 
United States Golf Association, (2000) 205 F.3d 1001, in which the 7th Circuit found the opposite 
conclusion to that in Martin, namely that while the game of golf does not forbid the use of golf carts, 
allowing Olinger to use one would give him an unfair advantage over the rest of the field (prior to the 
issue being decided in Martin in the Supreme Court). 
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decision was made purely on the grounds of what were perceived to be the rules of the 
sport itself – essentially a factor of the social environment.388  
 
Nonetheless, these differences should not be over-emphasised as both cases 
essentially involved a policy decision that a disabled person could not be provided for 
within the parameters of the sport, and in this respect the concepts of discrimination 
and adjustments may be seen to be similar (see the discussion below). The courts have 
therefore been cautiously aware of their undesirable potential to encroach on policy-
making decisions that perhaps could not be reconciled with legal obligations. 
 
A ‘Royal and Ancient’ approach? 
 
Martin raises challenging theoretical questions: how far can, or should, rules in 
competitive sport be modified to accommodate disabled athletes, without such 
changes being deemed unreasonable under the law? In Scotland, the Royal and 
Ancient Golf Club at St Andrews regulates the Rules of Golf, not only in this 
jurisdiction but across the world.389 In recent years, it has also produced modified 
rules for golfers with disabilities, which consider some interesting scenarios.390 These 
                                                          
388
 In the following chapter it will be seen how there has been a theoretical struggle to conceptualise the 
meaning of disability, based on differing ‘medical’ and ‘social’ models. 
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 The Royal and Ancient Golf Club is golf’s world rules and development body and its Rules of Golf 
are approved by The United States Golf Association (the Rules used in Martin). See Royal and Ancient 
Golf Club (2007) Rules of Golf: as approved by R&A Rules Limited and The United States Golf 
Association (31st Edition) St Andrews: The Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St Andrews (Effective 
worldwide from 1 January 2008), available from http://www.randa.org/.  
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 See Royal and Ancient Golf Club (2003) A Modification of the Rules of Golf for Golfers with 
Disabilities St Andrews: The Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St Andrews, available from 
http://www.randa.org/. (It may be speculated that the Club produced these modified rules partly in 
response to the issues arising in Martin.) 
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modified rules are not intended to apply automatically for disabled golfers in any 
competition – instead they are essentially suggestions for committees which oversee 
individual competitions.391 The rules include an Exception to Rule 14-3, which 
permits an individual to approach a committee in charge of a competition to ask them 
to make an exception to the rules about the use of equipment – this rule stipulates the 
circumstances in which (what are rather archaically called) “artificial devices, unusual 
equipment and unusual use of equipment” may be utilised.  
 
One of the scenarios envisaged by the modified rules is where a physically disabled 
golfer in a wheelchair (which counts as ‘unusual equipment’) is unable to access a 
bunker to play the ball, and he deems the ball ‘unplayable’.392 In such a case, he 
would be entitled to play a ball outside the bunker, incurring a penalty of one extra 
stroke. Similarly, “[a] potential issue for some lower extremity amputee golfers who 
wear a prosthesis is their inability to climb into or out of bunkers, a situation that 
probably occurs rather infrequently. On that basis Rule 28 (Unplayable Ball) should 
apply without further modification.”393 On the face of it, this may seem reasonable, 
but a look at Rule 28 reveals otherwise. In fact, even worse than the penalty for the 
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 The preface to the modified rules states: “This publication contains permissible modifications to the 
Rules of Golf for use by disabled golfers. This is not intended to be a revision of the Rules of Golf as 
they apply to able-bodied players. As is the case for the Rules of Golf themselves, these modifications, 
along with the philosophy expressed herein, have been agreed upon by R&A Rules 
Limited and the United States Golf Association. It is important to stress that these Rules modifications 
only apply if they have been introduced by the Committee in charge of a competition. These 
modifications do not apply automatically to a competition involving disabled golfers”. 
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 Ibid. p.16. 
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 Ibid. p.7. It may well be difficult to accurately assess exactly how often a lower extremity amputee 
golfer would struggle to climb in or out of bunkers, but it is not entirely facetious to observe that the 
author of the modified rules seems to be forgetting the infamous Hell Bunker at the 14th hole on the Old 
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wheelchair golfer, the amputee golfer ends up having no alternative but to play the 
ball from where he or she took the original shot as well as incurring a stroke penalty 
(with the net effect of a two-stroke penalty).394 Depending on the lie of the ball, an 
able-bodied golfer might easily play a good shot, incurring no stroke penalty at all 
(having had no problem climbing in and out of the bunker).  
 
The disparate impact on disabled people of this interpretation of the Rules (and it is 
important to bear in mind that it is an interpretation of the Rules which purports to 
modify them in the interests of disabled golfers), reveals at least two things. Firstly, it 
demonstrates what appears to be a real, and persistent, reluctance to change the Rules 
to fit the requirements of, and to accommodate on an equal basis, a disabled golfer. It 
is hard to think of another area of the provision of facilities or services to disabled 
people in which an entirely easy and expense-free, and ultimately trivial, adjustment 
or modification could be justifiably refused. Secondly, to a certain extent the very 
idea of a bunker on a golf course affirms the view that the sporting environment, like 
most of the physical environment, has been designed exclusively for the able-bodied, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Course at St Andrews (ironically, the Royal and Ancient’s flagship course) which is hard enough for 
able-bodied players to access. Every round on the Old Course could cause such a problem. 
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 Rule 28 reads: “If the player deems his ball to be unplayable, he must under penalty of 
one stroke: a. Play a ball as nearly as possible at the spot from which the original 
ball was last played (see Rule 20-5); or b. Drop a ball behind the point where the ball lay, keeping that 
point directly between the hole and the spot on which the ball is dropped, with no limit to how far 
behind that point the ball may be dropped; or c. Drop a ball within two club-lengths of the spot where 
the ball lay, but not nearer the hole. If the unplayable ball is in a bunker, the player may proceed under 
Clause a, b or c. If he elects to proceed under Clause b or c, a ball must be dropped in the bunker”. 
Quite obviously, if the player “deemed his ball to be unplayable” because the limitations of his 
impairment meant that he was physically unable to access the bunker, his only option is ‘a’, because 
options ‘b’ or ‘c’ require the ball to be dropped in the bunker (which he cannot access). 
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often to the cost of the physically disabled – and that design includes the design of 
how the Rules interact with the course.395  
 
Types of discrimination law challenges by disabled sports participants  
 
Within the jurisdiction of the USA, Weston has identified three main types of legal 
challenges which can arise in respect of disability discrimination and sport.396 The 
first type of challenge occurs where participants with a high medical risk seek to take 
part in sport. In some cases they obtain medical clearance but subsequently die or are 
injured whilst playing, giving rise to liability and safety concerns for the service 
provider; in other cases they are denied medical clearance to play and subsequently 
sue the provider on the grounds of unlawful discrimination.397 The second type she 
identifies occurs when disabled athletes are excluded from sport because they fail to 
meet a ‘neutral’ eligibility requirement, such as age or academic standards. The third 
type involves participants who require accommodations (adjustments), including 
modifications to the rules.398  
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 Crossley discusses this idea in relation to what she calls the ‘minority group’ model of disability, 
attributing it to writers such as Anita Silvers and Harlan Hahn (Crossley, M (2004) ‘Reasonable 
Accommodation…’ pp.880-881). See also discussion of the ‘social model’ in Chapter 2.  
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The exclusive nature of elite sport might suggest that the issues arising in Martin are 
unlikely to crop up in the lives of the average disabled sportsperson and that the 
scenario arising in White is generally more likely. The issues in Martin are not as 
obscure as they may at first seem, however, and they are instructive on a number of 
levels about wider instances of how society and the law treats issues of discrimination 
in a context such as sport. It is possible to speculate that, if they experience 
circumstances similar to Casey Martin, recreational sports participants are more likely 
simply to accept unfair discrimination and drop out of the activity. Hence, these cases 
are less likely to be drawn to our attention. 
 
As discrimination legislation has developed over recent years, it has become 
increasingly apparent that there are some fundamental tensions in the way that 
discrimination law interacts with certain areas of life, the distinctive features of which 
were previously taken for granted – to pick a couple of current examples, there is a 
much-reported tension between certain religious beliefs and sexual-orientation 
discrimination issues such as civil partnerships; and there is also a tension between 
age discrimination and pensions provisions.399 The examination so far suggests that 
there may be a fundamental tension between the concept of disability discrimination 
and many of the features of sport that were previously taken for granted by society 
(and probably still are taken for granted). Disability in sport and the cultural emphasis 
that is placed, from an early age, on ability in sport are not mutually exclusive,400 but 
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 The British Government recognises that there is a potential fundamental tension between the terms 
of Schedule 2 (concerning pensions) of the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 and the rules 
on flexible retirement which, prior to the introduction of age discrimination law, had not previously had 
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 See Chapter 1. 
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this emphasis does mean that it is necessary to think very carefully about the 
implications of how both the disabled, and non-disabled, body and mind can be 
adapted, modified and potentially enhanced to increase sporting performance, and 
how such changes relate to disability discrimination.  
 
From disability to ‘super-ability’  
 
It is a trite point that we live in a rapidly changing world in terms of technology and 
innovation, and recent developments highlighted by Casey Martin and Oscar Pistorius 
indicate that as time goes by such innovations will increasingly help to allow disabled 
people to participate in sport – and to compete both in disability sport and mainstream 
sport, at all levels. Such innovations could impact on all three of the types of 
discrimination law challenges identified above. This possibility raises a number of 
difficult questions. What judgements should we make about the bodies and minds of 
sportsmen and women being adapted and changed to enhance their levels of 
participation and performance?401 In which circumstances should such modifications 
be permitted? In which circumstances are these questions for sports regulators; and in 
which circumstances are they questions for disability discrimination (and other 
aspects of the) law to resolve? These issues are not as speculative as they might at 
first appear. Furthermore, they do not begin and end with disabled people. There are 
two very important scientific developments which impact on disabled athletes and 
non-disabled athletes alike – genetic technologies,402 such as ‘gene doping’,403 and 
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 There is a burgeoning literature on genetic enhancements and in recent years scholars have been 
anticipating their impact on sport. See, for example, Miah, A (2007) ‘Genetic Selection for Human 
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cyborg enhancements.404 Both of these developments have the potential to create what 
might be called ‘super-abilities’ in disabled athletes. 
 
The pace at which these developments have occurred means that they appear to have 
crept up on sports regulators, lawyers and the general public alike. As Abrams 
observes: “It is uncertain how we will respond as the line between equalizing athletes 
– as was Casey Martin’s claim for fairness – and enhancing the athletes continues to 
blur. The next generation of technology-and-sports cases will be far more difficult to 
address than a dispute over a golfer’s use of a cart”.405 
 
Oscar Pistorius – from disabled athlete to cyborg 
 
Although the extent to which genetic technologies have already penetrated sport may 
be unclear, what is clear is that cyborgs no longer simply belong in science fiction. 
The recent media storm over the South African elite disabled runner, Oscar Pistorius, 
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demonstrates how shocking it can be to the public to realise that there already exists 
the physical embodiment of a cyborg athlete.406 Pistorius is a double amputee and 
uses specially adapted prosthetic legs to compete in running events. Having won gold 
in the 200 metres at the 2004 Paralympics, he began to compete successfully in able-
bodied races.407 Since then, his progress in mainstream sport appears to have been 
blocked by the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) amending 
its competition rules to ban the  "…use of any technical device that incorporates 
springs, wheels or any other element that provides a user with an advantage over 
another athlete not using such a device".408 Whether Pistorius’ prosthetic limbs 
provide an artificial advantage over and above another athlete’s legs is currently in 
dispute.409 Whatever the outcome, it is perhaps inevitable that disabled athletes will 
soon have the potential to have ‘super-abilities’, through the use of enhancements 
such as prosthetic limbs, which are of course considered legal in the ordinary run of 
events. In terms of the law, the question would then become: are organisations like the 
IAAF exercising unlawful disability discrimination by insisting that paralympic 
athletes conform to ‘normal’ human morphology?410 Disabled athletes such as Casey 
Martin and Oscar Pistorius operate at the boundaries of mainstream sports, but their 
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 See, for example, ‘Oscar Pistorius is put through his paces to justify right to run’ The Times, 20 
November 2007; ‘Furious Pistorius Blade Runner slams IAAF’ The Guardian, 16 July 2007. 
407
 For example, he took second place in the 400 metres at the South African National Championships 
in March 2007. 
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 Rule 144(2) (e), IAAF Competition Rules 2008. 
409
 As noted in the Introduction, the IAAF ruled on 14 January 2008 that Pistorius’ prosthetics gave 
him an unfair advantage. The suggestion is that the prosthetics allow him to run faster during the 
second 200 metres, rather than the first 200 metres, of the 400 metre race – something which no non-
disabled athlete has achieved and which raises suspicions about the performance of the prosthetics. 
Pistorius appealed this decision to the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne and the appeal 
hearing was on 29 and 30 April 2008. 
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cases cause us to question what the limits are of discrimination or reasonable 
accommodations/adjustments. 
 
Arguably, it is only a matter of time before the legal issues in Martin arise in the 
context of elite sport in Scotland and comparable issues have already arisen in the 
context of education.411 In the light of the recent CAS ruling,412 it is entirely possible 
that Oscar Pistorius will compete in the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow.413 
Whether, and when, these high-profile issues will reach the courts in Scotland remains 
to be seen, but they certainly have the potential to do so.  
 
It may well be that disability discrimination law as it stands is insufficient to cope 
with such developments. Returning to Lord Justice Hale’s assessment that disability 
discrimination law requires favourable treatment for disabled people, in light of the 
subsequent discussion – could this feasibly extend to sport, or must the provision of 
sport be an exception to this doctrine? The problem seems to be that the DDA has 
been founded on the implicit assumption that disabled people may require favourable 
treatment to bring them up to the same level of performance as that of non-disabled 
people. That assumption does not take account of instances in areas such as sport, in 
which the disabled person might end up with a ‘super-ability’, which surpasses that of 
non-disabled people, as it might turn out to be in the case of Pistorius.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
410
 Dvorsky, G (2007) ‘Is the World Ready for Cyborg Athletes?’ (article posted on the website of the 
Insitute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 25 April 2007, www.ieet.org). 
411
 See Chapter 5. 
412
 On 16 May 2008, the CAS published its ruling allowing Pistorius’ appeal against the IAAF. See 
CAS 2008/A/1480 Pistorius v/IAAF. 
413
 On 9 November 2007 it was announced that Glasgow had won its bid to host the 2014 
Commonwealth Games. (See http://www.glasgow2014.com/default.aspx for more details.) 
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As technology progresses it may no longer be possible to argue that a technological 
enhancement such as Pistorius’ prosthetics amount to reasonable adjustments as these 
enhancements go beyond what ‘reasonableness’ requires. There is still debate on the 
facts as to whether or not his prosthetics give Pistorius an advantage by making him 
quicker as the race progresses (something which no organic legs can achieve), but 
better technology will eventually put this beyond debate. One way forward may be to 
accept that in the future humanity will have to take account of genetic engineering and 
to look at ways of uniting disability discrimination laws with emerging genetic 
discrimination law; however, that is a project which may still be some way off in the 
future.414 As the identities of athletes become more complex, transhumanist aspects to 
identity can no longer be ignored. These aspects of identity also have parallels in 
other minority groups such as transgender individuals.415  
 
Part 3, Disability Discrimination Act 1995 – goods, facilities and services 
 
Having introduced some of the main themes in disability discrimination and sport, the 
following legislative summary picks out the relevant provisions in the DDA. Section 
19(1), DDA establishes liability for providers of sports facilities and services as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
414
 See the discussion in Macintosh, K L (2005) Illegal Beings: Human Clones and the Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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 See McArdle, D (2008) ‘Swallows and Amazons: Or the Sporting Exception to the Gender 
Recognition Act’ 17 Social and Legal Studies 1. 
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It is unlawful for a provider of services to discriminate against a disabled 
person: 
 
(a) in refusing to provide, or deliberately not providing, to the disabled 
person any service which he provides, or is prepared to provide, to 
members of the public; 
 
(b) in failing to comply with any duty imposed on him by section 21 in 
circumstances in which the effect of that failure is to make it 
impossible or unreasonably difficult for the disabled person to make 
use of any such service. 
 
Section 20 lays out the two types of discrimination discussed above: 
 
 (1) …a provider of services discriminates against a disabled person if:  
(a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person’s disability, he 
treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to whom 
that reason does not or would not apply; and 
(b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified. 
(2)…a provider of services also discriminates against a disabled person if:  
(a) he fails to comply with a section 21 duty imposed on him in relation 
to the disabled person; and  
(b) he cannot show that his failure to comply with that duty is justified.   
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Detailing the second type of discrimination, section 21 determines the provider’s 
duties to make adjustments: 
 
(1) Where a provider of services has a practice, policy or procedure which 
makes it impossible or unreasonably difficult for disabled persons to make use 
of a service which he provides, or is prepared to provide, to other members of 
the public, it is his duty to take such steps as it is reasonable, in all the 
circumstances of the case, for him to have to take in order to change that 
practice, policy or procedure so that it no longer has that effect. 
 
One of the principles of disability discrimination that sets it apart from other sorts of 
discrimination legislation is the relatively substantial (and complex) justification 
defences available to service providers. In relation to the justification defences at 
sections 20(1) (b) and 20(2) (b), above, the provider must demonstrate that, in his 
opinion, 416 one of five conditions apply (section 20(3) (a)), and that it is reasonable in 
all the circumstances for him to hold that opinion (section 20(3) (b)).  
 
Those conditions, laid out in section 20(4), allow justifications where: (a) the 
treatment is justified on grounds of health or safety; (b) the disabled person is 
incapable of entering into an enforceable agreement, or of giving an informed 
consent; (c) (in circumstances in which the provider refuses to provide or deliberately 
does not provide a service which he provides or is prepared to provide to members of 
the public) the treatment is necessary because the provider would otherwise be unable 
to provide the service to members of the public; (d) (in the standard, manner, or terms 
                                                          
416
 See discussion in Chapter 6 of subjectivity and objectivity in justification decision-making. 
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on which the services is provided) the treatment is necessary in order for the provider 
to be able to provide the service to the disabled person or to other members of the 
public; (e) (in the terms on which he provides a service) the difference in the terms on 
which the service is provided to the disabled person and those on which it is provided 
to other members of the public reflects the greater cost to the provider of services in 
providing the service to the disabled person. 
 
Hence, in summary, there is a ‘health and safety’ defence (this is one of the defences 
most relevant to sport and will be focussed on in Chapter 6); an ‘incapacity’ defence; 
two defences where the justification depends on the impact of the treatment on the 
provider’s ability to serve; and one defence based on cost.  
 
The rightful place of disability in the discrimination canon 
 
It is possible to identify four main factors common to the concept of adjustments in 
disability discrimination legislation and these can be applied to sport. 417 The first 
factor is the requirements of the individual’s particular disability. This factor is 
covered by section 19(1) (b), above, but it is also implicit in section 21, in that the 
provider’s duty is to make adjustments ‘in all the circumstances of the case’. The 
second factor is the essential aspects of the sports role she seeks to perform. Arguably, 
this factor impacts on the provider’s approach to all the sections listed above – 
sections 19(1), 20 and 21. The third factor is any possible adjustments that would 
enable her to participate. This is the subject of section 21. Finally, the fourth factor is 
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 These factors are adapted from Karlan, P and Rutherglen, G (1996) ‘Disabilities, Discrimination…’ 
p.13. (Karlan and Rutherglen identify the interaction of these factors in the context of employment.) 
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the burden that those adjustments would impose on the provider of facilities or 
services. This can be related to the defences above. 
 
Returning to the distinction made above between the two types of discrimination – 
although it was constructive to make this in order to bring out some of the nuances in 
the issues arising, in light of the above discussion, it might be argued that this 
distinction in fact has limited application in the context of sport. American 
scholarship in recent years has argued that there are, at the very least, limits to this 
distinction. For example, Jolls argues that the ‘disparate impact’, or ‘indirect 
discrimination’ aspect (in which an apparently neutral policy or procedure of a service 
provider has a disparate, or indirectly discriminatory effect on disabled people) is 
arguably difficult to distinguish, in terms of its specified aspects, from the 
requirements of adjustments. 418 This can be illustrated by the case of White, above. In 
fact, although for the sake of illustration the above discussion of the case concentrated 
on the concept of adjustments, White considered both types of disability 
discrimination, as laid out in sections 19(1), 20 and 21 of the DDA, above. The reason 
why the school was held to have acted unlawfully in respect of the reasonable 
adjustments required, was in effect the same reason why it was held to have acted 
unlawfully in respect of the requirement not to treat Tom less favourably, without 
justification – namely it had failed in terms of its policy to undertake a proper health 
and safety assessment.419   
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 Jolls, C (2001) ‘Antidiscrimination and Accommodation’ 115 Harvard Law Review 642, p.651. See 
also Colker, R (2000) ‘ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise’ 21 Berkeley Journal of Employment & 
Labor Law 377; Stein, M A (2004) ‘Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination’ 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 579. 
 145
Another reason why the differences between the two types of discrimination should 
not be over-emphasized may be drawn from the Oscar Pistorius example, above. 
Having briefly discussed the future impact of genetic and cyborg technology in the 
world of sport for disabled people, it may be seen that the adjustments that have to be 
made in order for Pistorius to compete may soon no longer be regarded as a form of 
‘special favour’ – a kind of reluctant favouratism towards disabled people only.420 If 
the future of sport holds the possibility of genetic or cyborg technological 
enhancements which can be utilized by all, disabled and non-disabled alike, then the 
disability-specific nature of ‘adjustments’ begins to fade into a continuum of 
requirements which exist irrespective of whether the athlete is disabled or not. In that 
case, an adjustment would simply be made according to the requirements of the 
individual, treating disabled athletes and non-disabled athletes alike. Judicial 
interpretation of what is ‘reasonable’ may adjust accordingly. 
 
Two interim conclusions 
 
There are two conclusions to make about disability discrimination legislation, at this 
stage of the chapter, – one positive and the other negative. The first, positive, 
conclusion is that disability discrimination law viewed through the prism of sport is 
illustrative of the extent to which the legislation may in fact function in a way more 
similar to other types of discrimination law than is commonly acknowledged – in that 
the distinction between the requirements of the ‘traditional’, antidiscrimination 
provisions and the adjustment provisions are, in practical terms, reasonably artificial. 
This is a positive conclusion on the one hand because it counters the common implied 
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criticism that disability discrimination extends beyond the terms of fair treatment; and 
on the other hand because it recognizes the parallel nature of the goals behind 
antidiscrimination and adjustments.421  The second, negative, conclusion is that the 
disability discrimination legislation as it stands, may no longer be adequate to fully 
comprehend the future transition of disabled athletes from being people who are a not 
as able to those who (with the benefit of enhancements) are ‘super-enabled’.   
 
How can the legislation prevent disability discrimination in sport? 
 
At this point the chapter changes tack. Despite the fact that the case examples above 
demonstrate that unlawful discrimination can easily occur in the context of disabled 
people participating in sport, it is less clear that enforcement by individuals is the best 
means to tackle this.422 As the DDA fell into a familiar pattern of litigation, it soon 
became striking how many more cases concerned Part 2 (relating to employment) 
than Part 3 (goods, facilities and services). In the first few years of its enactment, in 
comparable periods between 1996 and 2001, there were 8,908 Part 2 cases compared 
to only 53 Part 3 cases.423 Following the findings of the MacPherson Commission in 
the context of race discrimination, it was found that the impact of discrimination 
legislation must be increased by creating positive duties, and one way that the 
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Government found to do this was to introduce ‘equality duties’ for public 
authorities.424 In recognition that this idea may constitute the birth of a substantially 
new approach to enforcement, Fredman calls such duties ‘fourth generation’ 
equality.425 
 
The Disability Discrimination Act 2005 – the disability equality duty 
 
One of the key amendments which the 2005 Act introduced was to provide that, as of 
4 December 2006, part 3 of the 1995 Act would apply to the functions carried out by a 
public authority.426 This is potentially a very significant development for the provision 
of sport for disabled people due to the scale on which public authorities in Scotland 
are the providers of sports facilities and services.427  
 
The general duty 
 
The 2005 Act introduced a ‘general duty’ on the part of public authorities to have 
regard to disability discrimination issues.428 The terms of the general duty are as 
follows:  
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‘general duty’, above.  
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(1) Every public authority shall in carrying out its functions have due regard 
to- 
(a) the need to eliminate discrimination that is unlawful under this Act; 
(b) the need to eliminate harassment of disabled persons that is related to 
their disabilities; 
(c) the need to promote equality of opportunity between disabled persons and 
other persons; 
(d) the need to take steps to take account of disabled persons’ disabilities, 
even where that involves treating disabled persons more favourably than other 
persons; 
(e) the need to promote positive attitudes towards disabled persons; and 
(f) the need to encourage participation by disabled persons in public life. 
 
Unlike the UN Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Treaty of 
Lisbon or even domestic legislation from other jurisdictions such as the (Australian) 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992,429 there is no specific reference to sport in the 
Act, but these all-encompassing duties will potentially have a significant impact on 
disability sport in Scotland. The ‘disability equality duty’ (DED) is laid out in far 
greater detail than it is in the Act, in a Statutory Code of Practice for Scotland, which 
is enforceable by way of judicial review in the Court of Session, or by way of a 
compliance notice.430 
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 Section 28 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 states that: “Sport (1) It is unlawful for a 
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An underpinning principle of the DED is the need to take steps to take account of 
people’s disabilities, even where that involves treating disabled people more 
favourably than others.431 Provisions relating to participation in sport (those relating 
to the provision of goods, facilities and services, the exercise of a function, the use of 
transport vehicles, private clubs, and education) contain an ‘anticipatory’ duty to 
make adjustments to take account of disabled people’s specific needs.432 An 
anticipatory approach requires adjustments to be made in advance of individual 
disabled people attempting to use the service desired or to access education. In this 
respect, although the 2005 Act retains the discrimination provisions of the earlier 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which it amends, the introduction of this 
anticipatory element may be an important step forward in using law to encourage 
disabled people to participate in sport by providing a more inviting environment, 
rather than only responding to the needs of disabled people once challenged. This 
approach also allows for additional sports services to be provided alongside a 
‘mainstream’ approach. The Statutory Code of Practice for Scotland gives a useful 
example of this in which a local authority leisure centre provides swimming lessons 
every week, which are only open to disabled adults in order to allow disabled people 
to learn to swim in what might be a more comfortable and confidence-building 
environment.433 However, in this example, disabled people are also able to attend 
those sessions aimed at the general public and support is provided to do so where 
necessary. This offers a choice over and above that open to non-disabled people and 
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in this respect arguably amounts to positive discrimination, although the Government 
would rather term this ‘positive action’434 – perhaps a somewhat artificial distinction. 
 
Such an approach can only impact on the whole disabled population in Scotland if it 
has near universal application, and the legislation looks as though it could go some 
way to achieving this. The 2005 Act applies to public authorities in Scotland.435 The 
definition of ‘public authority’ is wide and includes education authorities and the 
managers of a grant-aided school (within the meaning of section 135 of the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1980). As noted in Chapter 1, fairly importantly for participation in 
sport, private clubs are also covered, in section 12 (on the satisfaction of certain 
conditions, including membership of twenty-five people or over). This was the result 
of a policy initiative of the current Government to address a number of omissions in 
the 1995 Act and to bring private clubs into line with other service providers.436 
Subsequent regulations have also ensured that private clubs have a duty to make 
reasonable adjustments, as that duty was not on the face of the 2005 Act.437  
 
Three key features of the disability equality duty 
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The 2005 Act therefore has three notable features encapsulated in the DED, which 
may have a good claim to change the nature of UK discrimination legislation which 
has gone before: it is anticipatory; it allows for positive action to be taken; and it has 
wide application. 
 
The specific disability equality duties 
 
The 2005 Act also provides the Scottish Ministers with the power to introduce 
regulations setting out specific duties which might assist public authorities in meeting 
their general duty.438 These specific duties are set out in regulations439 in which there 
is a list of the authorities to which the duties apply.440 This list explicitly includes 
sportscotland, which is the ultimate governing body for sport in Scotland.441 
  
The main specific duty in the regulations is the requirement to produce a Disability 
Equality Scheme.442 The purpose of such a Scheme is to show how the authority 
intends to fulfil its general duty and its other specific duties. All affected public 
authorities were required to publish their initial Schemes by 4 December 2006443 and 
a revised Scheme within every three years thereafter.444 
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The Disability Equality Scheme should include a statement of: how disabled people 
have been involved in its development; the steps which the authority will take to fulfil 
its general duty; arrangements for assessing the impact of the activities of the body on 
disability equality; arrangements for gathering information about performance of the 
public body on disability equality.445 The information gathered by the authority 
should include the effect of its policies and practices on: recruitment, development 
and retention of its disabled employees; their effect, in the case of an authority 
specified in Parts II or III of the Schedule,446 on the educational opportunities 
available to, and on the achievements of, disabled pupils and students; and the extent 
to which, in the case of an authority other than one specified in Parts II or III of the 
Schedule, the services it provides and those other functions it performs take account 
of the needs of disabled persons.447  
 
An example of public authority sports provision and disability equality duties 
 
One example of Scottish public authority involvement in sports schemes is the City of 
Edinburgh Council Community Education Department’s ‘Play4It’ and ‘Go4It’ 
schemes.448  
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The Council is a public authority under the Regulations; consequently it has been 
obliged to publish a Multi-Equalities Scheme (MES), incorporating a Disability 
Equality Scheme.  The Council is also an education authority, as defined by section 
135 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 which means that, under the specific duties 
requirements detailed above, the MES must identify information gathered under its 
policies and procedures on the educational opportunities available to, and on the 
achievements of, disabled pupils and students. The MES ‘delegates’ this task by 
detailing that “Each Council department will be required to produce a three yearly 
Mainstreaming Equalities Action Plan (MEAP)… Yearly monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting of progress against targets described within the MEAPs will form part of the 
MES annual report”.   
 
Turning to the relevant MEAP, this task is implemented in part by two paragraphs. 
Paragraph 7.10 requires that “[i]nformation will be gathered on support services for 
people with disabilities, including learning disabilities who wish to participate in 
Community Learning and Development activities. This will then be distributed to key 
staff to promote participation”. The responsibility for gathering this information falls 
to the Accessibility Strategy Manager and the Principal Officer Equalities. Paragraph 
7.11 requires that “Young disabled people will be given appropriate support to 
participate fully in informal learning opportunities and extracurricular activities”. This 
requirement is the responsibility of the Community Learning and Development Policy 
Officer and the Community Learning and Development Managers. 
 
A disabled child wishing to take part in either the Play4It or the Go4It scheme might 
therefore expect to benefit from these specific tasks in the MEAP. The Accessibility 
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Strategy Manager and the Principal Equalities Officer can be expected to have 
gathered information on support services for disabled children in these schemes and 
the staff running the scheme can be expected to have been made aware of this 
information and to act on it to promote participation by disabled children. Under the 
general duty, they would be able to treat disabled children more favourably than non-
disabled children in providing, for example, individual instruction or assistance in the 
kayaking activities listed. This example would also meet the above requirement in 
paragraph 7.11 of the MEAP to provide appropriate support to participate fully in 
informal learning opportunities and extracurricular activities (the kayaking activity 
available in the schemes’ programmes is likely to be construed as an ‘informal 
learning opportunity’, or alternatively it is an ‘extracurricular activity’). 
 
In R (on the application of Chavda and others) v Harrow London Borough 
Council,449 local Harrow residents brought a challenge by way of judicial review to 
the Council’s decision to restrict adult care services to people with critical needs only. 
One of the grounds for the challenge was that the Council’s decision making process 
did not comply with the DED, which provided an opportunity for the court to examine 
the requirements of section 49A, DDA. It was held that the requirement in this section 
to give “due regard” to the DED, involved more than simply giving ‘consideration’ to 
disability equality. One way to satisfy this requirement is to undertake a full impact 
assessment of the relevant policy decision. The court found that the decision had been 
unlawful and the judicial review was successful. The main reason provided was that 
the decision was unlawful because “it was taken without the decision-makers having 
had sufficiently drawn to their attention the seriousness and extent of the duties which 
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the Defendant owed under the Disability Discrimination Act 2005”.450 Therefore, 
sports policies which have the potential to impact on disabled people must be 
adequately assessed for their impact and decision makers must be appropriately 
informed. This requirement should ideally help to ‘mainstream’ disability equality for 
public authority decision makers in relation to sports policy and governance.  
 
What happens if an act of potential discrimination against a disabled participant 
arises? In terms of enforcement, of course the option to bring an action under the 
general Part 3 service provisions is still available, but what the 2005 Act adds is a 
further set of duties under the new ‘public authorities’ (sections 21B-E) with which 
the Council must comply, and which the court may take account of in assessing a 
claim of discrimination under Part 3.  
 
Under the amended provisions, there is a questionnaire procedure, similar to the 
employment provisions. At this point, both the Council’s MES and MEAP can be 
brought into play. Copies of these could be requested and scrutinised and any relevant 
steps in the action plan which might not have been taken by the Council might be 
brought to light. For example, it might be shown that in fact insufficient information 
has been gathered by the Council on support services in the Play4It or Go4It scheme; 
or that staff running the scheme were not made aware of any necessary information 
and/or did not act on it to promote participation in the scheme by disabled children.  
 
Questions might also be asked whether the Council should have treated the child more 
favourably, as permitted under the general duty, perhaps by providing an instructor or 
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an extra member of staff trained in working with people with disabilities. In ways 
such as this, the DED has the potential to be used as an effective tool in claims against 
a public authority for a breach of a statutory duty, where the authority has failed to 
promote the duty.  
 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission  
 
The Equality Act 2006 established a new Equality and Human Rights Commission451 
which subsumes the previous equality commissions in Britain: the former 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE); Equal Opportunities Commision (EOC) and 
the Disability Rights Commission (DRC). In relation to disability rights and 
discrimination, the new Commission performs similar functions to those of the former 
DRC. One of the notable developments in the functions of the new Commission is the 
creation of a ‘general duty’ to use its powers and functions to work towards 
developing a society in which equality and rights principles may become rooted.452 
One, fairly obvious, but major criticism which has been made is that by centralising 
all the strands of discrimination in one Commission some of the equality grounds may 
be submerged or overlooked (disability is at risk of being one such victim).453 
O’Cinneide also notes that there is a current ideological dispute as to the appropriate 
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aims for the Commission: “should its primary focus be on combating discrimination, 
denial of rights and social exclusion, or should it also be expected to play a major role 
in representing the needs of particular communities?”454  
 
Other means of enforcement 
 
There are a limited number of other means of enforcing the disability equality duties. 
The general duty has no specific enforcement method, but since it constitutes a set of 
statutory duties, a public authority may be judicially reviewed in the same way it 
would be for breach of any statutory duty. In Elias v Secretary of State455 the 
equivalent ‘race equality duty’ under section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976456 
was examined by the courts.457 (See also R (on the application of Chavda and others), 
above.) As noted previously, however, the high cost of judicial review actions means 
that this is an impractical and unrealistic means of enforcement for most individuals 
and its impact may therefore be seen to be limited. Individuals have a more secure 
means of enforcement retrospectively, only after they have suffered discrimination in 
a personal capacity.  
 
                                                          
454
 Ibid., p.71. A possible answer to this question is addressed in more general terms in Chapter 2. 
455
 [2005] IRLR 788. 
456
 As amended by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. 
457
 Mrs Elias was a British subject, born in Hong Kong, who had been interned by the Japanese during 
the Second World War, and wished to benefit from a government non-statutory compensation scheme. 
For former civilian internees to qualify for compensation from the scheme they either had to have been 
born in the UK or have a parent or grandparent born in the UK. Mrs Elias brought proceedings for 
judicial review and claimed that the criteria adopted operated as direct discrimination on grounds of 
national origins or, alternatively, that they were indirectly discriminatory and could not be justified.    
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As well as judicial review as a means of enforcement, the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (formerly the DRC) is able to issue a compliance notice, stating that the 
public authority must meet its duties and must inform the Commission of the action it 
has taken to comply with its duties.458 The notice can also request information 
regarding the authority’s performance.459 A compliance notice can be enforced in the 
sheriff court.460 
 
The future of disability discrimination law 
 
The government published a Green Paper in June 2007 proposing to untangle Great 
Britain’s complex tapestry of discrimination legislation by drafting a new Single 
Equality Bill.461 A number of commentators have suggested that the proposals in the 
Green Paper do not, however, sufficiently address the issue of access to justice in 
goods, facilities and services discrimination cases, and that this area of law remains in 
need of effective reform.462 Another key issue in any prospective Bill will be whether 
the equality duties will remain largely intact, be weakened or strengthened. 
 
Lastly, drawing the law in this chapter and the chapter 1 together, it should be borne 
in mind that the greatest effect of the law may be achieved by taking it as a cohesive 
whole. For example, Bamforth has argued that discrimination law must be put in its 
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 Section 49E. 
459
 Section 49E (4). 
460
 Section 49F. 
461
 Department for Communities and Local Government (2007) Discrimination Law Review: A 
Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain, London: HMSO 
462
 See for example, The Discrimination Law Association’s Submission for the Discrimination Law 
Review (available at: www.discrimination-law.org.uk.). 
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constitutional context, with reference to EU Law and also the ECHR.463 This is a 
strong argument when it comes to ECHR rights, as the above consideration shows. As 
regards EU Law, the Framework Employment Directive may have some limited 
application to this context,464 but until the European Commission extends the 
jurisdiction of its discrimination law provisions to areas outside employment, EU 
disability discrimination law is less relevant to the aspects of sport under 
consideration.465  
 
In the next chapter, which considers disability, sport and education law, it will 
become apparent that the law must be permitted a level of certainty as to its 
underlying aims and purposes, and that concepts such as social inclusion are of great 
importance for the law’s interpretation of debates such as whether to ‘integrate’ or 
‘segregate’ disabled school children and students. 
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 See Bamforth, N (2004) ‘Conceptions of Anti-Discrimination Law’ 24 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 4, pp.697-698. 
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European Union Brussels. See also European Disability Forum (2007) Promoting Equality and 
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Chapter 5: Learning Participation – disability, sport and 
education law 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter considers freedom from discrimination and other rights of disabled 
children and young people in the context of sport in education.466 The first section is a 
review of the main legislative provisions relevant to Scotland, against which the 
provisions of other jurisdictions are later compared. Thereafter, the chapter examines 
how the concept of social inclusion, introduced in Chapter 4, illuminates the central 
social and political debates about the integration of disabled children and young 
people in sport in education; considering how the courts have dealt with this debate in 
practice.  
 
The Legislative Framework 
 
The Disability Discrimination Act, Part 4 
 
Education is uniformly regarded as a vital aspect of social inclusion, something which 
made it all the more controversial that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) 
as originally enacted did not include education in its antidiscrimination provisions.467 
                                                          
466
 This chapter should be read in conjunction with the comments on the right to education in Chapter 
3. 
467
 See Doyle, B J (2005) Disability Discrimination: Law and Practice (5th Ed.) Bristol: Jordan 
Publishing Limited, p.207. Section 19(5), DDA excluded education, before it was repealed by the 
Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001, sections 38(1), 38(5) (a)-(b), 42(6) and schedule 9. 
Doyle provides a concise account of the legislative development in Chapter 9. It is also important to 
note that there was a lacuna in the old provisions in that the exclusion of ‘education’ did not extend to 
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The Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001 (SENDA), however, has 
amended Part 4 of the DDA to cover discrimination in education from 1 September 
2002 onwards. Within Part 4, section 28A now prohibits discrimination by bodies 
responsible for schools468 against disabled pupils and prospective pupils in relation to: 
admission (section 28A(1)); “education” and “associated services” provided for, or 
offered to, pupils (section 28A(2)); and permanent or temporary exclusions from the 
school (section 28A(4)). 
 
The ‘antidiscrimination’ provision contained in section 28(B)(1) is the same as in 
relation to the provision of goods, facilities and services in Part 3, namely that for the 
purposes of section 28A, a responsible body discriminates against a person if – a) for 
a reason which relates to his disability, it treats him less favourably than it treats or 
would treat others to whom that reason does not or would not apply and b) it cannot 
show that the treatment in question is “justified”. 
 
The ‘adjustments’ provision in section 28C requires that responsible bodies take 
reasonable steps to ensure that disabled pupils are not substantially disadvantaged in 
relation to admissions or in relation to the education or associated services provided 
for, or offered to, them. Section 28C(2)(b) states that the section 28C duty does not 
require the responsible body to provide “auxiliary aids or services”. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
non-educational facilities or services such as sports facilities. (Hence the application of Part 3, DDA in 
White.) 
468
 ‘Bodies responsible’ in Scotland refers to: an ‘education authority’ in the case of schools managed 
by the same; the ‘proprietor’ of the school in the case of independent schools; the ‘board of 
management’ of the school in the case of a self-governing school; and the ‘managers’ of the school in 
the case of a grant-maintained school (all terms as defined by section 135(1) of the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1980). 
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There are two main defences available to a responsible body – ‘lack of knowledge’ 
and ‘justification’. First, if the responsible body can show that, at the time in question, 
it did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that a person 
was disabled, it will not have discriminated against them in cases either where its 
failure to take a particular step was attributable to that lack of knowledge or where it 
took a particular step which would otherwise amount to ‘less favourable treatment’ 
(section 28B(4)). Second, less favourable treatment or the failure to comply with the 
duty to make reasonable adjustments can be justified if the reason for it is both 
material to the circumstances of the case and substantial (section 28B(7); 28B(5)). 
Less favourable treatment may also be justified if it is the result of a ‘permitted form 
of selection’ (sections 28B(6); 28B(5)). 
 
As regards Further Education (FE) and Higher Education (HE), there are analogous 
provisions to those above, which apply to schools – sections 28R, 28S and 28T 
correspond to sections 28A, 28B and 28C.  An important difference, however, is that 
section 28T allows FE/HE institutions no exception for auxiliary aids, services or 
physical features,469 by contrast to the exception for schools contained in section 
28C(2) (b), above. 
 
The Disability Discrimination Act, Part 3   
 
Although Part 4 of the DDA is the main legislative provision which tackles 
discrimination and disadvantage experienced by disabled children and students in an 
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educational setting, there are other provisions to take into account. Because the 
education exemption in Part 3 was repealed in its entirety from 1 September 2002, 
institutions not covered by the amended Part 4 will be covered by the goods, facilities 
and services provisions in Part 3.470 This safety net is particularly important for 
younger children as Part 4 duties do not cover day nurseries and family centres, 
private and voluntary playgroups and pre-schools, and accredited childminders.471   
 
The Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004 
 
The Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004, (the 2004 Act) 
avoided the term ‘special educational needs’ and introduced the concept of ‘additional 
support needs’ (ASN).472 Such factors do of course include disabilities, but they are 
also intended to encompass bullying, behavioural difficulties, being a parent, 
bereavement, or being at risk.473 Hence, children with ASN are not necessarily 
disabled; conversely, disabled children do not necessarily have ASN. 
 
Education (Disability Strategies and Pupil’s Records) (Scotland) Act 2002 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
469
 Duties to provide these aids, services and adjustments came into force later than the rest of Part 4: 1 
September 2003 for auxiliary aids and services and 1 September 2005 for physical adjustments. 
470
 See Chapter 4. 
471
 See the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 Part 4 Code of Practice for Schools, paragraphs 10.7-
10.9. 
472
 It will be considered further in the context of case-law, in the section below on mainstream and 
special education, but it is important to note that ASN can arise from any factor or factors which cause 
a barrier to learning. 
473
 See Education: A Guide for Parents – Scotland, published by the former Disability Rights 
Commission but available from Enquire, the Scottish advice service for additional support for learning: 
www.enquire.org.uk. 
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Section 1 of the Education (Disability Strategies and Pupil’s Records) (Scotland) Act 
2002 (the 2002 Act)474 introduced, from October 2002 onwards, a requirement for 
responsible bodies to prepare and implement accessibility strategies to improve access 
to education for disabled pupils.475 Such strategies include improving access to the 
curriculum (section 1(2) (a)); improving the physical environment of the school to 
increase access to education and associated services (section 1(2) (b) and (6));476 and 
by section 1(2) (c), improving communication with disabled pupils by, for example, 
producing school information in a range of formats such as Braille, audiotape or large 
print.477  
   
Social inclusion and sport in education law 
 
The underlying purpose of education law and policy in the UK relating to disabled 
children may be identified with the concept of social inclusion.478 This purpose has 
important implications for the opportunities of disabled children to be involved in 
sport, because of the varying levels of sports provisions in different types of schools. 
What is meant by social inclusion and how this meets the aims of integration has no 
doubt been made significantly more complex by the comparatively recent political 
and legal empowerment of young people and their parents and carers. The notion of 
                                                          
474
 Provisions for England and Wales broadly corresponding to this Act are to be found in SENDA, 
which also applies to Scotland insofar as it amends the DDA (see above). 
475
 Section 2 extends these responsibilities to the education of children under school age, or children of 
school age who are travelling people. 
476
 These sections allow regulations to specify associated services. See Education (Disability 
Strategies) (Scotland) Regulations 2002, SSI 2002/391. 
477
 The implications of this Act for the physical environment are considered further in Chapter 6. 
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the empowerment of citizens as users of public services first gained political currency 
in the UK in the 1980s.479 Since then, much of the education law affecting disabled 
young people has been concerned with arguments arising as a result of what young 
people (and usually their parents or carers on their behalf) believe to be within their 
interests and within the scope of their legal rights, and any conflicting beliefs which 
the authorities responsible for their education hold about those interests and rights. 
These arguments are of profound importance because, as with all children and young 
people, choices about where they should be educated and their school environment 
can be enormously influential factors in the lives of disabled children. Needless to 
say, schools are a different environment from the institutions of adult life. Non-
disabled children’s attitudes to disabled children are often negative.480 A Disability 
Rights Commission survey in 2002481 of the views and ambitions of 305 young 
disabled people aged 16–24 demonstrated the barriers to social inclusion (and entry 
into adult life and employment) experienced by young disabled people. How young 
disabled people end up perceiving their school environment influences their subject 
selection, aspirations and career decisions.482 From a policy perspective, this is one of 
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 Russell, P (2003) “Access and Achievement or Social Exclusion?’ Are the Government’s Policies 
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 Harris, N (2005) ‘Empowerment and State Education: Rights of Choice and Participation’ 68 
Modern Law Review 6. 
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 Disability Rights Commission (2002) Survey of Young Disabled People Aged 16–24 DRC Research 
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the major reasons why educational settings for sport are so important. In order to 
avoid disabled children being ‘turned off’ sport for life, law can be instrumental in 
reversing a negative perception of sport by ensuring that the correct checks and 
balances are in place.   
 
So what are the relevant legal rights available to young people? It should be clear 
from what has just been said that an important aspect of the concept of inclusion is the 
ability of disabled people to have a part in their own educational futures by allowing 
their voices to be heard. Accordingly, the law does contain a right for disabled 
children to be heard and to express their wishes to, for example, take part in sport. 
Article 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires central and local government to 
uphold a right to freedom of expression. It has been argued that this right 
complements comparable rights in some domestic legislation such as the Children Act 
1989 (applying to England and Wales – the Scottish equivalent is the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995) which requires local authorities to ascertain the wishes of 
children they look after or are about to look after, and to give these due 
considerations, subject to practicability and the child’s age and understanding.483 
 
By contrast to ECHR rights and those found in domestic legislation, however, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) appears to legitimise what may be 
regarded as principles of formal non-discrimination rather than more substantive 
social inclusion. Article 23(1) of the CRC prescribes that: “States Parties recognise 
that a mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a full and decent life, in 
conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance, and facilitate the child’s active 
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participation in the community.” Additional paragraphs emphasise the right to special 
care and assistance (Article 23(2)) and recognise that such assistance should be free 
(Article 23(3)). There is an emphasis on education, training, health care services, 
rehabilitation services, preparation for employment and recreation opportunities “in a 
manner conducive to the child’s achieving the fullest possible social integration and 
individual development” (Article 23(3)). In emphasising such concepts as individual 
development, special care and assistance and the fullest possible integration in these 
rights, however, it is arguable that these Articles suggest a model of disability which 
promotes non-discrimination only insofar as it supports parallel education provisions 
for disabled children, rather than fuller social inclusion.484 The danger is that by using 
the language of antidiscrimination rather than inclusion, these rights at least permit, 
and possibly promote, the harmful segregation of disabled children.  
 
In Chapter 4 it was seen that social inclusion as a concept may well be regarded as the 
underpinning purpose or aim of disability discrimination law, but in areas such as 
education the emphasis of the law sometimes appears to be more to do with the sort of 
inclusion in society which is manifest in, at best, parallel education and sports 
programmes – segregated disability sports. As the concept drifts further away from 
inclusion in mainstream social activities, to inclusion in activities specifically 
designed for disabled people, antidiscrimination measures may in fact have the effect 
of promoting discrimination.485 
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 Freeman, M (2000) ‘The Future of Children’s Rights’ 14 Children & Society 277. 
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of Children with Disabilities in International Law’ 5 International Journal of Children’s Rights 177, 
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A and Others v Essex County Council and Others486 
Returning to human rights law, in the recent English case A and Others v Essex 
County Council and Others, the right to education under the First Protocol, Article 2, 
ECHR,487 was considered in the context of four claimants who have “special 
educational needs” under section 312 of the Education Act 1996. The issue raised in 
this case, which is relevant for current purposes, is the extent to which there is a right 
for disabled students to education in a particular school or of a particular type. In the 
process of dismissing the claims for a declaration and damages, Field, J fairly 
comprehensively discussed the limits of the ECHR right to education. Citing the 
recent House of Lords judgment in A v Head Teacher and Governers of Lord Grey 
School,488 the judge affirmed “…that a person of compulsory school age who has 
special educational needs has no right under [Article 2, First Protocol] to be provided 
with an education of any particular type or in any particular school”.489 All that the 
local education authority requires is to provide a minimum standard of education.490 
In fact this minimum standard is relatively easy to satisfy and might encompass no 
more than the offer of part-time education and a limited range of subjects.491 Another 
case raised in the judge’s discussion is Yasanik v Turkey,492 concerning an applicant 
who had been expelled from a military academy, the Commission holding that there 
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was no denial of the right to education because the Turkish education system also 
included civilian establishments in which he could enrol.  
Picking out two aspects of this judgment – the limited range of subjects being 
sufficient to satisfy the minimum standard required by the law; and the lack of a legal 
right to be educated at a particular institution, such as an academy – it seems apparent 
that we might struggle to argue that a disabled student has an ECHR right to be 
provided with sufficient opportunities to take part in sports, or indeed in any named 
activity. For example, there would be no right to choose to be educated at any special 
type of sports academy;493 there may not even be much scope in arguing that sport 
should be included in the limited range of subjects to which the disabled student was 
entitled. 
 
There is a detectable public policy trend in the UK in recent years to allow parents 
more input in the specifics of what is to be included, or excluded, in the school 
curriculum, and the political claim is that this supposed element of choice specially 
protects State school systems.494 If such a policy were to be effectively carried 
through into enforceable law, it might be possible for the parents of disabled students 
to choose and demand greater access to sport on behalf of their children. As in the 
USA, however, the law falls short of this. Harris argues that European human rights 
provisions have failed to substantially protect parental choice and empowerment in 
terms of education.495  
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Perhaps mindful of such policy concerns, courts in Europe have recently tried to find 
a balance, in the right to education, between safeguarding parental choice and 
protecting decisions taken by schools themselves. In Folgerø (and Others) v 
Norway,496 the European Court of Human Rights examined Article 2 of Protocol 1, 
ECHR, and found that the element of individual choice inherent in the ability of 
parents to have their children educated in private schools did not dispense the State 
from its obligation to safeguard pluralism in State schools which are open to 
everyone. On the other hand, the House of Lords has demonstrated that there is 
judicial reluctance to overrule the experienced and informed decisions of head 
teachers, staff and school governors in sensitive matters of choice in education; this 
deferential approach was recently followed in R (on the Application of Begum) v 
Denbigh High School Governors.497 These cases suggest that, whilst there may be an 
obligation on schools to provide an even provision of sport in education across the 
population (including disabled students), they would also be permitted fairly wide 
discretion as to how they go about this. 
 
The wide discretion allowed decision-makers in interpreting the right to education no 
doubt stems, at least in part, from concerns about resources. This means that those 
seeking rights to sport for disabled students in Scottish education probably find a 
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better resource in the education provisions of the DDA and in the additional support 
needs legislation.  
 
Models of disability and education 
 
Childhood has recently been theorised as a variable of social analysis, along with 
other categories, including disability.498 This accords with the social model of 
disability which regards disability as resulting from the interaction between 
individuals and their respective environments. ‘Disability’ can be caused by aspects of 
the institutional environment such as segregated schooling.499 
 
In the Canadian case Eaton v Brant County Board of Education,500 the question of 
integration – where a disabled child with cerebral palsy, Emily, should be educated – 
was examined by the Special Education Tribunal, the Ontario Court of Appeal and, 
subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada. The question specific to Canada was 
whether the domestic education legislation in Ontario was unconstitutional under the 
equality rights provisions of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (see Chapter 2); the general debate, however, was about integration – 
whether or not Emily could be integrated in a mainstream school. In overturning the 
Tribunal’s decision, the Court of Appeal found that Emily could be included in the 
main school population and that, despite various pedagogical arguments for the merits 
of segregated special education, the Charter meant that to non-consensually exclude 
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her from this population was discriminatory and should not be resorted to unless 
alternatives were proven to be inadequate.   
 
By contrast, and in overturning this decision, the Supreme Court found that 
integration can either be a benefit or a burden, depending on whether or not the 
individual can profit from the advantages that integration provides. The main themes 
identifiable in the Tribunal’s argument, which was allowed by the Supreme Court, 
were that: Emily was not benefiting by being in main school population; she was 
isolated in such a setting; consequently, integration was in fact harmful to her; and, it 
was in her own best interests to be in a special class.501  
 
Stepping back to consider for a moment, it is possible to align the contrasting 
approaches of these two courts with the social and medical models of disability, 
respectively (see Chapter 4).502 The Supreme Court appeared to follow the medical 
model in focussing on the apparent inevitability of Emily’s impairments as the causal 
root of her isolation and the supposed harm of integration. On the other hand, the 
Court of Appeal appeared to follow the social model in acknowledging that the 
discrimination against Emily was the result of assumptions of pedagogical theory, 
statutory law and social constructs of disability.503  
 
What this case demonstrates is that the law concerned with the integration of young 
people in education cannot be easily separated from the wider educational, social and 
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political debates. The uncertainties created by the cross-currents of such debates have 
the potential to result in fundamentally contradictory views at judicial level on what 
the law prescribes about issues of integration. Add to this the factor of participation in 
sport, which occurs perhaps at the very boundaries of such debates, in terms of the 
uncertainty as to whether sport constitutes essential education, and it is hardly 
surprising that judicial opinion shows signs of fundamental division.  
 
Furthermore, there is an even greater uncertainty created by adding the factor of 
disability. Then there is the added dimension as to how in specific cases the rules of 
sport at the micro level relate to the rules of law at the macro level. It soon becomes 
apparent that models of disability and how these relate to education, and specifically 
to sport, rapidly lead us into the uncomfortable realm of ‘non-law’ with which judicial 
decision-making often has to contend.504      
 
‘Mainstream’ and ‘special’ education 
 
This is also a debate that is being fought closer to home, in the forum of the 
Additional Support Needs Tribunal for Scotland (ASNTS). Within the context of the 
ongoing debate as to the most appropriate forum for educating children with 
disabilities, at issue is whether ‘mainstream’ or ‘special’ education best serves 
disabled children.505 Access to ‘mainstream’ education is closely linked to access to 
‘mainstream’ sport in the context of education. If disabled children and students 
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experience separate educational arrangements as a whole this is likely to reduce the 
opportunities to participate in mainstream sport. 
 
One way in which Scotland, and the rest of Great Britain, has attempted to enable the 
integration of disabled children in mainstream schools is by introducing law to 
prescribe when and by what means disabled children should receive extra support and 
assistance. In Scotland the 2004 Act, and in England and Wales the SENDA, allow 
cases to be assessed at tribunal.   
 
Cases at the ASNTS have involved the question of the degree to which a particular 
child requires additional support, for example by means of a “co-ordinated support 
plan” (CSP).506 What is apparent from the cases brought to date, is that the parents 
and carers of children and the Education Authority do not take consistent or 
predictable sides in the ‘integration in mainstream education, or segregation in special 
education’ debate. In ASNTS D-01-2006, for example, the appellant, who was the 
father of the child concerned, had made a ‘placing request’ to the Education Authority 
with the intention that the child should placed in a special school. The child was in a 
mainstream class where he received additional support. He had been assessed at a 
prior medical examination at which it was concluded that his needs were generalised 
developmental delay, significant speech and language difficulties, fine motor 
difficulties and emotional immaturities.507 The Tribunal agreed that the Education 
Authority did not, however, agree that these were sufficient impairments to merit his 
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being placed in a special school – instead it was sufficient for his needs to attend his 
local Primary School with an Additional Support Plan.508  
 
In the case reference ASNTS D-02-2006, the mother of the child concerned obviously 
wished her child to be educated in a mainstream school and had requested, and been 
refused, a CSP. The child had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD) and was on medication, but was attending the local Primary 
School. The Tribunal found that his Individualised Educational Programme (IEP) and 
a Record of Needs (under the Education (Scotland) Act 1980)509 was sufficient for the 
child’s requirements. The Tribunal took account of and agreed with the school’s view 
that given appropriate support the child could sustain mainstream education and 
access the curriculum (paragraph 11).  
 
Under section 2(1) (d) of the 2004 Act, a CSP is only required to be made when 
“significant” additional support is provided by both the Education Authority and by 
other agencies. In the recent Court of Session decision JT v Stirling,510 the meaning of 
“significant” was examined and it was held that it imports more than “not 
insignificant” and relates to the support “to be provided” rather than to the needs 
themselves. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
507
 It is not clear from the case report whether or not these impairments would have met the definition 
of disability in the DDA. 
508
 An Additional Support Plan differs from a CSP in that it is non-statutory and a simpler document. It 
outlines the nature of the pupil's additional support needs, the factors affecting learning, the approaches 
to be used and the learning outcomes to be achieved. It can be used by school staff to ensure 
consistency of approach in meeting the needs of individual pupils.  
509
 All Records of Needs were finally transferred to CSPs by 14 November 2007.  
510
 [2007] CSIH 52; [2007] CSOH 67. 
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The 2004 Act tries to take a relatively progressive approach to ensuring that disabled 
children receive the education that is of most benefit to them. There are a number of 
features which set it apart from other sorts of individually enforceable civil law, such 
as the discrimination provisions in the DDA. Firstly, the Tribunal is intended to be 
fairly inquisitorial, rather than adversarial, in nature. In SM v City of Edinburgh 
Council,511 it was held that the duty of the Tribunal is to make investigations. 
Secondly, there is an obvious attempt to move away from the adversarial approach in 
features such as the requirement under section 15 for every Education Authority to 
make arrangements for independent (also free and non-compulsory) mediation. 
Thirdly, there are alternative dispute resolution procedures available under section 16 
– these apply in cases where the ASNTS does not have jurisdiction, i.e. where a child 
does not require a CSP.512 
 
Another aspect of the 2004 Act which is worth noting is that its provisions are entirely 
parent-oriented. The parents have rights and responsibilities over the child, yet the 
child does not appear to have rights and responsibilities (despite being able to instruct 
a solicitor at age 12). This is a potentially significant access to justice issue in the 
provisions which could be incompatible with ECHR rights.513 It is inconsistent with 
the idea that young disabled people should have their say in their own futures (see 
above). 
 
Resources and education 
                                                          
511
 [2006] CSOH 201. 
512
 See the Additional Support for Learning (Dispute Resolution) (Scotland) Regulations 2005. 
513
 I am grateful to Sir Crispin Agnew of Lochnaw for making this point during a Legal Services 
Agency seminar on Education Law, September 2007. 
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Something which has the potential to limit all social and economic rights is the 
question of public resources and this is, of course, no different in relation to 
education. Time and again, educational institutions and the authorities responsible for 
them are constrained in their decisions by budgetary considerations. As was 
considered above, the ECHR right to education is a weak one and this is no doubt in 
part due to the fundamental policy consideration that there is no point in construing a 
right which might be claimed against the state if it cannot practicably or economically 
be delivered. There is, however, high domestic authority to suggest that rights to 
education have the capacity to override economic considerations. In the English case 
of R v East Sussex County Council ex parte T,514 the issue of local authority resources 
was considered in relation to the question of what was the proper forum of education 
for a disabled child. This case concerned a girl with chronic fatigue syndrome whose 
home tuition was being cut by the local education authority from five to three hours 
per week due to budgetary constraints. The House of Lords held that the statute did 
not suggest that resource considerations were relevant to the question of what was 
‘suitable education’. Browne-Wilkinson, LJ thought it was significant that the parallel 
parental duty to ensure their child received a suitable education ‘cannot vary 
according to the resources of the parent’.  
 
In VK v Norfolk County Council and the Special Educational Needs and Disability 
Tribunal,515 the question arose as to whether or not the resources available to a local 
education authority could be taken into account in determining whether it had a 
material and substantial reason for its treatment of a disabled pupil. In terms of 
                                                          
514
 [1998] ELR 251; [1998] AC 714. 
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justification for less favourable treatment, Stanley Burnton, J made it clear that a local 
education authority could not simply point to a lack of available resources within its 
visiting teacher scheme in order to justify its treatment of the disabled pupil. 
 
Indirect discrimination in education and exclusion from sport 
 
Chapter 3 identified three types of disability discrimination challenges arising in the 
context of sport. The second type concerns eligibility criteria which has a disparate 
impact on disabled people and can be regarded as a form of indirect discrimination (in 
which the relevant discriminatory practice is on the face of it ‘neutral’, yet it 
adversely affecting disabled people more than non-disabled people). A body of case 
law has developed in the USA in relation to this type of challenge. Although the 
situation in Scotland is somewhat different, there are examples of possible indirect 
discrimination happening in practice. 
 
In the USA this type of challenge has often arisen in relation to what is known as the 
‘age nineteen rule’, in which school athletes above a certain age are blocked from 
participating in sports and athletic programmes with children who are younger than 
them (supposedly in the interests of competitive fairness). The debate concerns 
whether the age nineteen rule should apply to a student whose disability has caused 
her to remain in high school beyond the age of eighteen, or whether applying the rule 
constitutes unlawful discrimination on the grounds of disability.516 In the case of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
515
 [2004] EWHC 2921 (Admin). 
516
 Frederickson, B A (2003) ‘The Age Nineteen Rule and Students with Disabilities: Discrimination 
Against Disabled Students with Athletic Ability’ 25 Thomas Jefferson Law Review 635, p.636. See 
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Pottgen v Missouri State High School Activities Association,517 for example, a boy 
had repeated two years of school before his disability was identified. This meant that 
he turned nineteen before the deadline set for playing in the senior school year. In this 
case it was held that the age limit was an essential eligibility requirement, because it 
reduced the competitive advantage for teams using older athletes; protected younger 
athletes from harm; and discouraged students from delaying their education.518  
 
The USA has had to tackle the issue of learning disabilities and exclusion largely 
because of the framework of sports institutions at school and college level, which 
includes highly-competitive leagues and generous scholarships.519 There is a different 
framework of sports governance in Scotland, yet it is still possible for indirect 
discrimination issues to arise. One way this might happen is in the context of the 
future provision of Scottish sports schools and the proposals to create ‘sports 
academies’.520 The general tenor of the current discussion about these proposals very 
much emphasises the role of elite mainstream sport, and there is little or no mention 
of disability sport, elite or otherwise.521 At present, Scotland has only one such elite 
                                                                                                                                                                      
also Wolohan, J T (1997) ‘Are Age Restrictions a Necessary Requirement for Participation in 
Interscholastic Athletic Programs?’ 66 University of Missouri Kansas City Law Review 345. 
517
 40 F.3d 926 (8th Circuit 1994). 
518
 See discussion in Frederickson, B A (2003) ‘The Age Nineteen Rule and Students with 
Disabilities…’ p.642. 
519
 See Chapter 1. 
520
 See ‘Experts Want Specialist Academies to Foster Talented Youngsters’ Scotland on Sunday, 19 
August 2007. This article discusses the background to proposals for creating six new sports academies 
in Scotland. See also Coalter, F and Radtke, S (2007) ‘Sports Schools: An International Review: 
Report to the Scottish Institute of Sport Foundation’ Stirling: Department of Sports Studies.  
521
 See ‘Academic Genius: How Sports Academies can Change Scottish Sport Forever’ the Scottish 
Institute of Sport Foundation ezine In the Winning Zone (Edition 12, December 2007), available at 
www.inthewinningzone.com. 
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sports-orientated school, Glasgow School of Sport.522 This school has never 
knowingly had a pupil who it has considered to be disabled.523 It is revealing that the 
application form for the school makes no reference to prospective disabled pupils.524 
Under the heading ‘Selection Procedure’, there is a requirement that all applicants, 
having previously competed in sport, must match at least two of certain criteria 
(distances or times for five athletics disciplines). No allowance is made on the form 
for a different scale of distances or times for disabled applicants.525 Just as there is a 
presumption that students are non-disabled in the age criteria in the USA, here there is 
a presumption that students are non-disabled in the selection criteria. In both cases, 
the practice is potentially indirectly discriminatory (though it has been justified in 
cases such as Pottgen, above). Hence, the aim of integration and social inclusion of 
disabled students in mainstream sports education can be seen to struggle against 
institutional, indirectly discriminatory practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
522
 Glasgow School of Sport, Bellahouston Academy, 30 Gower Terrace, Glasgow, G41 5QF. 
Telephone 0141 582 0034.  Fax 0141 582 0032.  
523
 This was confirmed in private correspondence between the author and the Director of the School. 
Note that the Director stated that the School would be open to applications from disabled pupils.  
524
 Glasgow School of Sport Application for Admission (available from the above address). 
525
 A disabled student with elite performance might be turned down on such facially neutral criteria. 
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Chapter 6: A Safe Environment – rights, planning and 
health and safety 
 
Introduction 
 
The subject of this chapter is how planning and health and safety considerations 
interact with disability rights law.526   The chapter first considers physical access for 
disabled people to the sporting environment and how this is served by disability rights 
law, in particular discrimination law. It goes on to consider how these rights relate to 
health and safety considerations and explores the idea of the disabled athlete as a 
‘threat’.527 
 
Access for Disabled People 
 
This part of the chapter considers access for disabled people to the sporting 
environment, within the context of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) and 
the analogous legislation in other jurisdictions.  
 
                                                          
526
 Of course, there are other aspects of the law which affect the sporting environment: notably, the law 
of nuisance as used to control, for example, noisy crowds or potentially dangerous projectiles such as 
golf balls (see the early case Castle v St Augustine’s Links Limited and Chapman (1922) 38 TLR 615; 
and for the Scottish interpretation of nuisance Kennedy v Glenbelle Limited (1996) SC 95); and also 
environmental law (see, for example, the English case R v Watford Borough Council, ex parte 
Incorporated West Hertfordshire Golf Club [1990] 1 EGLR 263 concerning public access for 
environmental or public reasons). These give rise to issues of application to the general population, 
however, whereas this discussion focuses on problems specifically experienced by disabled people. 
527
 There are also a number of areas of private law which impact on the participation of disabled people 
in sports and the safety and planning aspects of the physical environment – for example, personal 
injury liability and insurance law. There is insufficient space to consider these here, however, and the 
focus will remain on the public law aspects of the sporting environment.  
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The Fundamental Problem 
 
The fundamental problem is that in general terms the manmade world has not been 
designed for disabled people, yet whenever attempts are made to correct this it seems 
nobody can agree on how or even whether, this can be changed. Inevitably, arguments 
rapidly well up about resources, cost-effectiveness and the correct ratio of ‘disability-
friendly’ physical features to ‘disability-indifferent’ features. 
 
The barriers to access and participation created by the physical environment are 
numerous. Analysis of issues in accessible housing demonstrates the variety of 
aspects of adaptive design which need to be considered.528 These include features 
which improve access for those with impaired mobility, such as widened doorways. 
There are, however, a multitude of other possible physical adaptations which could 
improve access to participation in sport for disabled people, ranging from clear and 
accessible signage to seating arrangements (see below).529  
 
There are a number of reasons why disabled people find it difficult to access sport. 
Some of the fullest empirical research into these reasons in the UK has been 
undertaken by Sport England and The English Federation of Disability Sport 
                                                          
528
 A recent summary of barriers in the design and construction of housing is provided in the context of 
the USA’s Fair Housing Act by Schwemm, R G (2006) ‘Barriers to Accessible Housing: Enforcement 
Issues in “Design and Construction” Cases Under the Fair Housing Act’ 40 University of Richmond 
Law Review 735. (Access issues in housing are arguably better developed than issues for sports 
buildings, but provide a reasonable analogy.) 
529
 See, for example, the design of the Stade de France which incorporates a features such as a system 
of ‘vomitories’ to ensure safe and easy crowd flow (see for example http://www.sportsvenue-
technology.com/projects/stade_de_france/). 
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(EFDS).530 Of those in a sample of young people asked what prevented them from 
doing more sport or exercise over the last 12 months, 37% cited the unsuitability of 
local sports facilities.531 In a separate survey, the EFDS found that, out of a cross-
section of disabled children surveyed in Leicester, 42% considered that access and 
equipment and 27.5% identified ‘environment’ as barriers to participation in sport.532 
This demonstrates that facilities, access and equipment and the sports environment all 
substantially contribute to exclude disabled people from access to sport. Clearly, if 
access is to be improved, physical barriers must be corrected as well as other 
discriminatory practices.533  
 
Physical barriers to participation as a spectator 
 
Some of the trickiest aspects of the access problem arise when disabled people wish to 
attend in person as spectators at sports events, rather than play sport themselves, 
although of course there is considerable overlap between these two activities both in 
terms of what it means for disabled people to ‘participate’ in sport and in terms of 
how the legal provisions function. In the USA, the question of how best to go about 
providing wheelchair-friendly seats at sports arenas and stadiums has foxed 
                                                          
530
 Reports by Sport England (2000-2001) Adults with a Disability and Sport National Survey; and 
Young People with a Disability and Sport, Sport England.  
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 Young People with a Disability and Sport, p.41. 
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 The English Federation of Disability Sport (2002) Young People’s Experiences of Accessing 
Sport/Leisure Opportunities in Leicester (available at 
www.efds.net/index.php?incpage=content/research/research.php.) 
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 Burgdorf Junior, Robert (1991) ‘Equal Members of the Community’ 64 Temple Law Review 551 
discusses the importance of correcting architectural barriers as well as discriminatory practices. 
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developers, campaigners and lawyers alike.534 In Paralyzed Veterans of America v DC 
Arena, L P, the Court of Appeals for the Washington DC Circuit attempted to clarify 
the standards for the construction of seating for disabled people, under the ADA 
Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG).535 The ADAAG were introduced in order to 
effect the requirement in Title III of the ADA that new facilities must be designed to 
be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities”.536 The approach 
that the ADAAG appear to take is nominally straightforward in that it consists of a 
quota system for a certain number of disabled access seats in proportion to the total 
number of seats.537  
 
A factual point arising in this case which may not be immediately obvious is this. It is 
all well and good providing disabled access seating, but that is only of real benefit 
where the disabled spectator is in fact able to see whatever sporting action is taking 
place – there need to be adequate ‘sightlines’ from the seats, but these can be blocked 
by people standing up to cheer. Indeed, this point was anticipated by the ADAAG, 
which determined at section 4.33.3 that “[disabled access seating] shall be provided so 
as to provide people with physical disabilities a choice of… lines of sight comparable 
to those for members of the general public”. Generalising this principle, it becomes 
clear that absolute care must therefore be taken to ensure that accommodations built 
for disabled people into the physical environment have the intended result, which 
must surely be to allow participation on an equal, or at least close to equal, basis. The 
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 See the general discussion in Conrad, M A (1998) ‘Wheeling Through Rough Terrain – The Legal 
Roadblocks of Disabled Access in Sports Arenas’ 8 Marquette Sports Law Journal 263. 
535
 28 CFR Pt. 36, App. A (1996). 
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 Section 12183(a) (1), ADA. 
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 Section 4.1.3(19), ADAAG, for example, requires arenas seating more than 500 people to have six 
disabled access seats plus one for every hundred total seats in excess of the first five hundred. 
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central goal of Title III of the ADA is, after all, to ensure that disabled people have 
access to “…the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation”.538  
 
More recently, the question of what exactly constitutes participation on an equal basis 
has been considered in a series of further ‘sightlines’ cases, this time about wheelchair 
access in the new type of ‘stadium-style’ cinemas539 which have been introduced in 
the USA in recent years.540 In Oregan Paralyzed Veterans of America v Regal 
Cinemas Inc.,541 the question was whether wheelchair seating located in the front, flat 
portion of a cinema satisfied the requirements of section 4.33.3, ADAAG (above). 
The potential barrier for the disabled cinema-goer in this case was not of course 
spectators standing up to cheer, but it was the sharp viewing angles created by the 
location of the seats. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that viewing angles 
must be taken into account when assessing the comparability of sightlines.542 The 
Court also held that it was possible to objectively evaluate and compare the amenity 
and comfort of the viewing angles and sightlines available for wheelchair users, based 
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 42 USC, section 12182(a) (2000). 
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 The idea behind the design of stadium-style cinemas is that they more closely resemble sports 
stadiums or arenas than do traditional cinemas by providing stepped seating on a steeper incline, thus 
improving sightlines to the screen. The problem then is that people using wheelchairs are obliged to sit 
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540
 See further analysis of these cases in Watts, J D (2004) ‘Let’s All Go To The Movies, And Put an 
End to Disability Discrimination: Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v Regal Cinemas, Inc. 
Requires Comparable Viewing Angles for Wheelchair Seating’ 34 Golden Gate University Law 
Review 1. 
541
 339 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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1048497; 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000), in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that lines of 
sight did not encompass viewing angles, but merely required sightlines to be unobstructed.  
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on relevant engineering guidelines.543  Since these guidelines designated the viewing 
angles in question as ‘uncomfortable’, the Court found that it was inconceivable that 
objectively uncomfortable seating met the requirements of the DDA to provide 
“…full and equal enjoyment…” for disabled people.544 
 
 Interestingly, in the DC Arena case it was deemed insufficient to provide a composite 
approach of making accommodations in both the physical environment and the social 
environment. The Defendants had suggested implementing ‘no-sell’ and ‘no-stand’ 
policies, the idea being that either the seats in front of the disabled access seats would 
be kept empty or the people in the seats would be given notice that they were not 
permitted to stand. According to the Court, however, this solution was an 
“operational” rather than a “design” solution which meant that it violated the ADA 
requirement that it is the design and construction that must provide the access.545 
Whilst it may seem churlish to criticise this relatively decisive and positive 
interpretation of the ADA, it does suggest that the Court was somewhat ignoring the 
teachings of the social model that a disability is caused by a complex mixture of 
environmental and social factors. In other words, to avoid discriminating against 
disabled spectators the right type of seat has surely got to be matched up with the right 
type of policy or ‘house rules’, such as requiring other spectators to treat disabled 
people respectfully and not blocking their view by standing up unnecessarily. 
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 The Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers: Engineering Guidelines: Design of 
Effective Cine Theaters (1994). 
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 Regal Cinemas, paragraph 1131. 
545
 See Conrad (at note 5), p.274. 
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The ADA’s accessibility requirements for new builds are strong. The only available 
defence to a failure to design in terms of accessibility is where meeting this 
requirement is “structurally impracticable” in “…those rare circumstances when the 
unique characteristics of the terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility 
features”.546 These are unlikely ever to apply to new stadiums.  
 
It is also interesting to compare the approach in the DC Arena case with a similar 
English case, Baggley v Kingston-upon-Hull Council.547 In Baggley, the issue was 
also to do with the sightlines available – this time from the position to the rear of a 
concert hall with which the Claimant had been provided (due to separate health and 
safety concerns). Although originally the District Judge had found that there had been 
unlawful discrimination in the hall’s failure to provide a viewing platform, on appeal 
it was held that the DDA would not require adjustments to be made in these particular 
circumstances. The DC Arena case differed from Baggley in that it involved 
prospective, group litigation, rather than individual, retrospective litigation, but the 
principle question in each case was the same – should the venue be expected to 
improve the sightlines for the disabled spectator? Compared to the ADA requirements 
Baggley demonstrates the relative ease with which a service provider may be able to 
comply with the section 21(2) duties in the DDA to help disable people overcome 
physical features since these features have to make it “…impossible or unreasonably 
difficult for disabled persons to make use of such a service…” before they require to 
be altered. In practice, this appears to be a much harder test to satisfy when it comes 
to physical barriers to participation.     
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 Section 12183(a) (1), ADA. 
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 (2002) CC Claim No. KH101929 (unreported), discussed in McColgan, A (2005) Discrimination 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials Oxford: Hart Publishing, p.603.   
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So, why are the issues these cases raise important to the participation of disabled 
people in sport? Firstly, these sorts of issues exemplify classic examples of disability 
discrimination – they concern a barrier (or barriers) which substantially limit the 
disabled individual’s ability to enjoy an aspect of life, and to participate in the broad 
sense; yet this remains a barrier which may not be immediately obvious. Secondly, 
the prospect of creating a ‘wheelchair’ ghetto in this kind of scenario is a real and 
valid worry.548 If the adjustments made to the physical environment only serve to 
segregate and bring unwanted attention to disabled participants, they quickly become 
counterproductive situations. Such scenarios suggest uncomfortable parallels with the 
classic Rosa Parks-style segregation549 which ignited the civil rights movement in the 
USA, and consequently the wider world. Whereas Rosa Parks was discriminated 
against as a result of unfair barriers arising in the social environment (namely racist 
rules of segregation) which were all too easily overlooked, or at least tolerated; 
disabled participants in sport, whether spectators at a stadium or players in a match, 
are also discriminated against as a result of unfair barriers arising in the physical 
environment, which are perhaps equally easily overlooked or tolerated.550   
 
In a 1998 English report by the Football Task Force,551 it was suggested that FA 
Premier League clubs and Football League clubs should instruct architects to 
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 Report of The Football Taskforce (1998) Improving Facilities for Disabled Supporters (Submitted 
to the Minister for Sport 1998). 
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incorporate full wheelchair access to all social and retail facilities when 
commissioning plans for a new stand or ground; and review access to existing social 
and retail facilities and carry out corrective work where necessary. It was further 
suggested that The Football Trust should make it a condition of grant-aid that major 
new developments incorporate wheelchair access to all social or leisure facilities. 
 
The wheelchair – a deceptive symbol 
 
The prevalence and visibility of mobility impairments throughout the population as a 
whole, and the near inevitability that all of us will experience this form of disability at 
some point in our lives, no doubt helps to create society’s illusion that ‘disability’ is 
synonymous with ‘wheelchair’.552 This really is, however, an illusion. It is an illusion 
not only because the development of the social model of disability has taught us of the 
relevance to the concept of disability of environmental and social factors – factors 
other than impairments and ‘corrective’ technology – and not only because we are 
forced by common medical, political and statutory usage to grapple with a wide and 
unwieldy definition of disability which encompasses a vast array of impairments. It is 
                                                          
552
 Of course, this illusion has multiple sources – other sources than those mentioned above include the 
historical origins of the twentieth century disability civil rights movement in the aftermath of the two 
World Wars (and in the US in particular the Vietnam War), giving rise to organisations such as 
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Hollywood film ‘Forrest Gump’ (1994), see ‘Gary Sinise, A Trouper for the Troops’, Washington Post, 
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developments characteristic of our post-industrialised society allow people to operate technological 
environmental controls, such as wheelchairs, in order to live both independently of and integrated in 
society is explored in Finkelstein, V (1980) Attitudes and Disabled People, New York: World 
Rehabilitation Fund.        
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an illusion because, in order to fully take account of disability when assessing the 
physical environment, it is essential to be able to see far beyond the ubiquitous 
‘disabled’ sign which depicts a wheelchair in the abstract. It is this deceptive symbol 
of disability, however, which is perhaps most associated with the concept of disabled 
access in the manmade physical environment, which includes sports arenas, stadiums, 
pitches, centres, clubhouses and so on.       
 
In 2005, the Scottish Executive (now Scottish Government) undertook an 
investigation into access to public services in Scotland using British Sign Language 
(BSL).553 This research found significant barriers for deaf people in accessing services 
– mostly barriers which have little to do with wheelchair access. For example, glass 
windows in serving areas were particularly difficult to negotiate.554 
 
Health and Safety Protections 
 
One of the major defences against disability discrimination claims is a justification on 
grounds of health and safety. The relationships between the law which determines the 
physical environment, the law which protects individuals within that environment, 
and disability discrimination law can be examined in the context of sport. 
 
The DDA includes as one of its main ‘justification’ defences that the service provider 
holds a reasonable opinion that his or her (potentially discriminatory) treatment of the 
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 Ibid., paragraph 4.8. 
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disabled person is necessary in order not to endanger the health or safety of any 
person (which may include that of the disabled person).555 In Rose v Bouchet,556 a 
Scottish case concerning a visually impaired man who was refused the let of a flat 
which was up five steps with no handrail, a health and safety defence was used to 
successfully repel the pursuer’s claim of discrimination under Part 2 of the DDA.557 
The Principal Sheriff Court held that the defence requires a subjective rather than an 
objective standard, in that the defender only needed to show that he had reasonably 
reached the conclusion, on the facts then known to him, that the scenario in question 
was unsafe for the pursuer. Sheriff Nicholson held that:  
 
…the defender's discriminatory treatment of the pursuer would be justified if, 
in the defender's opinion, the treatment was necessary in order not to 
endanger the pursuer's safety. So far as that part of the test is concerned, there 
can be little doubt in my view that it is subjective, in the sense that what is in 
issue is the opinion of the person carrying out the discriminatory act.558  
 
It is, therefore, unnecessary to determine objectively whether a disabled person would 
be endangered, or would endanger other people, when participating in sport. All that 
is required is that the person providing the sports services in question reasonably 
believes this to be the case. 
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A comparable defence exists in the ADA.559 An obvious difference, however, is that 
unlike the DDA the ADA does not provide an explicit defence where participation 
would endanger the health and safety of the participant themselves.560 It has been left 
to the Supreme Court to clarify that the defence extends to a direct threat to self.561 A 
second difference is that the ADA utilises an objective test, which is based on the 
decision in School Board of Nassau City v Arline,562 in which the Supreme Court 
reconciled competing interests in prohibiting discrimination and preventing the spread 
of disease which posed a ‘significant risk’. Otherwise, the ADA defence works in a 
way that is sufficient for the comparison below. Weaker, however, is Australia’s 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992. There is no specific health and safety defence in 
this statute – instead courts have had to make do with the artificial construct of 
finding an appropriate hypothetical comparator who would pose the same risks as the 
disabled person, in determining whether discrimination is lawful.563    
 
The officious referee and the ‘free for all’ 
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It is extremely difficult to decide how strong the health and safety defence should be 
made in the context of sport (and indeed in any disability discrimination context). The 
three different legislative approaches, briefly described above, each have their own 
disadvantages. The problem with the approach of the DDA, as illustrated by Rose, is 
that it may weight the balance too far in favour of the provider of sports facilities or 
services. Making the defence subjective, albeit according to the standard of 
reasonableness, risks allowing to surface all the drawbacks of the medical (or 
‘individual’) model of disability. The focus is then on the perceived limitations 
imposed by the individual’s impairment, rather than on an objective examination, 
along the lines of the social model, of what are the real risks arising from the physical 
environment.  
 
Favouring an objective test, as in the ADA, however, raises its own set of 
disadvantages. In Knapp v Northwestern University,564 the university refused to let 
Knapp play basketball based on a medical opinion that he should be ineligible on 
grounds of his increased risk of cardiac death.565 At trial, the five medical experts 
disagreed on the acceptability of this risk,566 which immediately raises the evidential 
conundrum – who should arbitrate when such disagreements arise? The general 
disadvantage of this approach is therefore that it is often extremely hard to objectively 
determine the risks posed by the physical environment, either to the disabled sports 
participant, or to others. This exposes the courts to a heavy procedural burden. 
 
                                                          
564
 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). 
565
 Although this case was brought under the Rehabilitation Act 1973, the same objective approach to 
the health and safety defence is found in the ADA, which in many respects reproduces the earlier Act.  
566
 Ibid. at 484. 
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If the health and safety defence is left too weak or is only indirectly present, as it is in 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1992, the disadvantage is that, as in Purvis v New 
South Wales (Department of Education & Training),567 courts will be left to decide on 
their own account that for policy reasons it must be possible to exclude disabled 
people where their participation seems clearly to endanger themselves or others. They 
may then be inclined to ‘work backwards’ by finding a mechanism to achieve that 
policy outcome.568 This has led Australian commentators, frustrated at the lack of 
certainty in the relationship between discrimination and health and safety law, to call 
for greater prescription and specificity of a health and safety defence.569   
 
Dipping for a moment into the somewhat richer stream of case law in the employment 
field to compare how the health and safety defence has been used in that context,570 in 
2002, the former Disability Rights Commission conducted a review of UK case law 
on the use of health and safety requirements as a false excuse for not employing sick 
or disabled persons.571 This review strongly suggested that the effect of the DDA is 
                                                          
567
 See above. 
568
 See discussion of this interpretation of the approach of the court in Campbell, J (2005) ‘Using Anti-
Discrimination Law as a Tool of Exclusion: A Critical Analysis of the Disability Discrimination Act 
1992 and Purvis v NSW’ 5 Macquarie Law Journal 201, p.218. 
569
 See, for example, Rattigan, K (2004) ‘Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education & 
Training: A Case for Amending the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (CTH)’ 28 Melbourne 
University Law Review 532, p.560. 
570
 This comparison has limitations because the employment case law is not directly applicable to 
education and goods, facilities and services because the justification defence in non-employment 
related discrimination is dealt with differently – section 5, DDA, specifies that the employer can show 
less favourable treatment to be justified if there is a reason which is “both material to the circumstances 
of the particular case and substantial” – i.e. there is not a specific reference to health and safety.    
571
 Disability Rights Commission (2002) Review of UK Case Law on the Use of Health and Safety 
Requirements as a False Excuse for not Employing Sick or Disabled Persons (available at 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrhtm/rr167.htm). 
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dampened by the ease with which the health and safety defence can be utilised by 
employers; and it reported expert suggestions both “that health and safety operates as 
a subtext behind many disability discrimination cases and that there is a tension 
between health and safety protectionism and non-discrimination, whether this arises 
as an explicit issue or not”.572 In particular, the Court of Appeal’s test in Jones v Post 
Office573 was highlighted as having important implications for cases in which health 
and safety concerns are pleaded as a justification for not employing a disabled person. 
The test developed in Jones entails that the court must consider whether the 
employer’s decision not to hire is within a range of responses open to a reasonable 
employer. This is a relatively easy test for the employers to satisfy,574 taking into 
account the wide range of risks, from relatively minor and remote risks to serious and 
major ones, upon which they might decide to base their decisions. This leaves open 
the possibility that stereotyped views about disabled people, excessively cautious risk 
assessments and decisions which are simply wrong may all act as lawful barriers, so 
long as they do not result in decisions which fall outside the range of responses open 
to a reasonable employer.575 Although Jones is not directly applicable outside the 
field of employment,576 it has been referred to as being of assistance in the judgment 
                                                          
572
 Ibid. p.6, reporting that these views had been expressed by a senior practitioner, Nicola Dandridge, 
then Head of Equality at Thompsons Solicitors (one of the UK’s leading firms representing claimants) 
and Director of the DDA Representation and Project and Nick O’Brien, then Director of Legal Services 
at the Disability Rights Commission. (It is helpful to be aware of the views of those in a position to 
judge the issues arising in the (large majority of) disability discrimination cases which settle before 
tribunal.) 
573
 [2001] ICR 805 (CA); [2001] IRLR 384. 
574
 See also Heinz Co. Limited  v Kendrick [2000] ICR 419 (EAT), which had already established a 
relatively low threshold for the justification defence generally, in employment disability discrimination 
cases.    
575
 Disability Rights Commission (2002) Review of UK Case Law…, p.1. 
576
 See above. 
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of the Part 3 sports participation case of White.577 In relation to participation in sport 
then, the position is no different. Health and safety concerns are almost raised as 
standard in both education and facilities and services cases, acting to block disabled 
participants from taking part both with non-disabled people and with other disabled 
people.578  
 
There is, however, a proviso in favour of disabled people. Health and safety concerns 
are quite clearly at the root of many reasonable adjustments579 (or ‘accommodations’ 
in the language of the ADA – see Chapter 3) which the law requires for disabled 
sports participants, so it is in the interests of disabled people not to completely 
surrender these concerns. The correct balance in the law must be struck between 
allowing it to act like an unwanted, officious referee who steps in to decide whenever 
there is the merest hint of an unsafe outcome; and permitting a ‘free for all’, leaving 
disabled people to fight it out over what they can and cannot do, be it with employers, 
educators or service providers.   
 
One possible way of achieving this balance might be to revaluate the standard of risk 
as it has evolved within the context of health and safety law. Whether the health and 
safety defence is specified in the legislation or not, and whichever of the mechanisms 
is chosen, the brief comparative examination above suggests that courts have a 
tendency to allow paternalistic protectionism to override the disabled person’s 
                                                          
577
 Ashton, J at paragraph 23. See citation and discussion of this case in Chapter 4.  
578
 See, for example, the discussion of the Parent A case in Chapter 5 and White in Chapter 4.  
579
 For example, in Roads v Central Trains Limited [2004] EWCA Civ 1541 the adjustments at issue 
were considered to be reasonable as a result of the only available route for Mr Roads to reach the 
station platform being negotiable only with excessive difficulty and risk in his wheelchair.  
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autonomous choice and this arguably conflicts with the purpose of disability 
discrimination law.580  
 
If we are to find a new standard of acceptable risk, it is worth considering the concept 
of ‘reasonable practicability’ which has its basis in the common law, in cases such as 
Edwards v National Coal Board.581 Here, Asquith LJ defined ‘reasonably practicable’ 
as a computation in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice 
involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or 
trouble) is placed on the other – if the risk is insignificant in relation to the sacrifice, 
then there is a defence for the employer.582  This test could be evolved to take account 
of the disability discrimination created by the DDA.583 Following Edwards, the two 
questions to ask in utilising this concept in the context of Part 3 of the DDA, for 
example, would then become: (1) what measures are necessary and sufficient to 
prevent any breach of section 20(4) (a); and (2) are these measures reasonably 
practicable?584 This approach would also be compatible with the concept of 
‘autonomy’ which acknowledges that risks may carry benefits and that disabled 
individuals should be permitted to assume known risks, allowing them to participate 
in society (which would include participation in sport).585 
 
                                                          
580
 This observation is adapted in general terms from Davies, J and Davies, W (2000) ‘Reconciling 
Risk and the Employment of Disabled Persons in a Reformed Welfare State’ 29 Industrial Law Journal 
4. 
581
 [1949] 1 All ER 743; followed by R v HTM Ltd [2007] 2 All ER 665. 
582
 Ibid. Paragraph 747 E-F. 
583
 Davies, J and Davies, W (2000) ‘Reconciling Risk…’ p. 365. 
584
 Section 20(4) (a) states that (a provider of services can be justified in treating the disabled person 
less favourably) if “in any case, the treatment is necessary in order not to endanger the health or safety 
of any person (which may include that of the disabled person)”. 
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The right of the individual to be free from a paternalistic state and to make 
autonomous choices about risk is reflected in the court’s interpretation of section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act 1973586 in the sports participation case of Poole v Plainfield 
Board of Education.587 The court interpreted the purpose of section 504 as being 
“…to permit handicapped individuals to live life as fully as they are able, without 
paternalistic authority deciding that certain activities are too risky for them”.588 This is 
no doubt the sort of thought that communities of disabled people are aiming at 
politically, with the slogan ‘nothing about us, without us’.589  
 
As has been seen in Chapter 4, if the real normative and political purpose behind 
disability discrimination law is to do with the concept of social inclusion, a 
cornerstone of this purpose must be autonomous, individual choice, which is 
manifested through the inclusion of disabled people in decision-making. Instead, the 
health and safety defence in current disability discrimination law seems to broadly 
follow two of the most negative aspects of the medical model: paternalism and the 
disenfranchisement of disabled people in assessing their own needs (and the needs of 
others in relation to them). Perhaps one reason why the law is yet to alight on a good 
assessment of risk is down to entrenched misperceptions of the needs and 
requirements of disabled people. What does the law reveal about such 
misperceptions? 
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 Davies, J and Davies, W (2000) ‘Reconciling Risk…’ p. 365. 
586
 On which Title III, ADA is based. 
587
 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980). This case concerned whether a high school wrestler with only one 
kidney was ‘otherwise qualified’ to participate.   
588
 Ibid., pp. 953-954. This interpretation is highlighted in ‘An Ethical and Legal Dilemma’, p.383. 
589
 See Chapter 4 and also Inclusion Scotland (2007) Manifesto for Inclusion – Policy into Practice 
(available at www.inclusionscotland.org/manifesto/index.asp). 
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The disabled athlete as a physical ‘threat’ 
 
As was seen above, adapting the physical environment for disabled sportsmen and 
women is not a simple story of making adjustments to allow wheelchair access; 
likewise, health and safety for disabled participants does not begin and end with 
keeping a wheelchair from dangerously straying into another lane on the running 
track, though of course wheelchairs do provide their own particular set of safety 
issues.590 The idea of the disabled person as a physical ‘threat’ to others has been 
developed in sociological theories and it also has some evidential basis in cases where 
disabled individuals have attempted to participate in sports. These theories and cases 
act to cast light on how the law chooses to include or exclude disabled people from 
participating in sport, in particular through the relationship between disability 
discrimination and health and safety law. 
 
On 3 December 2007, the Indian cricketer Muttiah Muralitharan bowled out 
England’s Paul Collingwood to become the world’s leading wicket-taker in Test 
cricket.591 Apart from this spectacular and unique sporting achievement, Muralitharan 
is notable because he is an elite athlete with particularly unusual physical 
characteristics in his arm. He is both ‘double-jointed’ in his wrist, and he was born 
                                                          
590
 The health and safety aspects of using a wheelchair were considered in Lawrence and Others v 
Cambridge County Council, Monkfield Park Primary School and Anderson (Headmistress) [2005] 
EWHC 3189 (QB). 
591
 Collingwood was Muralitharan’s 709th Test cricket ‘victim’. Muralitharan is recognised as one of 
the finest bowlers of his generation. He imparts an exceptional amount of spin on the cricket ball when 
it is bowled at the wicket, making it particularly difficult for the batsmen to hit the ball.  
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with a permanently bent arm.592 In seeking to account for Muralitharan’s exceptional 
ability, the cricket analyst Simon Hughes opined that he “…is what I would call a 
freakish genius…”593 The former India spin bowler Bishan Bedi said that the 
International Cricket Council, in relaxing its rules on bowlers keeping straight arms 
and as a consequence accommodating Muralitharan, had “created a monster” by 
legitimising his playing style.594 Thus, instead of simply celebrating his sporting 
success, commentators report on Muralitharan’s physical difference as making him a 
‘freak’ and a ‘monster’ that somehow threatens and endangers sport.595 It is this 
stigmatizing focus on physical differences and how these impact on social 
‘acceptance’ which is the focus of Goffman’s analysis.596 More recently, Wendell597 
has characterised this threat in terms of ‘the myth of control’, in which the widespread 
belief that the body can be controlled results in a fear of abnormality and a rejection 
of people with physical disabilities.  
 
The hidden threat – HIV/AIDS 
 
The inherently physical nature of sport means that it is an area of public life in which 
even otherwise unnoticed physical differences, such as Muralitharan’s, are subject to 
                                                          
592
 It is not clear whether or not the characteristics of Muralitharan’s arm would constitute a disability 
for the purposes of the DDA or other discrimination legislation. The point, however, is to do with the 
perception of abnormal physical difference which has obvious parallels with disability.    
593
 Reported on the BBC Sport Website, 3 December 2007 (available at www.bbc.co.uk/sport). 
594
 Ibid. 
595
 See also the case of Oscar Pistorius, discussed in Chapter 4. Pistorius’ prosthetic limb is seen as a 
physical threat both to himself and the runners in other lanes. 
596
 Goffman, E G (1963; 1990) Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity London: Penguin 
Books Ltd, p.19. (See Chapter 2.)  
597
 Wendell, S (1996) The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability London: 
Routledge – see in particular Chapter 2. 
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especially close public scrutiny. The physical impairments of disabled people, which 
are a subset of physical differences, are also subject to scrutiny, at least when they are 
noticeable. Muralitharan’s physical difference, however slight, is noticeable even to 
the casual observer. Another, equally high-profile example of an athlete with a 
physical difference trying to participate in sport is the case of the American 
professional basketball player Ervin ‘Magic’ Johnson who contracted HIV.598 HIV is 
a near-perfect example of unnoticed physical differences which can occur in sport at 
all levels and yet which amounts to profound physical disability.599  
 
In Bragdon v Abbot, 600 the courts considered the issue of whether the plaintiff’s 
asymptomatic HIV would have put her dentist at risk of infection during treatment in 
his office. It was held by the US Supreme Court that the existence of a significant 
health risk from the treatment or accommodation of the disabled person must be 
determined from the standpoint of the person refusing treatment or accommodation. 
The risk assessment, however, must be based on medical or other objective evidence, 
and not simply on that person’s good-faith belief that a significant risk exists. This 
affirms the objective test for the health and safety defence in the ADA. It is 
reasonable to suppose that this principle would also be applicable in the context of 
                                                          
598
 Magic Johnson was, by any standards, a basketball superstar who played for the Los Angeles 
Lakers, winning both the National Basketball Association (NBA) Most Valuable Player award at the 
1992 NBA All-Star Game and a gold medal in the Olympics that same year.  
599
 At least during the phase of HIV which is ‘asymptomatic’ – the person infected with the virus does 
not at this stage exhibit any symptoms that are easily distinguishable by the ordinary person from, for 
example, those of flu. For a concise summary of HIV/AIDS and further analysis of its impact on sports 
management and law, see Wolohan, J T (1997) ‘An Ethical and Legal Dilemma: Participation in Sports 
by HIV Infected Athletes’ 7 Marquette Sports Law Journal 373. See also Mitten, M J (1993) ‘Aids and 
Athletics’ 3 Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law 5; and Hums, M A (1991) ‘AIDS and Sports Participants: 
Legal and Ethical Considerations for School Sports Programs’ 1 Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport 22.   
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 912 F. Supp. 581 (1995); 524 US 624 (1998). 
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sport, and that a service provider refusing to let a disabled person participate, or to 
make suitable accommodations, citing a ‘direct threat’, would be judged against this 
objective standard.  
 
Wolohan identifies a series of questions to ask in assessing the legal position in 
respect of HIV-infected athletes wishing to take part in competitive sport, which 
follow this objective theme: do athletes with HIV pose a direct threat to the health and 
safety of other athletes while competing in athletic events; should any athlete infected 
with HIV compete in competitive athletics; are there any reasonable accommodations 
that can be made to eliminate the risk of transmission to non-infected athletes?601 
These would be equally applicable to sport in Scotland. 
 
The cause of people with HIV/AIDS in Scottish sport has been significantly advanced 
in recent years by the incorporation by the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 of 
HIV/AIDS as one of the grounds for unlawful disability discrimination.602 
Consequently, the issues discussed in these cases from the USA now have far greater 
relevance to this jurisdiction. In August 2006, the UK Government produced a 
discussion paper entitled Tackling AIDS Through Sport.603 This paper addresses a 
number of the issues, such as stigma and social inclusion (which are addressed 
elsewhere in this thesis). Like the Lisbon Treaty, the policy aims are focussed on 
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 Wolohan, J T (1997) ‘An Ethical and Legal Dilemma…’ pp.394-396. 
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 Section 18, Disability Discrimination Act 2005 amends Schedule 1 of the DDA (which supplements 
the definition of ‘disability’ in section 1 of that Act) to include HIV infection, also providing that “[i]n 
this Schedule “HIV infection” means infection by a virus capable of causing the Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome [AIDS]”. Note also that this section also adds to the definition of disability in the 
DDA, cancer of certain types and multiple sclerosis.  
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 Department for Culture Media and Sport and Department for International Development (August 
2006) Tackling AIDS Through Sport London: HMSO. 
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children and young people. It is perhaps too early to predict whether the 
recommendations in this paper will have any impact on participation, but what is clear 
is that disabilities such as HIV/AIDS infections are not going to disappear from sport 
and they will continue to pose tricky legal questions. 
 
The violent threat 
 
In the Australian case Purvis, a disabled child, Daniel, who had suffered severe brain 
injury as a child, was excluded from his local high school on grounds that his violent 
behaviour threatened the health and safety of the staff and students. A complaint was 
made on behalf of Daniel to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 
(HREOC), alleging that his exclusion amounted to direct discrimination under the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992. The complaint was initially upheld by the Inquiry 
Commissioner who reasoned that Daniel’s disability and the behaviour in question 
were so closely connected that they should be treated as the same thing. According to 
section 5, Disability Discrimination Act 1992, in the test for direct discrimination the 
comparator is the person in the same or not materially different circumstances, 
without the disability. The Commissioner combined these two premises, one factual 
the other legal, to conclude that the correct comparator in this case was a student 
without the disability who had not behaved like Daniel. Because this comparator 
existed in the form of other students who had not been excluded, it was easy to see 
that Daniel had been treated unfavourably and had been discriminated against. 
 
The New South Wales Department of Education and Training appealed this decision 
to the Federal Court, where the appeal was upheld on the grounds that the 
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Commissioner’s first, factual premise was incorrect and that he had consequently 
chosen the wrong comparator. The Federal Court held that the correct comparator 
would be someone who behaved as Daniel had, but who was not disabled. On further 
appeal, the High Court upheld the Federal Court’s findings, affirming the view that 
the correct comparator should be this hypothetical one. 
    
This vain search for an appropriate comparator reveals the difficulty the courts have 
in deciding how to treat children with a disability which plays a part in behaviour 
threatening health and safety. Just as an athlete with HIV like Magic Johnson, or a 
cricketer with a deformity like Muralitharan, is perceived as a potential threat and a 
danger to sport; a disabled child like Daniel creates a defensive, hard-line response. 
With all of these people, the instinctive reaction of the public and the courts alike 
(and, sadly, other sportsmen and women) seems to be to try to find ways to exclude, 
rather than include, them. Jacob Campbell sums this up: “In Daniel’s case disability 
was reduced to individual, pathological behaviour and that behaviour was, in turn, 
reduced to violence and threat”.604  
 
The threat to self 
 
Last, but not least, risk of harm to self is very often cited as a reason to exclude 
disabled athletes.605 A person who has serious heart problems, of which they may at 
first be unaware, is one example – as in the case of Knapp, above. In characterising 
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 Campbell, J (2005) ‘Using Anti-Discrimination Law as a Tool of Exclusion: A Critical Analysis of 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and Purvis v NSW’ 5 Macquarie Law Journal 201, p.215. 
605
 See the general discussion in Mitten, M J (1998) ‘Enhanced Risk of Harm to One’s Self as a 
Justification for Exclusion from Athletics’ 8 Marquette Sports Law Journal 189. 
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the disabled athlete as a socially-constructed ‘threat’, it is of course important not to 
lose sight of the possibility that he or she poses a genuinely high medical risk by 
participating in sport. In such cases paternalism may be called for and discriminatory 
treatment justified. Jones has argued that athletes can easily lose sight of their 
limitations (sometimes even regarding themselves as ‘invincible’) and particular care 
needs to be taken that they are fully aware of, and understand, the medical 
implications, should they choose to continue to play a particular sport.606 
 
                                                          
606
 Jones, C J (1992) ‘College Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to Play’ 40 Buffalo 
Law Review 114, p. 201. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has examined the nature of the rights of disabled people to participate in 
sport. As part of this examination, it has been possible to determine the potential 
emergence of a specific right to sport; the existence of a composite group of rights, 
which taken together may equate to such a right; and the utility of antidiscrimination 
rights, mainly as contained in disability discrimination legislation. In terms of a legal 
framework, the nature and strength of these rights depends in part on whether the 
focus is on international public law, which may contain an embryonic right to sport; a 
national constitutional or bill of rights model, which contains a composite group of 
rights; or a model of domestic legislation, which focuses on antidiscrimination rights. 
 
The general failure of sports superpowers such as the USA to sign up to international 
provisions brings into sharp relief the potential lack of utility in positing rights in 
international public law. The increasingly international focus of sport nevertheless 
means that it can no longer be seen as a purely domestic issue and attentions may 
increasingly need to turn towards provisions such as Article 30.5 of the new UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which applies to sport for 
disabled people. In a world where the Governor of the USA’s richest state, which is 
not party to the Convention, acts as ambassador to the 2007 Beijing Special 
Olympics,607 held in a country which is simultaneously a sports superpower and 
notorious for its human rights record, the need to comprehend disability rights to sport 
has arguably never been greater.  
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Within instruments such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the new 
Treaty of Lisbon, as well as the ECHR, the constitutional focus becomes more 
apparent, reflecting the merits of a more holistic approach to rights. There is some 
evidence that a right for disabled people to participate in sport may be gleaned from 
other rights, such as those protecting the ‘integrity’ of the individual, or the right to 
education. The gain in strength of the mechanisms for enforcing these sorts of rights 
(over rights in international public law) may be in approximately inverse proportion to 
the decrease in the specificity of the rights protected.  
 
Within the USA and the UK domestic models (as well as in Australia), a relatively 
powerful set of disability rights are specified by antidiscrimination legislation, and 
these are complemented by statutes which provide a further group of rights, such as 
education statutes. Once again, although these sorts of rights are more directly 
enforceable than the disability rights contained in constitutional or public international 
law, they are yet further removed from a ‘direct’ right to sport, and can only hope to 
achieve increased (and better quality) participation for disabled people ‘indirectly’, 
via general concepts such as equality or social inclusion.    
 
Disability rights are an invention which has still to develop beyond the inherent 
struggle between the quality of the right protected and the quality of the remedy 
provided. The first conclusion is, therefore, that in order to truly identify and deliver 
rights to participate in sport for disabled people, it may be necessary to significantly 
strengthen the relationship between international law, constitutional law and state 
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 Arnold Schwarzenegger, who is Governor of California, acted as ambassador to the Special 
Olympics 2007.  
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decision-making at the level of domestic law, in order to attain both greater specificity 
and better enforcement.  
 
Within the context of sport for disabled people, the thesis has examined concepts 
contained in the law, such as ‘social inclusion’, and its application to the 
integration/segregation debate in sports education; the redistributive ideals of 
‘equality’; models of disability and their application to definitions of disability 
contained in discrimination legislation; the rules of sport and their relation to the law; 
and the potential creation of ‘new’ rights such as a right to sport. All of these have 
been shown to cause significant problems of interpretation for the judiciary in 
Scotland and further afield. The fact that courts struggle with, or even shy away from, 
these concepts is not a reason in itself to think that the law cannot legitimately deal 
with them. What this thesis has tried to demonstrate, however, is that this area of the 
law is perhaps especially hard to separate from a purposive interpretation of the law, 
in which judges must attempt to discover the underlying aim of the legislation, rather 
than formalist interpretations in which the text alone is taken to constitute the law. 
The second fundamental conclusion then is that the law which has been examined in 
this thesis operates at the very boundaries of what has traditionally been taken to be 
the role of the courts. 
 
This second conclusion can be illustrated by revisiting questions arising in key cases 
that have been considered. For example, does the purpose of disability discrimination 
legislation extend to overriding the rules of mainstream sports, so as to allow for 
individual enhancements or accommodations for disabled sportspersons, as in Martin? 
Does a child with behavioural difficulties which are inextricably linked to his 
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disability, like the boy in the Parent A v East Ayrshire Council case, retain a right to 
be integrated in mainstream sports, or must he play sport separately from the other 
children? How much of a ‘threat’ must the disabled athlete constitute before he is 
legitimately excluded from participating in sport and, as was the issue in Knapp, who 
should make that decision? Should a disabled athlete continue to receive more 
favourable treatment when it means they potentially end up performing with a distinct 
advantage over non-disabled athletes (as in the case of Oscar Pistorius)? All of these 
are ultimately questions of social policy and perhaps society should attempt to find 
clearer answers to them, and the legislature should create clearer law, before courts 
are asked to undertake the challenging task of deciding them. 
 
Further to these two main conclusions, this study also concludes that the context of 
sport demonstrates that disability discrimination law, and in particular its 
‘adjustments’ (or ‘accommodations’) requirements, may be closer in character to the 
main canon of discrimination law than is often assumed. It also raises questions about 
the adequacy of the current law to cater for the requirements of disabled athletes (and 
disabled people more widely), who are ‘super-enabled’ by way of technological 
enhancements. (Implicit in the law is the assumption that disabled people are ‘less 
able’.) 
 
Lastly, in terms of the underlying aims of the law, it is concluded that, in relation to 
sport (as opposed to areas such as employment) the concept of ‘social inclusion’ may 
better fit the law, rather than the concept of ‘equality’; and in relation to definitions, 
the ‘social’ model of disability should not entirely supersede the ‘medical model’ in 
the context of sport.  
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The way forward 
 
There may be a fundamental tension between the concept of disability discrimination 
and many of the features of sport that have been taken for granted by society up to 
now. It is likely that disabled people will increasingly continue to enter sport at all 
levels, both recreational and competitive, including elite sport. Technological 
innovations will increasingly help to allow disabled people to participate in sport and 
the time may come when sports regulators have to make many further allowances for 
those who have a good claim to use enhancements as legitimate, reasonable 
adjustments to their chosen sport. 
 
Some of the issues arising from this examination of discrimination law will have to be 
addressed further, and this will probably require the involvement of the courts. In 
particular, the extent of what amount to reasonable adjustments, and how far 
favourable treatment can be taken, will ensure that this debate continues. Rights 
drawn from discrimination law will also have to be more enforceable if real change is 
to be achieved. The proposals for new domestic equalities legislation should aim to 
strengthen, rather than weaken, the disability equality duties, which should help 
increase sports provision at public authority level.  
 
Although this thesis has not managed to confidently identify a human right to 
participate in sport for disabled people, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities comes somewhere close to achieving this in Article 30.5 and the UK 
Government should be urged to ratify, without reservation, this important treaty. This, 
and the increasing recognition of sport in European law and policy, via concepts such 
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as ‘personal integrity’, could play an important role in implementing change and 
assisting organisations such as NGOs to facilitate better access for disabled people to 
participate in sport.    
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Chair’s foreword 
Equity is not necessarily about treating people equally, but is concerned more with fairness, 
justice and inclusion. It’s about taking action to ensure that all individuals are respected, have 
equality of opportunity, and have their rights protected. Sports equity is about making sure 
that everyone has an equal chance to take part in sport if they choose to do so, and that no 
one is discriminated against for reasons such as gender or gender reassignment, disability, 
race, religion or belief, sexual orientation, age, marital or civil partnership status, pregnancy or 
maternity, or social background. 
 
We’d all like to believe that sport is open to everyone, but this is not always the case, as the 
results of research repeatedly show. For some – for example, people with a disability, black 
and minority ethnic (BME) people, and women and girls – there are a range of barriers which 
can hinder their opportunities to take part in sport, whether as a participant, official, volunteer, 
coach or club member. These barriers are unacceptable and as Scotland’s national agency 
for sport, we’re committed to taking action as an organisation and with our partners to help 
remove them. 
Everyone has a unique range of skills and knowledge that they bring to sport. Recognising 
this and the value that different cultures, backgrounds, abilities and lifestyles contribute to 
developing sport and achieving organisational objectives is a clear sign of a healthy and 
inclusive organisation committed to diversity and continuous improvement. If we embrace 
diversity and strive to achieve equity within sportscotland and in Scottish sport, we will not 
only reap real benefits for our organisation and staff, but we will also make a positive and 
tangible impact on both increased sports participation and improved sporting performance – 
the two key aims of our Corporate Plan and the national strategy for sport. 
 
This Single Equity Scheme (the ‘Scheme’) for 2006-2009 sets out how we will embed equity 
into our functions, and how we’ll comply with our statutory Disability, Gender and Race 
Equality Duties, promoting equality between disabled people and other people, men and 
women, and people from different racial groups. 
 
We are required to publish this Scheme by law but, regardless of our legal requirements, we 
are committed to promoting equity because we passionately believe that sport should be 
open to and enjoyed by all. We always welcome feedback on our approach to equity, and we 
look forward to continuing to work with our partners in sport to ensure that everyone has a 
sporting chance. 
Julia Bracewell OBE 
Chair 
 232
Executive summary 
Equity is about fairness. Our vision for equity in Scottish sport is to ensure that discrimination 
in sport is tackled, barriers are broken down, current inequalities in participation, coaching 
and leadership are addressed, and that Scottish residents have equal opportunities to 
participate in sport at all levels. This must be regardless of factors such as their gender or 
gender reassignment, disability, race, religion or belief, sexual orientation, age, marital or civil 
partnership status, pregnancy or maternity or social background. 
 
Our vision is supported by a number of key pieces of legislation, set to reshape the landscape 
of equity across the UK, and within sport. The three main pieces of legislation relevant to this 
vision, and to which this Scheme responds, are listed below: 
 
• The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (RRAA 2000) which places on us a general 
duty to consider the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, promote equality of 
opportunity and promote good relations between people of different racial groups. And as 
outlined under the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (Statutory Duties) (Scotland) Order 2002 (as amended in 2006), we have 
a specific duty to publish a Race Equality Scheme. 
• Under the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 (DDA 2005), we have a general duty to 
promote equality of opportunity between people with a disability and other people. This Act 
also requires us to publish a Disability Equality Scheme. 
• Under the Equality Act 2006, we have a general duty to eliminate unlawful discrimination 
and harassment and promote equality of opportunity between men and women. And, like the 
legislation for disability and race, we must publish a Gender Equality Scheme. 
This Single Equity Scheme (the ‘Scheme’) covers how we meet the general and specific 
duties outlined in each piece of legislation. A general duty is best described as the outcomes 
an organisation needs to achieve. A specific duty involves the steps an organisation must 
take to achieve the general duty, and thus reach equity, such as publishing an equity scheme 
or conducting an equal pay review. 
 
The overall aim of these duties is to address the inequalities faced by some groups of 
Scottish society – including women, people with a disability, and black and minority ethnic 
(BME) people. 
We are required to publish a Disability Equality Scheme by 4 December 2006, a Gender 
Equality 
Scheme by 29 June 2007, and a Race Equality Scheme by 30 November 2007. 
We have decided to combine the three schemes into one. We strongly believe that issues 
such as gender, disability and race should not be viewed as separate elements. The life and 
experiences of an individual will be affected by a variety of these factors, and some people 
are affected by multiple discrimination. The whole field of equity is moving towards an 
integrated approach, as demonstrated by the UK Government’s decision to replace the three 
commissions for race, gender and disability with the Commission for Equality and Human 
Rights (CEHR).On a practical level, the duties outlined in each piece of legislation have many 
common elements, and the steps we’ll take to tackle them will be similar, so it makes sense to 
take a combined approach and publish the three Schemes for disability, gender and race 
within one Single Equity Scheme. 
 
In order to meet our public sector duties, and help to fulfil our vision for equitable sport, we 
have identified five goals for equity which all the key agencies involved in developing and 
delivering Scottish sport should strive to achieve. These goals provide a framework for the 
detail of our Scheme, and are as follows: 
• a network of informed, well trained people working and volunteering in sport to deliver and 
promote opportunities for all; 
• quality, accessible facilities in place that provide and promote opportunities for Scottish 
people to participate in sport; 
• strong and equitable organisations supporting and promoting equality of opportunity for all in 
sport and in the workplace; 
• the development of sporting pathways that promote opportunities for everyone to take part 
in sport at all levels to the best of their ability; and 
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• strong awareness of current equity issues, and promotion of the importance of embedding 
equity and ensuring equality of opportunities for all. 
We have outlined a number of specific objectives that we will aim to meet in order to 
contribute to each of these goals for equity in Scottish sport. It is vital to realise that we can 
only be expected to contribute to the five goals. Their achievement will require contributions 
from all of the key partners working to develop and deliver sport in Scotland. The detail of how 
we will work to achieve our agreed outcomes is set out in our Generic Equity Action Plan, 
Disability Equity Action Plan, Gender Equity Action Plan and Race Equity Action Plan, which 
are included in this document as Appendices E to H. 
 
As well as committing to our general duties, we have a number of specific duties to fulfil. One 
of these is publishing this Scheme. The others are as follows: 
 
Involving and consulting stakeholders in the development of the Single Equity Scheme 
We are required to involve disabled people and consult with male and female stakeholders 
and people from different racial groups to shape the way we carry out our functions; develop 
our Equity Scheme; decide on equity goals; and carry out assessments to ascertain the equity 
impact of our policies, programmes and services. The specific requirements vary between 
each of the three public sector duties, as set out in more detail in the Scheme. 
 
We’ve already made considerable inroads into this requirement, including research to find out 
the barriers that prevent participation, and setting up a number of advisory and consultation 
groups to help us develop this Scheme. We will continue to involve and consult with a range 
of stakeholders, as appropriate, as we develop and implement the Scheme and action plans. 
 
Monitoring sportscotland’s workforce 
All three of the public sector duties for race, gender and disability equality require us to 
undertake some form of equity monitoring of our staff. Again, the specific requirements differ 
between the three duties, but in essence, we need to look at the recruitment, retention, 
training, development and promotion of our staff by gender, disability and racial group, and 
publish the results of this monitoring each year. 
 
In December 2006, we carried out an equity profile survey on all staff. We will repeat the 
exercise annually, and report the results to our Board for consideration as part of the ongoing 
development and implementation of the Scheme. 
 
Equity impact assessment 
All three of the public sector duties require us to undertake some degree of Equity Impact 
Assessment of our policies, practices, services and functions. This means we’ll look at how 
the work we do impacts on key excluded populations such as BME individuals, women and 
disabled people. 
 
Plans are already in place to look at the areas outlined above, including ownership, training, 
consultation and publishing of the results. 
 
Monitoring the impact of sportscotland’s policies on the promotion of equality of 
opportunities 
All three of the public sector duties on race, gender and disability equality require us to set out 
in our Scheme how we will monitor the impact of our policies on disabled people, women and 
men, and BME people. By following the steps set out to conduct Equity Impact Assessments 
on our policies, programmes and services, we will be engaging with people from all three of 
these groups, which will allow the impact of the policies to be monitored. We will also monitor 
the impact through a variety of other means, including investment agreements, ongoing 
partnership working and formal reporting, as set out in the Scheme. 
 
 
Procurement 
Each year, we form a number of contracts with external organisations to commission work on 
our behalf. When an external consultant undertakes work or provides services on our behalf, 
the obligation to comply with the public sector duties remains with us. However, this means 
 234
that we will need to build relevant equity considerations into the procurement process, to 
ensure that we meet the public sector equality duties in relation to this function. The Scheme 
and attached action plans address how we will meet these duties.  
 
Monitoring, reporting and review 
sportscotland’s Equity Project Group, chaired by the Senior Management Team Equity 
Champion, will be responsible for overseeing delivery of, reporting on and reviewing the 
Scheme. It will meet regularly during the period of the Scheme. Progress on delivery will be 
reported on a regular basis to the Senior Management Team and the Board. Any issues 
regarding non-delivery or other significant problems will be escalated to the Senior 
Management Team as soon as possible. 
 
We are required by law to publish annual reports on our Disability, Gender and Race Equality 
Schemes. An integrated report on the entire Scheme will be published by 4 December 2007, 
and then once every year after that. The three public sector duties require us to revise our 
Gender, Race and Disability Schemes within three years of their initial publication dates. 
Therefore, the entire Scheme will be reviewed and revised by 4 December 2009, and every 
three years thereafter.Towards the end of 2008, the Equity Project Group will develop a plan 
for the review and revision of the Scheme. Disabled people, women and men, BME people 
and key stakeholders representing the other key equity strands will be involved in this process 
as appropriate. 
 
For more information on the Scheme, talk to our Ethics Manager on 0131 317 7200, or visit 
www.sportscotland.org.uk/ethics. 
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01 
Introduction and background to the 
Single Equity Scheme 
About sportscotland 
sportscotland is the national agency for sport in Scotland. We are a non-departmental public 
body. Working with our core partners, our key responsibility is to facilitate the development of 
sport and physical recreation in Scotland. 
 
Our goal is to get more people participating more often in sport in Scotland. Everything we do 
is part of the drive to achieve the dual challenges of increasing participation and improving 
performance. 
 
sportscotland has a key role in supporting local authorities and Scottish Governing Bodies of 
sport (SGBs) to develop and implement their planning and delivery frameworks. We advise 
the Scottish Executive on sports policies and issues; invest Exchequer and Lottery funding 
primarily through local authorities and SGBs; and support partners in developing their 
contribution towards Scotland’s national strategy for sport. We also identify and disseminate 
good practice and develop technical, policy and financial support. In all that we do, we strive 
to add value to the work of our partners. 
 
Based in Edinburgh, we employ approximately 260 staff. The organisation is run by a Board 
of 
Directors, and is headed up at executive level by the Chief Executive Officer, who is 
supported 
strategically by the Senior Management Team. Further details of sportscotland’s structure, 
teams 
and Board members can be found at www.sportscotland.org.uk, as can our Corporate 
Plan608. 
 
sportscotland is also the parent company of the Scottish Institute of Sport, and the three 
National 
Centres of Glenmore Lodge, Cumbrae and Inverclyde. 
 
The public functions of the Scottish Institute of Sport and the three National Centres are or will 
be 
subject to the general race, disability and gender equality duties. However, unlike 
sportscotland itself and an extensive list of listed public authorities in the UK, these 
organisations are not subject to the additional specific duties, such as the duties to publish a 
Race, Disability or Gender Equality Scheme.During the period of this first Scheme, we’ll work 
with the Scottish Institute of Sport and the three National Centres to advise and support them 
as they comply with their general duties. 
 
Our Single Equity Scheme 
Equity is about fairness. In sport, it’s about making sure that people living in Scotland, 
regardless 
of factors such as gender or gender reassignment, disability, race, religion or belief, sexual 
orientation, age, marital or civil partnership status, pregnancy or maternity, or social 
background are able to participate and enjoy the benefits an active life has to offer. 
 
                                                          
608
 Our Corporate Plan is currently under review. The new Corporate Plan for 2007-2011 will be available from spring 2007. 
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As the national body for sport in Scotland, there are a number of statutory public duties we 
need to consider in order to promote equity. Some of these are general duties, some of these 
are specific. 
 
A general duty is best described as the outcomes an organisation should achieve, such as 
promoting equality of opportunity. A specific duty involves the steps an organisation must take 
to fulfil its general duties and reach equity, such as publishing an equity scheme or 
conducting an equal pay review. The overall aim of these duties is to address the inequalities 
faced by some groups of Scottish society – including women, people with a disability and 
black and minority ethnic (BME) people – and to promote equality of opportunity for people in 
these groups. 
 
We have produced this Scheme as part of our statutory duty to promote equality, but also 
because we passionately believe that sport should be open and accessible to all. 
 
Accountability and leadership 
Ultimately, our Chief Executive, Chair and Board have accountability for the delivery of this 
Scheme and thus for ensuring that we meet our public sector race, gender and disability 
duties. Our Senior Management Team has nominated one of its members to be the 
sportscotland Equity Champion, and to lead the Equity Project Group. The Equity Champion 
will ensure that a key reporting and communication link exists between the Equity Project 
Group and our Senior Managers and Chief Executive. 
 
However, every member of staff in the organisation has a responsibility to ensure that 
sportscotland complies with its public sector equality duties, and to help deliver the actions 
within this Scheme. All staff will be made aware of these responsibilities through briefings and 
training, as discussed in more detail later in the Scheme. 
 
Public Sector Equality Duties and our Single Equity Scheme 
Race Equality Duty 
Under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (RRAA 2000) we have a general duty to 
consider the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination; promote equality of opportunity; 
and promote good relations between people of different racial groups. 
 
As a result of the Race Relations Act 1976 (Statutory Duties) (Scotland) Order 2002 (as 
amended in 2006), we are also subject to a number of specific race equality duties. For 
example, we are required to monitor the profile of our staff by racial group (‘the employment 
duty’), to carry out assessments on the impact of our policies on race equality, and to publish 
a Race Equality Scheme by 30 November 2007. 
 
Details of our general and specific race equality duties are set out in Appendix C. 
 
Disability Equality Duty 
Under the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 (DDA 2005), we have a general duty to promote 
equality of opportunity between people with a disability and other people. The detailed 
requirements of this duty are set out in Appendix A. 
 
As part of this Act, we are also subject to a set of specific duties, one of which is to produce a 
Disability Equality Scheme, including an action plan. The Disability Equality Scheme is 
intended to help us meet our general duty more effectively. The details of all our specific 
duties under the DDA 2005 are also set out in Appendix A. 
 
Gender Equality Duty 
Under the Equality Act 2006, we have a duty to eliminate discrimination that is unlawful under 
the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 or the Equal Pay Act 1970, to eliminate harassment on the 
grounds of sex (including gender reassignment, or pregnancy and maternity) and to promote 
equality of opportunity between men and women. 
 
This duty came into force on 6 April 2007. 
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By 29 June 2007, we’ll also be subject to a number of additional specific duties under this Act, 
as set out in more detail in Appendix B. One of these is to publish a Gender Equality Scheme, 
helping us to meet our general duty more effectively. 
 
Other anti-discrimination and equalities legislation 
At the time of publication, public authorities do not have a duty to promote equality in relation 
to any of the other major equity strands (age, sexual orientation and religion or belief). 
However, our commitment to equity and diversity goes beyond simply complying with 
legislation; we are committed to promoting equality of opportunities as far as possible for all 
people in Scottish society. 
 
In light of this commitment, we’ll give due regard to promoting equity for all, regardless of age, 
sexual orientation and religion or belief when developing policies and carrying out our 
functions. 
This includes: 
• considering age, sexual orientation and religion or belief when monitoring the equity profile 
of 
our staff; 
• considering the impact of these factors, as appropriate, when carrying out Equity Impact 
Assessments on our policies, programmes and services; and 
• including actions in our Equity Action Plan (for example, the delivery of staff equity training) 
that 
relate to these three equity strands as well as to disability, gender and race equality. 
 
In addition to fulfilling our race, disability and gender equality duties, we will continue to 
comply with the following additional legislation: 
• the Equal Pay Act 1970; 
• the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (as amended in 1986 and 1999); 
• the Race Relations Act 1976 (as amended in 2000); 
• the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (as amended in 2005); 
• the Human Rights Act 1998; 
• the Scotland Act 1998; 
• the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003; 
• the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003; 
• the Gender Recognition Act 2004; 
• the Civil Partnership Act 2004; and 
• the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. 
 
We will also comply with any future anti-discrimination or equalities legislation that comes into 
force during the period of this Scheme. This includes those elements of the Equality Act 2006 
which will make it unlawful for an organisation involved in providing goods, facilities or 
services to discriminate on grounds of religion or belief or sexual orientation609. 
 
Why a Single Equity Scheme? 
Our decision to publish one Scheme, rather than three separate Disability, Gender and Race 
Equality Schemes was influenced by a number of factors. 
 
We strongly believe that it’s vital not to view issues such as gender, disability, race, age, 
sexual orientation and religion or belief as wholly separate elements. The life and experiences 
of any single individual in Scotland will be affected by a variety of these factors, and some 
individuals are affected by multiple discrimination. This view is commonly backed up by 
research and the views of contributing partners, and is clearly a strong factor in the UK 
Government’s decision to replace the three Commissions for race, gender and disability 
equality with the Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR). Therefore, it is 
important not to separate out the actions to tackle inequalities and discrimination into three 
                                                          
609
 The relevant elements of the Equality Act 2006 are due to come into effect by April 2007. 
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separate strategies, especially when many actions will help us to meet our three public sector 
duties simultaneously. 
 
The Race, Disability and Gender Equality Duties have many common elements. All three 
duties require us to have ‘due regard’ to the need to eliminate discrimination and to promote 
equality. There are also many similarities in the specific requirements under each of these 
equality duties, for example, shared duties to assess and consult on the impact of proposed 
policies, monitor existing policies, and monitor our staff equity profile. 
 
The current context of evolving anti-discrimination and equalities legislation means it’s 
important that we look to the future. The approach we develop now must be one that can 
easily be adapted at a future date to encompass any additional public sector duties to 
promote equality in relation to religion or belief, sexual orientation and age. We believe the 
rationale behind this approach is strengthened by the ongoing Discrimination Law Review and 
the potential for a single Equality Bill by 2009, as well as the decision to replace the three 
Commissions for race, gender and disability equality with the CEHR. 
 
In order to genuinely mainstream equity into the functions of sportscotland, it is important that 
our 10 staff and partners are able to understand the context and implications of the whole 
equity agenda.Having three separate schemes for race, gender and disability equality would 
simply reinforce the misconception that each area of action is separate, unrelated, and 
additional to our core work. In order to change the culture within sport, it will be vital to 
demonstrate that equity is integral to the existing work of organisations, not a burdensome 
‘add-on’. Having this Scheme will also significantly reduce duplication. 
 
The requirement to publish the three Schemes has been placed on us at largely the same 
time. 
Therefore, the processes to develop the three Schemes would have to run almost 
simultaneously, so it’s more effective to combine the development processes. 
 
Why equity and not equality? 
We’ve chosen to publish a Single Equity – rather than Equality – Scheme as this is the 
terminology that sportscotland and Scottish sport already uses. Equity is about the promotion 
of equality of opportunities and fair – rather than necessarily equal – treatment, which is in 
essence what the three equality duties focus upon. Equity recognises that everyone is 
different, and that sometimes people need to be treated differently – and on occasion more 
favourably – in order for barriers, inequalities and discrimination to be overcome. However, in 
this Scheme, the terms equity and equality have both been used interchangeably, in order to 
reflect the requirements of the three public sector equality duties. 
 
In 2005 we published an Equity Strategy (which has now been superceded by this 
Scheme)610, and 
are currently engaged in the implementation and roll out of the Equity Standard: A Framework 
for 
Sport (‘the Standard’). 
 
How sportscotland will comply with the Race, Disability 
and Gender Equality duties 
Although we recognise the benefits of producing a Scheme, we are fully aware of the need to 
ensure that the specific requirements of each duty are addressed in an explicit and 
discernible way. 
 
There are a number of requirements specific to each duty. For example: the Race Equality 
Duty requires promotion of good race relations; the Disability Equality Duty requires the 
involvement of disabled people in developing the Disability Equality Scheme and the 
promotion of positive attitudes towards disabled people; and the Gender Equality Duty 
requires us to publish an Equal 
                                                          
610
 Working Towards Diversity and Inclusion in Sport: sportscotland’s Equity Strategy (sportscotland, 2005). 
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Pay statement by 28 September 2007. 
 
When developing our Scheme, we’ve taken full account of all the specific requirements, and 
these have been addressed in the Scheme. To date, we’ve taken steps to ensure that we 
meet the specific Disability, Gender and Race duties, listed below. 
• Including distinct sections on meeting the various elements of the Disability, Gender and 
Race 
Equality Duties throughout the Scheme. 
• Including disability, gender and race specific objectives in the Scheme. 
• Identifying within the Generic Equity Action Plan those actions that will help to promote 
equality 
of opportunities between disabled people and other people, men and women, and people 
from 
different racial groups. 
• Including separate disability, gender and race action plans which set out the additional 
actions that are specific to the promotion of equity between disabled people and other people, 
women and men, and people from different racial groups respectively. 
• Ensuring that our arrangements to carry out Equity Impact Assessments on our policies and 
functions specifically consider the impact on disability, gender and race equity (as well as on 
the other major equity strands). 
• Including actions to fulfil our duties in relation to the equal pay elements of the Gender 
Equality Duty. 
• Involving disabled people in the development of the disability equity elements of the Scheme 
by 
organising disability focus groups, attending external disability working groups, and inviting 
disabled people and their representatives to provide feedback on an earlier version of the 
Scheme. 
• Involving BME people and their representatives in the development of the race equity 
elements 
of the Scheme, through the establishment of a race equity consultative group in 2006. 
• Involving women and men in the development of the gender equity elements of the Scheme, 
through holding a gender consultation event, and inviting written feedback on the gender 
equity elements of the Scheme. 
• Involving a wide range of staff, both male and female, in the development of all aspects of 
the 
Scheme, notably through the Equity Project Group. 
• Ensuring that our employment monitoring arrangements enable data to be disaggregated in 
order to produce specific reports on disability, gender and racial group (as well as age, sexual 
orientation and religion or belief). 
• Identifying which of our functions are relevant to each of the three duties, and setting this out 
in 
the Scheme. 
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02 
Achieving the visions for  
Scottish sport and equity 
A vision for Scottish sport 
The vision for Scottish sport is for Scotland to be: 
• a country where sport is more widely available to all; 
• a country where sporting talent is recognised and nurtured; and 
• a country achieving and sustaining world-class performance in sport. 
At the core of this vision is the principle of sport for all. That means that all Scottish residents, 
regardless of gender or gender reassignment, disability, race, religion or belief, sexual 
orientation, age, marital or civil partnership status, pregnancy or maternity, or social 
background should have equal opportunities not only to participate in sport recreationally, but 
also to develop talent and to achieve excellence. 
 
Underpinning the vision to transform Scotland into a truly sporting nation, as set out in the 
national strategy for sport, are the dual challenges of increasing participation and improving 
performance. Rising to meet these challenges will be critical to the successful achievement of 
the vision for Scottish sport. 
 
The building blocks – the components that will help overcome the challenges and turn the 
vision into reality – are four separate but interdependent national policy objectives. Achieving 
these objectives must be the aim of everyone involved in the planning, development and 
delivery of sport in Scotland. 
 
Together, these organisations must deliver: 
• well-trained people; 
• strong organisations; 
• quality, accessible facilities; and 
• improved pathways for all. 
The challenges and building blocks of the national strategy for sport set the context for 
everything 
that sportscotland does. Therefore, every action that we carry out to tackle discrimination, 
promote equality of opportunity and promote good relations as part of this Scheme will also 
be contributing directly to the achievement of the vision for Scottish sport. 
A vision for equity in Scottish sport 
Our vision for equity in Scottish sport is to ensure that discrimination in sport is tackled, 
barriers are broken down, current inequalities in participation and leadership are addressed, 
and that Scottish residents have equal opportunities to participate in sport at all levels, 
regardless of factors such as their gender or gender reassignment, disability, race, religion or 
belief, sexual orientation, age, marital or civil partnership status, pregnancy or maternity, or 
social background. 
 
Success would be demonstrated by an increase in participation and improved performance in 
Scottish sport by people from groups that are currently under-represented. This would directly 
contribute to meeting the dual challenges set for Scottish sport of increasing participation and 
improving performance. 
 
To help achieve the overall visions for equity and for Scottish sport as a whole, organisations 
involved in the planning, development and delivery of sport must work towards the 
achievement of the following five goals: 
1. Informed, well trained people 
A network of informed, well trained people working and volunteering in sport to deliver and 
promote opportunities for all. 
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2. Quality, accessible facilities 
Quality, accessible facilities in place that provide and promote opportunities for Scottish 
people to participate in sport. 
3. Strong and equitable organisations 
Strong and equitable organisations supporting and promoting equality of opportunity in sport 
and in the workplace for all. 
4. Development of sporting pathways 
The development of sporting pathways that promote opportunities for all to take part in sport 
at all levels to the best of their ability. 
5. Awareness and promotion of equity 
Strong awareness of current equity issues, and promotion of the importance of embedding 
equity and ensuring equality of opportunities for all. 
 
Current inequalities in Scottish sport 
Inequalities in participation 
Increasing participation is critical to the achievement of the vision for Scottish sport. More 
people in Scotland taking up sport, and an increased frequency of participation by those who 
already do, will help to build a healthier, more active nation and will also help to improve 
Scotland’s sporting performance. 
 
Yet despite the benefits of sport, research shows that 50% of people in Scotland still do not 
take part in any form of sport or physical recreation in its broadest definition611. Furthermore, 
research also shows that people from particular groups of society – notably older people, 
women and girls, disabled people, BME people and people from more deprived social 
backgrounds – participate significantly less frequently than the average population. 
 
In Scotland as a whole, 63% of adults and 96% of children aged 8-15 take part in sport and 
physical recreation (excluding PE classes) at least once a month. All of the figures below are 
also based on participation frequency of at least once a month. 
 
• Female participation in sport is considerably less frequent than male participation 
59% of women take part in sport compared with 68% of men, and 94% of girls take part in 
sport compared with 98% of boys. This shows that, as a whole, female participation in sport is 
considerably less frequent than male participation. 
 
• People with a disability are much less likely to take part in sport 
Research shows that people with a disability, who represent 23% of the adult Scottish 
population, are also much less likely to participate in sport. Just 39% of adults who regard 
themselves as having a long-term illness, health problem or disability that limits their daily 
activity (Census 2001 
definition) take part in sport and physical recreation, compared with 69% of those who do not 
have a disability. 
 
• Participation of people with a disability decreases with age 
Both lower participation and a higher incidence of disability are strongly related to increasing 
age, 
so it is more accurate to compare the participation of disabled people and non-disabled 
people 
according to different age groups. 
 
The data shows that, for the youngest adults (16-24), there is actually little difference in 
participation for those with a disability (78%) and those without a disability (80%). However, 
the effects of disability on participation are much greater for older age groups: for those aged 
35-54, 46% of those with a disability participate compared with 69% without a disability; and 
for those aged 55 and over, 30% of those with a disability participate compared with 58% of 
those without a disability. 
                                                          
611
 Scottish Opinion Survey: rolling average 2003-2005 figures. 
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• Fewer people from black and ethnic minority populations take part in sport, compared 
to white adults in the same age range 
The most recent national participation figures indicate that 68% of the adult minority ethnic 
population take part in sport compared with 63% of the adult white population (using the 
standard 
2001 Census definitions). 
 
However, this difference is accounted for by the different age profiles: 75% of minority ethnic 
adults are aged 16-44, compared to 50% of white adults. Therefore, these figures are not 
comparable. 
 
Taking into account this and other factors, the relevant comparisons for adults are that 60% of 
those from ethnic minorities aged 25-34 participate compared with 74% of those from the 
white population in this age group; 51% of ethnic minorities participate compared with 69% of 
the white population in the 35-44 age group; and 33% of ethnic minorities participate 
compared with 63% of the white population in the 45-54 age group. 
 
• Participation declines from 97% of 8-11 year olds to 29% of those aged 80 plus 
Age is the single most important factor in whether people are likely to take part in sport. Even 
with 
the broadest definition, participation declines from virtually all (97%) of 8-11 year-olds to 29% 
of 
those aged 80 or more. 
 
Participation therefore declines significantly with age, but there are some key transitional 
points in life where participation tends to drop off, including primary to secondary school and 
secondary school into further education or work. A graph illustrating the rate of participation 
decline according to age is shown below. 
 
 
 
• The lower socio-economic groups have the lowest participation rates in sport 
Participation is also influenced by social background, with lower participation rates amongst 
the 
lowest socio-economic groups. Based on the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004, 
51% 
of those who live in Scotland’s 15 most deprived areas take part in sport compared with 66% 
of those who live in other areas. 
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Inequalities in coaching and sports leadership 
In 2004, sportscotland conducted research into women in sports leadership in Scotland and 
the UK, which exposed some considerable inequalities in leadership positions, as the 
examples listed show. 
• Across the UK, only one in four coaches was female. 
• The proportion of female coaches decreases as the level of coaching increases. At Olympic 
level, only 8% of coaches were female. 
• In Scotland, most female coaches are found at introductory and club level: of 20 clubs that 
have a national coach, only one club had a female national coach. 
• The study found that women were also under-represented in other areas of sports 
leadership in 
Scotland. For example, only 18% of clubs had a female chair, 18% of clubs had a female 
head coach and 10% of clubs had a female team manager. 
 
Similarly, the report of the Coaching Task Force (2002)612 concluded that women, disabled 
people and individuals from minority ethnic backgrounds are under-represented in coaching, 
particularly at performance and elite levels. 
 
Information from the survey of coaches undertaken for the Coaching Scotland Research 
Report  
(sportscotland, 2006) concluded that, of the 137 paid coaches, 76% were male and 24% 
female. 
Only 12% of the full-time paid coaches were female. 
 
Further evidence of the under-representation of women at the elite end of the coaching 
spectrum was provided by the recent audit of Scottish Gymnastics613.6 The audit showed that 
the sport of gymnastics attracts a high percentage of females into coaching positions (93% of 
coaches gaining Foundation coaching awards were female), but that the gender balance 
switches to 61% male and 39% female when looking at high performance and international 
performance coaches. Work to identify the coaching profile within other sports is planned. 
 
 
Additional research 
There has been little additional quantitative research into the involvement in sport of disabled 
people, BME people, older people, people with different religious backgrounds or beliefs, and 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, although the boosted sample used in our 
participation survey does allow data on some of these groups to be captured. 
The main reasons for the lack of additional quantitative research are related to difficulties in 
identifying and targeting sample groups for research, and in identifying sample groups of 
sufficient size to allow statistical analysis to occur. 
 
We have identified this area as a gap, and during the period of the Scheme will work with our 
partners, particularly other sports councils in the UK, the Scottish Executive and major equity 
organisations in the UK, to identify possible arrangements for common working in this area. 
In terms of qualitative research, we have conducted several pieces of research in recent 
years into the barriers facing particular groups of Scottish society, and potential solutions to 
address these barriers, as set out in Appendix D. 
 
These research findings, along with the information gathered from consulting with disabled 
people and their representatives, women and girls, and BME people during the development 
of the Scheme, have identified a range of barriers to sports participation by disadvantaged 
groups in Scottish society. This has, in turn, helped us shape this Scheme. 
 sportscotland’s contribution to the vision for equity in Scottish sport 
Our contribution towards the vision and goals for equity in Scottish sport will be to firstly 
ensure that equity is mainstreamed into the relevant aspects of our work from the outset. This 
                                                          
612
 DCMS, The Coaching Task Force – Final Report. London: DCMS Sport and Recreation Division, 2002. 
613
 Coaching Audit and Workforce Development Plan, Stirling: John Lyle Consulting for Scottish Gymnastics, 2006. 
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includes policy development, programme delivery, employment and recruitment, and 
investment in partner organisations, sports development and facilities. 
 
When delivering our functions, we will have to give due regard to equity: that is, consider the 
principles of proportionality and relevance when considering whether equity relates to each 
function. We will need to pay greatest attention to mainstreaming equity into those functions 
which are most relevant to one or more of the public sector duties. Clearly, some of our 
functions will be more relevant to the duties than others. We have set out which of our policies 
and functions are most relevant to the three duties in Appendix I of the Scheme. 
 
 
Secondly, we will also take a role in influencing and encouraging our key partners – to varying 
degrees – to promote equity throughout their functions. Our degree of influence and support 
will depend on factors such as the amount of investment we make in an organisation. 
 
We cannot achieve this vision of equity for sport on our own. It will take a contribution from 
everyone, notably our key partners in Scottish sport – local authorities, SGBs, sports clubs, 
the Institute Network and the Scottish Executive – if the vision for equity in Scottish sport is to 
be achieved. 
 
It is also important to consider that many of our key partners – notably the local authorities – 
are 
also subject to the public sector duties to promote disability, gender and race equality. This 
means that these organisations are themselves responsible for ensuring they tackle 
discrimination and harassment, promote equality of opportunities and promote good relations 
between different groups in all aspects of their work to develop and deliver Scottish sport. 
 
We will therefore not be responsible for these organisations meeting their duties in relation to 
the development or delivery of sport at the local level. Instead, this Scheme sets out how we, 
sportscotland, will contribute to the achievement of the vision for equity in Scottish sport. Our 
commitment to contributing to the vision of equity is also to be set out in our Corporate Plan 
for 2007-2011, which can be downloaded from our website www.sportscotland.org.uk or 
obtained from a member of our communications team. 
 
sportscotland’s existing work to promote equality 
of opportunities 
Taking action to promote equity is not a new concept for sportscotland: we already undertake 
a great deal of work across the organisation with the aim of promoting and achieving equity, 
which will directly impact on the achievement of the vision and goals for equity in Scottish 
sport. 
 
Work to promote opportunities for disabled people 
• Delivery teams and staff 
We work in close partnership with Scottish Disability Sport (SDS), the Scottish Governing 
Body for disability sport, ensuring the development of partnerships which provide sporting 
opportunities and provision for disabled people. Our delivery teams work together to provide 
an integrated and inclusive approach to investment. Disability sport is part of a number of staff 
roles at sportscotland.These staff work with a range of sports to support provision of 
opportunities for disabled people. 
 
• Disability Inclusion training courses 
In partnership with SDS and the Youth Sport Trust, we’ve developed a Disability Inclusion 
training course. Initially, the course will be aimed at the Active Schools Network. All local 
authorities must ensure that every Active Schools Coordinator at primary and secondary level 
is given the opportunity to attend the course by March 2008. The training is aimed at raising 
disability awareness, and should help to ensure that children with disabilities within 
mainstream schools are given improved opportunities to participate in sport. 
 
• Active Schools  
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‘Children and young people with a disability’ is one of five key groups targeted for inclusion by 
the 
Active Schools programme. In order to assist the Active Schools Network of staff to achieve 
this target, an Active Schools Inclusion Networking group was established. One coordinator 
attends the group from each local authority, and is the lead contact for disability inclusion for 
that authority. The networking day serves as an opportunity for information sharing and the 
promotion of best practice within inclusion. 
 
At the time of publication, there are seventeen people employed in the Additional Support 
Needs 
(ASN) sector: three full time Active Schools Coordinators (ASC) (ASN), twelve part time ASC 
ASN posts and two full time ASC (Inclusion) posts. 
 
• Facilities Development 
Through published technical guidance and advice available from our project managers, 
applicants and building professionals are able to design and specify buildings which minimise 
the physical barriers that may prevent use by some of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups in the community. 
 
Our Facilities Development team seeks to ensure that the facilities in which we invest are 
accessible to all members of the community. From the first point of contact with the applicant, 
we provide assistance on build and specification required, and management of the facility and 
programme development, ensuring that all sections of the community have access to the new 
facility and its services. Through the assessment process, we take steps to ensure that the 
design, specification, operation and programming of the facility is accessible and inclusive. 
Project monitoring is then carried out to ensure that the applicant does carry forward the 
practices and principles detailed throughout the application process. 
 
• Performance sport 
sportscotland has increased investment into SDS in recent years, with a focus on 
performance development staff. Appointments made so far a Performance Development 
Officer for SDS to work across six identified ‘strand one’ sports and a Disability Swimming 
Development Officer within Scottish Swimming. Further investment means a Disability 
Athletics Development Officer post in partnership with Scottish Athletics is planned. 
 
Investment into performance sport is made directly to each SGB and then to athletes 
identified by each SGB through its selection policy. We’re committed to reviewing all SGB 
selection policies on an annual basis as part of this Scheme. 
 
• Provision of support to disabled people 
We have taken care to ascertain the support needs of disabled people when holding events 
and 
meetings. For example, we provided BSL interpreters and hearing loops during our disability 
focus groups held in summer 2006, and again provided BSL interpreters at the UK Equity 
Standard seminar in December 2006. One of the actions in this Scheme is to ascertain 
particular support needs of disabled people before planning events in future, and responding 
to these needs as appropriate. We are also committed to providing our corporate publications 
in alternative formats on request as appropriate and reasonable. 
 
Work to promote opportunities for BME people 
• Participation data 
Our annual participation survey has been boosted to include a sample of at least 650 minority 
ethnic adults (aged 16+). This allows for a top line comparison of sports participation based 
on census categories of white versus black and minority ethnic populations in Scotland. 
 
• Partnerships 
We’ve developed relationships with various organisations with a remit for race equality. These 
organisations include the Council for Ethnic Minority Voluntary Organisations in Scotland, 
Black and Ethnic Minorities Infrastructure in Scotland, Sporting Equals and the Glasgow Anti 
Racist 
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Alliance. Representatives of these organisations, plus others with a remit for race equality are 
now participating in sportscotland’s Race Equity Consultative Group. 
 
• Positive representation 
We are committed to promoting BME sport through our marketing and communications 
functions. 
With this in mind, we try to ensure that we feature individuals from a range of racial groups 
taking part in sport in our publications. We are also committed to making our corporate 
publications available in alternative languages on request. 
 
 
• Employment 
We continue to undertake minority ethnic employment monitoring in line with our duties under 
the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000. In December 2005 and January 2007 we 
undertook equity profiling exercise involving our staff and Board members which included 
questions on both racial group and religion or belief. 
 
• Equity Strategy and Equity Standard 
We published our Equity Strategy: Working Towards Diversity and Inclusion in Sport in 2005. 
This strategy is based on the implementation of the Equity Standard, the aim of which is to 
embed equity in all the practices and services of sports organisation. To achieve the 
Standard, organisations must be able to demonstrate their commitment to promoting 
opportunities for BME people, as well as women and girls, disabled people and other groups 
under-represented in Scottish sport. In 2006, we achieved Foundation level of the Equity 
Standard. We are now working towards the Preliminary level of the Standard, which requires 
us to have an Equity Action Plan including appropriate actions related to increasing equity 
between racial groups (as well as actions related to increasing equity for disabled people, and 
between women and men). 
 
Work to Promote Opportunities for Women and Girls 
• Staff 
In 2005, sportscotland employed a Women, Girls and Sport Officer, with a remit for 
overseeing the development and coordination of work within our organisation to promote 
women and girls’ sport. 
 
As well as providing advice and guidance on women and girls’ sport as part of the 
development of 
our work, the Women, Girls and Sport Officer works closely with key partners – notably the 
Active 
Schools Network – to deliver training. In addition, the Officer works closely with the Women’s 
Sport Foundation to develop guidance, conduct research and share good practice. 
 
• Research 
In 2004, we conducted research into women in sports leadership in Scotland and the UK. The 
findings of this research are discussed more in Section 2, ‘Current inequalities in sport’. A 
significant amount of work went into conducting research into the barriers to sports 
participation for women and girls. The findings of this research are published in the report 
Increasing Demand for Sport and Physical Activity for Adolescent Girls in Scotland (2006) 
This is supplemented by Increasing Demand for Sport and Physical Activity for Adolescent 
Girls in Scotland: Exploring Ideas, Suggesting Solutions which contains recommendations on 
how to involve adolescent girls in sport and physical activity, aimed at practitioners involved in 
delivering sport. 
 
• Guidance 
In 2005, we published the guidance document Making Women and Girls More Active: A Good 
Practice Guide. This document presents recommendations for overcoming the major barriers 
to 
women and girls’ participation in sport, and showcases good practice examples of existing 
work 
taking place within Active Schools, sports clubs, and in other parts of the community. 
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• Strategy 
In 2006, sportscotland developed a five year women, girls and sport strategy. A range of 
organisations and partners – including the Scottish Executive and the Women’s Sport 
Foundation – were consulted and encouraged to provide feedback during the production of 
the document. Many of the actions within the strategy have been incorporated into the generic 
and gender specific action plans within the Scheme in order to help fulfil our Gender Equality 
Duties. 
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03 
Fulfilling the general duties 
The objectives of sportscotland’s Single Equity Scheme 
We aim to achieve a number of objectives in relation to each of the five goals for equity in 
Scottish sport. The objectives we’ve set for ourselves have been influenced by a number of 
factors: 
• the findings of our research into barriers to participation by disabled people, women and 
girls, and BME people; 
• the outputs of engagement with disabled people, BME people, and women and men, as set 
out in more detail in the section on involving stakeholders in the development of the Scheme. 
We have tried to develop the key objectives to reflect some of the main concerns of the 
representatives of these groups; 
• the development of the Scottish Executive’s new national strategy for sport in Scotland; and 
• the development of our new Corporate Plan 2007-2011. 
These key objectives reflect both the priorities for action identified through research as well as 
our 
own priorities for action and as such are closely aligned with the vision for Scottish sport as 
set out in the Scottish Executive’s new national strategy for sport. 
By the end of the period which is covered by this Scheme (up to 31 December 2009), 
sportscotland will aim to achieve the following objectives. Unless an earlier date is specified 
in relation to each outcome, the date for achievement will be 31 December 2009. 
 
Goal: informed, well trained people 
Objectives 
• All our staff will be aware of their responsibilities under the disability, gender and race 
equality duties, and will be aware of the impact of these duties on their work by autumn 2007, 
following appropriate briefings and/or training. 
• By summer 2007, key staff involved in the development and delivery of our policies and 
functions will have been trained to carry out assessments to determine the impact of our 
policies on women and men, disabled people and other people, and people from different 
racial groups (plus the impact on age, sexual orientation and religion and belief where 
appropriate). 
• By the end of 2007, we will understand the equity training needs of our staff and a training 
plan will be in place to take account of these needs. By December 2009 we will have 
repeated the training needs analysis at least once. 
• The Active Schools staff network will be trained in Disability Inclusion by March 2008, and a 
plan for future roll out to other partners will be developed by the end of 2008. 
• By December 2009, the Active Schools Network staff and other key partners will have a 
good understanding of the issues facing girls and women and how they, by taking a targeted 
approach 
to provision, can help to overcome these issues. 
• By December 2009, the Active Schools Network staff and other key partners will have a 
good 22 understanding of the issues facing people from BME groups and how they can help 
to overcome these issues by taking a targeted approach to provision. 
• An initial network of trained Equity Standard advisers and sports equity trainers will be in 
place by the end of 2007 to support our partners as they take steps to mainstream equity 
throughout their functions through achieving the Equity Standard. The network will continue to 
expand until 
December 2009, and will include experts in disability, gender and race equity wherever 
possible. 
• By December 2009, key staff and volunteers in the Scottish Governing Bodies of sport 
(SGBs) involved in the implementation of the Equity Standard will have undergone at least 
introductory sports equity training. 
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Goal: quality, accessible facilities 
Objectives 
• Throughout the period of the Scheme, sportscotland guidance on the planning, design, 
management and programming of sports facilities will continue to promote equality of 
opportunity for disabled people, women and girls, BME people and other under-represented 
or disadvantaged groups by providing practical advice and good practice examples. 
• Throughout the period of the Scheme, guidance on the development, design, management 
and 
programming of sports facilities will increasingly reflect the needs of people from 
disadvantaged or under-represented groups, as a result of greater involvement by people 
from these groups in the development of the guidance. 
• By the end of 2007, criteria for making investment in sports facilities will include criteria on 
provision for disabled people, women and girls and/or BME groups. 
 
Goal: strong, equitable organisations 
Objectives 
• We will continue to be an equitable employer which tackles discrimination and promotes 
equality of opportunity and fair treatment for all staff and potential employees. 
• We will monitor and report annually on how many recorded instances of discrimination and 
harassment in the previous year were related to gender, race, disability, gender 
reassignment, 
pregnancy or maternity, age, marital or civil partnership status, sexual orientation or religion 
or belief, and we will have effectively tackled any discrimination or harassment of our staff that 
occurs on these grounds. 
• By December 2009, following continuing review of our HR policies/procedures and the 
adoption of positive action initiatives if required, our workforce will be more diverse and 
representative of the Scottish population, compared to the staff profile obtained in December 
2006. 
• By December 2009, we will have successfully reduced any pay gap between women and 
men that is identified in our equal pay review undertaken in 2007-2008. 
• By the end of the period of the Scheme, our policies and functions will help to promote 
opportunities for disabled people, women and girls, and BME people wherever appropriate 
and possible, as a result of Equity Impact Assessments being carried out and changes being 
made as necessary. 
• From spring 2007 onwards, any new policies and functions will pay due regard to the 
implications for disabled people, women and girls, and BME people, as a result of Equity 
Impact Assessments having been built into the development process. 
• Through the development of an equity monitoring framework, we will better understand the 
extent to which our investment in partner organisations and facilities promotes equality of 
opportunities for disabled people, women and girls, and BME people by December 2009. 
• By the end of our next Corporate Plan period, governing bodies in receipt of sportscotland 
investment will have achieved at least Foundation level of the Equity Standard: A Framework 
for 
Sport614.(Note: this objective is still being considered by the sportscotland Board – a decision 
will 
be made by the end of April 2007). 
• By the end of 2008, at least 20 Scottish Governing Bodies of sport will have received 
support and guidance to assist them towards achieving the Equity Standard. 
• Throughout the period of the Scheme – and beyond – our Partnership Managers will add 
value to the work of our partners by promoting equality of opportunity and good relations 
between women and men, disabled people and other people, and people from different racial 
groups. 
 
Goal: sporting pathways that promote equality of opportunities for all 
                                                          
614
 The level of requirement will depend on factors including the capacity of the organisation and the level of sportscotland 
investment in that 
organisation. 
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Objectives 
• Scottish Disability Sport strand one sports will have in place performance plans which 
include a 
focus on pathways for disabled people by summer 2007. 
• Targeted programmes for women and girls – supported by sportscotland – will be in place, 
with the aim of increasing and sustaining participation among women and girls in sport and 
physical activity. 
• A network will be in place to support the further development of female athletes and 
coaches by the end of the period covered by the Scheme. 
• By the end of 2007, at least twelve sports will have coaching workforce development plans 
in place that identify gaps in the coaching workforce in terms of gender, disability and racial 
group. 
• By the end of 2009 and thereafter, the strategic/development plans of our key partners – 
including local authorities, the national centres, Scottish Governing Bodies, and the Institute 
Network – will include specific and measurable actions to provide increased and targeted 
opportunities for disabled people, women and girls, and BME people. 
• Local authority Active Schools implementation plans, 2008-2011, will give due regard to 
provision of opportunities for disabled children, girls and BME children by December 2007. 
• By the end of 2007, we will have identified a number of minimum criteria encompassing 
equity to be recommended as good practice in the criteria of local authority and Scottish 
Governing Body club accreditation schemes. 
• Up to 100 new or upskilled existing female coaches, and up to 30 new female coach 
mentors, will be in place by December 2009 as a result of our Women into Coaching 
programme. 
 
Goal: awareness and promotion of equity issues 
Objectives 
• By the end of the period of the Scheme, our communications functions will increasingly 
promote 
equality of opportunity by including the participation and successes of disabled people, 
women and girls, and BME people. 
• We will be able to demonstrate a measurable increase in the quantity and quality of 
marketing and publicity of women and girls’ sport through our communications functions. 
• We will have developed targeted resources, guidance and programmes that will assist our 
partners to develop more gender sensitive services and programmes. 
• Throughout the period of the Scheme, where appropriate and reasonable, our published and 
electronic materials will be made available in alternative and accessible formats. 
• By the end of 2008, we will have published resources which identify and share good practice 
in  relation to the provision of sporting opportunities for disabled people, and people from 
different racial groups, and partners will continue to have access to the materials we have 
published on engaging women and girls in sport. 
• By summer 2008, one or more mechanisms to allow our partners to share information and 
good 
practice in relation to the provision of opportunities for disabled people, women and girls, and 
BME people will be in place. 
• By summer 2008, Scottish Governing Bodies will have a greater awareness of the equalities 
and anti-discrimination legislation that affects them (in relation to the six equity strands, 
including gender, race and disability equity). 
• From summer 2007, our research reports and/or policy implication analyses of research 
reports will include an analysis of the potential equity issues wherever appropriate, including 
potential impacts of the findings on women and girls, disabled people, and people from 
different racial groups. 
• During the period of the Scheme and thereafter, our policy development process will take 
into 
account relevant evidence, information and issues relating to gender, disability and race 
equity. 
• During the period of the Scheme and thereafter, we will ensure that relevant equity issues – 
including information on gender, disability and race equity – are integrated into the content 
and programmes of relevant sporting conferences and seminars. 
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• Our website will be more accessible to people with visual impairments. It will meet the 
minimum requirements of level A and level AA of the eGIF W3C Web Accessibility Initiative 
by March 2007 and March 2009 respectively. 
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Achieving the objectives 
We’ve set out how we intend to achieve these objectives in our Equity Action Plans 
(Appendices E, F, G and H). 
 
The Generic Equity Action Plan (Appendix E) details all of the actions intended to tackle 
discrimination and harassment, and/or promote equality of opportunity or good relations in 
relation to gender, disability, race, and indeed other equity strands where appropriate. It sets 
out who at sportscotland will be responsible for leading on the delivery of each action, a 
timescale for action and, where appropriate, identifies resources required. 
 
In order to meet the requirements of the three duties, we’ve identified within the Generic 
Equity Action Plan whether each action relates to disability, gender or race equality, or if it 
relates to one of the other three major equity strands. 
 
We’ve also developed separate action plans for disability, gender and race equity which 
identify 
additional actions that will specifically impact on the promotion of opportunities for disabled 
people (Appendix F), women and men (Appendix G) and BME people (Appendix H). 
 
Our Equity Project Group will be responsible for overseeing progress and reporting on the 
delivery of the actions, as discussed in more detail in the section on ‘monitoring, reporting and 
review’. 
 
The following diagram shows how the actions we’ve identified in our equity plans will help to 
achieve our Scheme objectives and our general equality duties. It also shows how these 
actions will contribute to the five equity goals and overall challenges for Scottish sport. 
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Fulfilling the specific duties 
Involving and consulting stakeholders in the  
development of the Single Equity Scheme 
The requirements to involve and consult with stakeholders vary between the three public 
sector duties: 
• The Disability Equality Duty requires that we involve disabled people ‘who appear to the 
authority to have an interest in the way it carries out its functions’ in the development of its 
Disability Equality Scheme. 
• The Gender Equality Duty requires that we consult with male and female stakeholders and 
employees in order to ensure that our gender equality goals are chosen with the support of 
those most likely to be affected by them. 
• The Disability, Gender and Race Equality Duties require us to involve disabled people, and 
to consult women and men and people from different racial groups respectively when 
developing our arrangements for carrying out Equity Impact Assessment on our policies and 
services. 
The actions we took to meet these duties are set out below. 
 
Identifying barriers 
We were in a relatively strong position when developing our Scheme, as we’d already 
gathered evidence about the key barriers to sports participation facing disabled people, 
women and girls, 
BME people and older people that could be used to help shape the priority objectives and 
actions in the Scheme. See Appendix D for more details of this research. 
 
Involving disabled people 
We’ve taken a number of steps to involve disabled people in developing our Scheme, as 
follows: 
• We conducted research on the barriers to participation facing disabled people in 2001. A 
range 
of disabled people were involved in this research, through a variety of methods including 
workshop days and in-depth interviews. People with a range of disabilities – including 
physical disabilities, learning disabilities, and sensory (visual and hearing disabilities) were 
involved in the research. Therefore, the barriers identified in the research are representative 
of a range of disabilities. 
• During 2006, we organised and held meetings with two different disability Advisory Groups. 
The first group was made up of athletes and people working in disability sport, the second of 
service users.This approach was chosen in order to hear the experiences of people currently 
involved in sport as well as those who found themselves excluded from sport in some way. 
The first Advisory Group was established with the support of SDS, and the service users’ 
group with the support of the Scottish Disability Equality Forum. Both groups included people 
with physical disabilities, including wheelchair users, and people with a variety of sensory 
impairments (visual and hearing). A representative of people with learning disabilities also 
participated in the first Advisory Group, as did officers from SDS. A representative of the 
Scottish Disability Equality Forum participated in the service users’ group. We provided 
support for the disabled people in both groups. For example, we provided and paid for BSL 
interpreters to attend the service users’ Advisory Group, as some of the participants had 
hearing impairments. A hearing loop was also provided for the use of hearing impaired 
participants in this group. We also paid for all expenses incurred by the participants of the 
groups. 
 
• We provided support for the disabled people in both groups. For example, we provided two 
BSL interpreters to attend the service users’ Advisory Group, as some of the participants had 
hearing impairments. A hearing loop was also provided for the use of hearing impaired 
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participants in this group. We also paid for all expenses incurred by the participants of the 
groups. 
 
• In addition to organising our own Advisory Groups, we also attended and delivered a 
presentation on the proposed objectives of our Scheme to the Scottish Executive’s Same As 
You Implementation Group, which included a number of people with learning disabilities, as 
well as some representative organisations. 
 
The approach taken with all three groups was similar. We first of all summarised our work and 
explained the provisions of the Disability Equality Duty. We then presented a summary of the 
barriers identified during earlier research, and invited discussion on these. Following 
identification of the major barriers to participation in sport, we then invited the groups to 
discuss and advise on the priority areas for action in terms of our Disability Equality Scheme. 
We also invited the groups to discuss and recommend some actions for us to take in order to 
tackle the main barriers to participation. 
 
In addition to holding meetings of the Advisory Groups, we also prepared written material on 
our role, the requirements of the Disability Equality Duty, a summary of barriers to 
participation identified in earlier research and a summary of our work to date to develop 
disability equality. This material, plus particular questions for consideration, was circulated to 
the members of the Advisory Groups in advance of the meetings, in large print format. This 
provided an alternative mechanism to enable disabled people and their representatives to 
participate in the development of the Scheme. 
 
• We invited feedback from all those previously involved in the initial work summarised above 
on the initial draft of our Single Equity Scheme, published in December 2004. This version 
focused strongly on meeting our disability equality duties. The feedback received was 
considered during the redevelopment of the Scheme. 
 
Major findings of the information gathering, consultation and involvement exercises 28 
involving disabled people 
Through a combination of the research undertaken, and the involvement of disabled people 
and their representatives, we were able to identify a number of key issues to focus on as part 
of this Scheme. The major issues identified as barriers to disabled people taking part in sport 
and employment were: inequitable recruitment practices; a lack of appropriate disability 
inclusion training for people working and volunteering in sport; poor access to sports facilities; 
lack of provision of opportunities in relation to school sport, club sport and coaching; a lack of 
suitable role models in sport; and a lack of accessible published materials. 
 
The outputs and key findings from all of this work were collated and presented to both the 
Equity 
Project Group and the Senior Management Team for discussion and consideration, and were 
used by the Equity Project Group members to inform their discussions on action planning with 
their teams. 
 
The information obtained through the research, Advisory Groups and written feedback on the 
first version of the Scheme were therefore all fundamental to the selection of our objectives 
and actions for this Scheme. 
 
Continued involvement of disabled people 
We are committed to continuing to involve disabled people in the delivery of this Scheme, 
notably 
during the Equity Impact Assessment process, during monitoring, and during review of the 
Scheme, and we will report on future involvement of disabled people in our annual reports on 
the Scheme. 
 
Involving BME people 
We have involved BME people in the development of our Scheme in the following ways: 
• In 2001, we carried out research into the barriers facing BME people in terms of sports 
participation.The research showed that there were relatively few circumstances where the 
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needs of BME people differ from those of the majority of the population, and that where there 
are differences, these generally relate to the delivery of the activity. For instance, this may 
include the appropriateness of the sporting facilities. However, by far the largest barrier 
identified was an experience or fear of racial discrimination.This does not just refer physical or 
verbal abuse, but also includes institutional racism. 
• To further explore the issues identified through research, sportscotland developed 
relationships with various equity partners whose remit is race equity. As part of this work, in 
summer 2006, we established a Race Equity Consultative Group which comprised a range of 
BME people and representatives of race equity organisations. This group advised us on the 
identification of key issues that impact on sports participation by BME people; on the priority 
areas for action and Scheme objectives; and on recommended actions for us to take forward 
as part of the Scheme. 
• The Race Equity Consultative Group has met three times to date and, following the first two 
meetings of the group, we began to shape our draft race equity objectives and actions for 
inclusion in the Scheme. These were influenced both by the research we had previously 
carried out and the contributions of the group at the first two meetings. The actions were then 
discussed with the group at its third meeting, and amended to take on board additional 
comments made. 
• sportscotland has also visited organisations in Scotland that offer sporting opportunities to 
BME 
communities to further explore the issues involved and to learn from examples of good 
practice. 
• In addition to this work throughout Scotland, we have engaged separately with Sporting 
Equals to identify ways of joint working in the future, and to take advice on our future 
approach to the development of race equity in Scottish sport. 
 
Major findings of the information gathering and consultation exercises involving 
BME people 
• The barriers to participation in sport by BME people identified through the consultation work 
were largely consistent with previous research. The Consultative Group identified the major 
issues as being related to four areas: culture, perception, experiences and racism. 
• More specific key issues identified through discussion with group members and with other 
representative organisations included: staff being unaware of race issues; lack of strategic 
direction to investment; lack of suitable facilities; lack of engagement with BME people; lack of 
monitoring of BME participation and performance; insufficient linkages between organisations; 
and poor signposting to examples of good practice. 
• Consultation also suggested that the issues could effectively be addressed through the five 
key equity goals identified within the Scheme. For instance, a lack of suitable facilities was 
highlighted throughout the consultation process. This issue will be addressed through the 
equity goal of a quality, accessible facilities in place that provide and promote opportunities 
for Scottish people to participate in sport. 
• And in the same way, issues relating to sporting organisations, such as organisations often 
not working effectively together to address the needs of BME people, will be addressed 
through the goal of strong and equitable organisations supporting and promoting equality of 
opportunity for all in sport and in the workplace. 
• The findings of all the work set out above were collated and presented to the Equity Project 
Group at its meetings in January, February and March 2007. Group members discussed 
these proposals with their teams and Directors. The outputs of these discussions helped to 
shape the revised draft objectives for the Scheme and the generic and race specific Equity 
Action Plans. 
 
Future consultation with BME people 
We are committed to continuing to consult BME people where appropriate in the delivery of 
this 
Scheme, notably during the equity impact assessment process, during monitoring, and during 
review of the Scheme. We intend to keep engaging with the BME consultative group to do 
this, and will revise or expand the membership of the group as appropriate. We will report on 
future involvement of BME people in our annual reports on the Scheme. 
 
Involving women and men 
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As part of the process of developing the gender duty sections of the single equity scheme we 
have been consulting internally and externally. We initially consulted widely when we 
developed 
sportscotland’s Women, Girls and Sport Strategy 2005-2010 in 2005. The initial consultation 
in 
preparation for the strategy was mainly done online and through partners. The issues raised 
in this consultation were incorporated in the strategy. 
 
This strategy has now become part of the Single Equity Scheme and the actions have been 
incorporated into the Scheme’s gender action plan. While developing the Scheme, we wished 
to consult more widely and involve both women and men in the development of the Scheme. 
We have done so in the following ways: 
• The Equity Project Group, which is responsible for the overall development of the Scheme, 
is made up of both women and men, and so the perspectives of both sexes have been taken 
into account. Similarly, a range of women and men across sportscotland, including the Senior 
Management Team, have been directly involved in the development of the Scheme from the 
outset. 
• We have involved women and women’s groups, as well as the Women’s Sport Foundation, 
in 30 our recent work to identify the barriers to women and girls in terms of sports 
participation, and in identifying potential solutions to these barriers. Specific projects are 
discussed in more detail in the earlier section on our existing work to promote equity. 
• We work closely on an ongoing basis with the Women’s Sport Foundation in our work to 
develop women and girls’ participation in sport, and have collaborated with them on specific 
projects, such as the development of the good practice guide on making women and girls 
more active, published in 2005. 
• We attended a number of events on the gender equality duties and the gender equality 
scheme, in order to obtain advice from the Equal Opportunities Commission and other 
participants about the development of our Scheme. 
• As part of the development of this version of the Scheme, we held a gender consultation 
event, to which we invited a range of our partners from governing bodies of sport, the Scottish 
Institute of Sport, local authorities, the university sector, gender equity organisations such as 
Engender, the Scottish Executive, and the Women’s Sports Foundation. We also invited a 
number of athletes and gender experts/academics. The invitee list included both men and 
women. 
 
The purpose of this event was to consult our partners and stakeholders on the draft goals, 
objectives and actions within the Scheme, and to seek comments on our proposed 
arrangements to meet our specific gender equality duties. 
 
We also invited written comments on the draft Scheme from the whole list of consultees and 
their colleagues. 
 
Major findings of the information gathering and consultation exercises involving 
women and men 
• The outputs from this consultation process were summarised in a paper which was 
discussed by the Equity Project Group and with colleagues more widely. As a result, a 
number of changes were made to the draft objectives to make them more outcome focused, 
to clarify roles and to reflect certain specific points raised during the consultation. For 
example, it was noted during the consultation that in some cases the draft objectives focused 
on the Active Schools programme when the objective would also be relevant to our work with 
our other partners. As a result, we added objectives that focused more on supporting our 
partners to integrate equity generally – and gender equity specifically – into their strategic 
plans through the work of our Partnership Managers. 
 
We also added a new objective about integrating information on equity (and gender equity) 
issues 
into conferences and seminars, to reflect feedback about the importance of information and 
good practice sharing. 
• The consultees reacted positively to the goals and objectives of the Scheme and generally 
agreed that the arrangements for meeting the specific duties (eg, impact assessment) laid out 
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the Scheme would be appropriate. There was a suggestion that a specialised impact 
assessment tool for facilities may be required, as the questions involved in impact assessing 
facilities may differ from those in an impact assessment of policy or other forms of service 
delivery. 
• Participants in the consultation also stressed the value of the support that sportscotland 
provides to its partners in the process of implementing equity and the need to continue that 
support. 
 
Future consultation with women and men 
We are committed to continuing to consult women and men and key gender equity partners 
where appropriate in the delivery of this Scheme, notably during the equity impact 
assessment process, during monitoring, and during review of the Scheme. We intend to keep 
engaging with those consultees who attended our gender consultation event to do this, and 
will revise or expand those involved as appropriate. We will also continue to work closely with 
the Women’s Sport Foundation and gender equality colleagues in the Scottish Executive, 
local authorities, Institute Network, and Scottish Governing Bodies of sport as we deliver the 
actions set out in our Scheme. 
In conjunction with this process, one of our specific objectives is to establish and develop a 
network to support the further development of female athletes and coaches. This network will 
be used as a network for communication, support for coaches and athletes as well as for 
further training and development, but we will also consult with the women in this network on 
relevant issues relating to the delivery of our Scheme and our specific gender equality duties. 
 
We will continue to consult with male and female staff during the delivery of the Scheme. The 
Equity Project Group will continue to be the key mechanism to facilitate this consultation. We 
will continue to consult and update the Senior Management Team on the delivery of the 
Scheme. We will also ensure our staff are briefed on the Scheme and are given the 
opportunity to feed into future development and delivery through this process. 
 
We will report on future involvement of women and men in our annual reports on the Scheme. 
 
Involving LGBT people and their representatives 
sportscotland has developed relationships with a number of organisations involved in the 
promotion of rights and equity for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, 
including Stonewall Scotland, the Equality Network, and LGBT Youth. 
 
We met with representatives from all three organisations during the development of the 
Scheme, in order to ascertain their views on the key issues that we should be considering and 
addressing in terms of promoting equality for LGBT people, and we have incorporated their 
comments as appropriate. 
 
Many of the actions in the generic action plan are relevant to the sexual orientation equity 
strand (for example, we include questions on both sexual orientation and transgender status 
in our staff equity monitoring survey), or seek to ensure that LGBT people are not harassed or 
discriminated against (for example, we will ensure that LGBT issues are considered in staff 
equity training, and our equity policy explicitly covers discrimination and harassment on the 
grounds of sexual orientation). In 2006, we amended the wording of the question on gender in 
the staff monitoring survey on the advice of our LGBT equity partners. 
 
We will continue to develop our relationships with our LGBT equity partners, and will seek to 
involve these partners where appropriate in the ongoing delivery and future development of 
the Scheme. We will also seek to engage these partners in the development of specific work 
to promote equality for LGBT people as appropriate. 
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Meeting the equality duties in employment  
To meet the equality duties in our employment functions, we must ensure that we have due 
regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination and harassment in our employment 
practice, and to actively promote gender, disability and race equality within our workforce. 
 
We are strongly committed to the fair treatment of all our employees, and to preventing 
unlawful 
discrimination and harassment. We already take steps to meet the equality duties by: 
• ensuring our recruitment processes are fair; 
• monitoring the equity profile of job applicants and staff in post; 
• promoting and managing flexible working arrangements, including arrangements to support 
those with caring responsibilities (both male and female); 
• having clear anti-bullying and anti-harassment, equity and equal opportunities policies in 
place; 
• having robust grievance and disciplinary procedures in place; 
• offering a wide range of work-based training opportunities to our staff, regardless of gender, 
disability, race or other equity-related factors; and 
• reviewing our HR policies on an ongoing basis, and taking steps to make any changes 
required as a result of new anti-discrimination and equalities legislation. 
 
Further details of how we are currently meeting the equality duties in employment, or how we 
plan to do this in future, are set out on the following pages. 
 
Transsexual employees and potential transsexual employees 
We are fully aware of our legal duty to prevent discrimination of transsexual people on the 
grounds of their gender reassignment in employment and vocational training, and this duty 
covers those who have undergone gender reassignment as well as those who intend to 
undergo gender reassignment, or who are currently undergoing it. We are also aware that, by 
the end of 2007, it will be unlawful to discriminate against transsexual people on the grounds 
of their gender reassignment in relation to access to and the supply of goods and services. 
 
We are fully committed to the protection of any transsexual member of staff or job applicant, 
and the rights of transsexual people are protected through our equity, equal opportunities, 
bullying and harassment, and grievance and disciplinary policies and procedures. We will also 
continue to ensure that the impact of our policies and functions on transsexual people is 
considered through the work of our HR policy review group, and through the Equity Impact 
Assessment process. 
 
Preventing discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy and maternity 
We are fully aware that we have a legal duty to protect the rights of female staff who become 
pregnant and who take maternity leave. This includes protecting their rights before, during 
and after their period of maternity leave. We have a range of policies in place already – 
including our equal opportunities and equity policies, our maternity policy and our policies on 
flexible working and parental leave – which seek to ensure that these rights are protected. 
 
However, we will continue to ensure that the impact of our policies and functions on pregnant 
women and women who are on maternity leave or returning from a period of maternity leave 
is considered through the work of our HR policy review group, and through the Equity Impact 
Assessment process. 
 
We will also collect data on the number of women returning to work after a period of maternity 
leave, and will consider the impact of part time working and caring responsibilities through our 
staff equity monitoring surveys and our equal pay review. 
 
Arrangements to ensure equal pay 
As a result of the gender equality duty, we will have a specific duty to publish an equal pay 
statement by 28 September 2007. This statement will require us to set out our policy and 
arrangements to ensure equal pay. We will ensure that this statement is published by this 
date. 
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We will also conduct an equal pay review by the end of 2007, in order to ascertain any 
discrepancies in terms of pay between men and women doing comparable work. We also 
plan to extend this review to ensure that any pay discrepancies between disabled people and 
other people, and between people from different racial groups are identified. Should any 
discrepancies be identified during this review, we will agree steps to address them. Any steps 
agreed upon will then form part of a later version of the Single Equity Scheme action plan(s). 
 
Monitoring the equity profile of our staff 
All three of the public sector duties require us to undertake some form of equity monitoring of 
our staff. The detailed requirements are as follows. 
 
Race Equality Duty 
Under the RRAA 2000, we have a duty to monitor, by reference to the racial groups to which 
they 
belong, the numbers of: 
• staff in post; 
• applicants for employment, training and promotion, and; 
• staff from each such group who: 
– receive training; 
– benefit or suffer detriment as a result of our company’s performance assessment 
procedures; 
– are involved in grievance procedures; 
– are the subject of disciplinary procedures; or 
– cease employment with that person or other body. 
 
We are also required to publish the results of this monitoring every year. 
 
Disability Equality Duty 
The specific duties require authorities like us to have information gathering systems 
established in relation to recruitment, development and retention of disabled employees. The 
Code of Practice for the Disability Equality Duty makes it clear that these systems should 
enable data to be collected and reported on at least the same categories that apply to the 
Race Equality Duty. 
 
Gender Equality Duty 
Under the Equality Act 2006, the specific duties of the Gender Equality Duty require us to 
gather information on the profile of our staff, including data on recruitment, promotion, the 
distribution of women and men in the workforce by seniority and by types of work, 
harassment, training opportunities, grievance and disciplinary procedures, and redundancy. 
We are also required to analyse this data for part-time staff, and those with caring 
responsibilities, because women are 34 disproportionately represented in these groups. 
 
Existing arrangements to monitor the equity profile of staff 
We already collect equal opportunities information about job applicants. An equal 
opportunities 
form is issued to all applicants, which includes questions about gender, disability, race, age, 
sexual orientation and religion or belief. In addition, in December 2005, we conducted a staff 
equity profile survey. All staff were asked to complete the survey, which asked questions 
about gender, disability, race, age, sexual orientation and religion or belief. 65% of the 
workforce responded to the survey. 
 
The survey was completed anonymously, and all findings presented only in the aggregated 
format. We based the questions on those asked in the 2001 Census, and sought advice from 
SDS on the wording of the question on disability. The results of the survey were made 
available in their disaggregated format to all staff via the intranet. 
 
 
 
 
Results of the sportscotland Equity Profile Survey: Staff 
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91% of respondents completed the questionnaire, whilst 9% chose not to complete the 
questionnaire.In relation to all responses, bands A-C generally represent administrative and 
support functions, 
whilst bands D-H generally represent officer, lead officer, Partnership Manager, adviser and 
management functions. 
 
Gender 
45% of respondents were female, 44% male and 11% chose not to answer this question. This 
represents an almost equal split of male and female staff across the organisation. However, in 
paybands A-C, 34% of responses are male and 66% female. There are comparatively more 
females in less senior positions. In pay bands D-H, 58% of respondents were male, and 42% 
were female.There are comparatively fewer females in more senior positions. 
 
Disability 
86% of respondents answered no; 3% yes and 11% chose not to answer this question. Very 
few staff in the organisation regard themselves as having a disability. In terms of disability, 
there is little variation in terms of banding. 
 
Ethnic origin 
70% of all staff selected white Scottish; 13% chose white other British; 11% chose not to 
answer this question; 1% selected white Irish and 5% selected any other white background. 
 
Sexual orientation 
83% of staff chose heterosexual; 14% chose not to answer this question; 1% selected 
bisexual and 2% other. 99% of respondents from pay bands D – H reported a heterosexual 
orientation (the other 1% did not answer the question), indicating slightly less diversity in 
terms of sexual orientation in more senior positions. 
 
Religion or belief 
48% selected Protestant; 5% Roman Catholic; 4% Other Christian; 19% Other. Buddhist, 
Jewish and Muslim were each selected by 1% of respondents. 21% chose not to answer. This 
indicates that there is some diversity in the workforce in terms of religion or belief. 
 
Age 
The age split is almost identical between bands A-C and D-H. 64% of the A-C band and 63% 
of the D-H band are aged under 40. sportscotland is therefore a relatively young 
organisation. 
 
Conclusions: Staff 
The workforce is relatively diverse in terms of age and religion or belief. However, it is much 
less diverse in terms of ethnic origin and disability. This is true across the whole workforce, 
and when the profile in terms of bands A-C and D-H are viewed.There is a greater proportion 
of men at senior level than women. The proportion of female staff declines as positions 
become more senior. 
 
Results of the Equity Profile Survey: Board members 
The form was also issued to all sportscotland Board Members. From the responses, the 
following was ascertained: 
• 71% of Board members were male; 
• 86% of Board members did not consider themselves to have a disability. The other 14% 
reported that they have a visual impairment; 
• 86% of the Board was white Scottish; 
• 86% of the Board reported that they were heterosexual, with 14% choosing not to answer 
the question; 
• 57% of Board members reported that they were Protestant in their beliefs, 14% were ‘other 
Christian’ and the remaining 29% reported that they were Aethiest; 
• 14% of Board members were aged 31-40; 29% were aged 41-50; whilst 43% were aged 51-
60; and 14% of respondents chose not to answer this question. 
 
Conclusions: Board Members 
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The results of the equity audit show that in December 2005, there was a greater proportion of 
men than women on the sportscotland Board, and that the vast majority of Board members 
were white Scottish, heterosexual, Christian, and did not have a disability. But the 
sportscotland Board has changed quite considerably in its composition since this survey was 
undertaken. The equity profile of the new Board will be ascertained following a new survey in 
2007. 
 
Future arrangements to monitor the equity profile of staff and Board members 
The staff equity profile exercise was re-run in January 2007. The survey questions on race 
and 
religion or belief again matched the Census questions. The question on gender was revised 
to take account of advice from our LGBT equity partners. The question on disability was 
revised to take account of guidance recommended by the Disability Rights Commission. A 
new question on caring responsibilities was added, in light of our new gender equality duty. 
The reports generated from this exercise will be published on the sportscotland website and 
staff intranet by the end of 2007, in line with our equality duties. 
 
By mid 2007, we'll have an upgraded Human Resources system in place, which will enable 
staff equity monitoring to take place electronically in future. Staff will be asked to complete 
their own profile details electronically and review these details annually. The system will 
enable the staff equity profiling data to be cross-referenced with information on recruitment, 
training, grievances, disciplinary action, performance appraisal, promotions, patterns of 
working, and termination of employment.  
 
Reports on each of these areas, showing the equity profile, will be published every year from 
December 2007, in line with our equality duties. 
 
The results of the profiling exercise undertaken in January 2007, and the subsequent reports 
produced from the new HR system, will be reported to the Senior Management Team 
annually. Any actions that need to be taken as a result of the findings of these reports will be 
integrated into the Scheme action plan. 
 
Staff training on the equality duties 
Under the RRAA 2000, we have a legal duty to set out in our Scheme our proposed 
arrangements for training our staff in connection with the general duty to promote race 
equality, and any specific duties. 
 
We are committed to doing this, and to also training our staff in connection with our duties to 
promote gender and disability equality. 
 
During the development of the Scheme, staff have received various briefings and information 
on the duties and on the Scheme itself. As well as receiving information at team meetings, all 
staff can access relevant briefings notes on a dedicated equity section of the staff intranet. 
 
In spring 2007, we will hold equity awareness briefings for all our staff. These briefings will 
explain the public sector equality duties, and will make staff aware of their responsibilities 
under these duties. 
 
Further briefings or training on particular elements of the duties, and on the Single Equity 
Scheme, will follow as required. For example, staff involved in carrying out Equity Impact 
Assessments on our policies and functions are currently receiving training on what this will 
involve. 
 
During 2007, we will also scope out the requirements for further equity training for staff, and 
will ensure that all staff receive equity training during the period of the Scheme. The need for 
ongoing 
equity training will again be ascertained before the end of the Scheme, following training 
needs 
analysis and/or internal staff engagement surveys. All new staff will also receive a briefing on 
our 
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equity work, including the equality duties, as part of their induction. 
 
Monitoring the impact of internal policies 
We are committed to keeping our internal policies under review on an ongoing basis. Part of 
this 
function will help us to ensure that our existing or future staff are not being discriminated 
against or harassed, and that our policies help to promote gender, race and disability equality 
in line with our public sector duties. 
 
In practice, we will continue to ensure that the impact of our internal policies and functions on 
all 
equity strands is considered through the work of our HR policy review group, and through the 
Equity Impact Assessment process. 
 
Equity Impact Assessments 
All three of the public sector duties require us to undertake some degree of Equity Impact 
Assessment of our policies and functions. 
 
Race Equality Duty 
Under the specific duties of the Race Relations Act 1976 (Statutory Duties) (Scotland) Order 
2002 (as amended in 2006), we are required to: 
• identify the relevance of our policies and functions to race equality, and; 
• assess the likely impact of proposed policies on race equality and good relations. 
 
Disability Equality Duty 
• Under the DDA 2005, our Disability Equality Scheme must include a statement of our 
intended 
methods for assessing the impact of our policies and practices, or the likely impact of our 
proposed policies and practices, on equality for disabled persons. These methods must then 
be carried out during the period of the Scheme. 
 
Gender Equality Duty 
Under the Equality Act 2006, we have a duty to ensure that our Scheme sets out the actions 
we have taken or intend to take to assess the impact of our policies and practices, or their 
likely impact on gender equality. The term ‘policies and practices’ is intended to cover all our 
proposed and current activities. This duty requires the assessment of our existing policies and 
practices as well as ones which are developed subsequently. 
 
Therefore, the disability and gender equality duties require us to look retrospectively at the 
equity 
impact of our policies and functions, as well as considering the possible impact of future 
policies 
and functions. 
 
A list of policies and functions identified as relevant to to our race, disability and gender 
equality duties is included as Appendix I. 
 
sportscotland’s arrangements for Equity Impact Assessment 
For the purposes of this Scheme and the impact assessment process, we will refer to ‘policies 
and functions’. This should be taken to cover all the Equity Impact Assessment requirements 
of the three public sector duties. 
 
The process that we will be required to follow to conduct Race, Disability and Gender Equity 
Impact Assessments will be broadly similar. Mindful of this, and of the potential requirement to 
consider the impact of policies and functions on age, sexual orientation and religion or belief 
in the coming years, we intend to carry out overarching Equity Impact Assessments on our 
policies and functions. This will enable one process and toolkit to be used, and will ensure 
that gender, disability and race equality all are considered simultaneously. 
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We intend to go beyond the requirements of the current duties by undertaking Equity Impact 
38 
Assessments on both our future and existing policies and functions and by considering the 
impact 
on gender, disability and race equity, as well as the impact on age, sexual orientation and 
religion or belief where possible and appropriate. These multi-strand assessments will also 
enable sportscotland to better identify the effects of multiple discrimination and multi-strand 
barriers. 
 
Set out below are the steps we have taken to date – or propose to take in the coming months 
– to 
conduct Equity Impact Assessments on our policies and functions. 
 
Actions undertaken so far include the following: 
• The Equity Project Group, in consultation with all of sportscotland’s teams, has produced a 
first 
draft of our existing and proposed policies and functions. When developing this list, group 
members were asked to identify whether each sportscotland policy/function should be 
regarded as being ‘high’ ‘medium’ or ‘low’ priority in terms of when it undergoes impact 
assessment. The group drafted some suggested criteria that staff used in order to undertake 
this prioritisation exercise. 
These criteria are as follows: 
– Is the policy/function a major one in terms of sportscotland’s work? 
– Will the policy/function impact on a high number of people (for external policies)? 
– Will the policy/function impact on a high number of staff (for internal policies)? 
– Is the policy/function directly related to the investment of money in external partners? 
– Is the policy/function currently being developed, or is it due to be developed this year (or is it 
an existing policy?) 
• The Equity Project Group also identified which members of staff from each team will be 
responsible for carrying out Equity Impact Assessments on each of the policies and functions 
identified. This was based on identifying which staff would have a key role in the development 
or delivery of each of the policies and functions. 
• These two actions culminated in the production of an Equity Impact Assessment timetable 
for 
action. This sets which policies and functions will be screened in order to determine their 
relevance to and impact on each equity strand, the order in which they will be screened, who 
will be responsible for screening, and by which date. The timetable for action is available to all 
our staff on the staff intranet, and is also available on the Single Equity Scheme page of our 
website. The timetable for action will be regularly monitored and updated by the Equity 
Project Group. Any comments on the timetable for action are welcome, and should be 
directed to our Ethics Manager. 
• In the early months of 2007, we commissioned the development of an Equity Impact 
Assessment toolkit and guidance manual that could be used by our staff when carrying out 
impact assessments on our policies and functions. 
 
In parallel with the above actions, we are now also training staff on how to carry out Equity 
Impact 
Assessments.This training is intended to cover the requirements of the three public sector 
duties, 
explain the process that should be followed when carrying out impact assessments, and 
demonstrate the use of our Equity Impact Assessment toolkit on some of our policies and 
functions. Following the delivery of this training, Equity Impact Assessments on our policies 
and functions will be undertaken in line with our timetable for action. 
 
We will seek to consult and involve key stakeholders – including disabled people, women and 
men and BME people, plus representatives of the three other major equity strands where 
appropriate and relevant – on the findings of the initial screenings. This will be done through a 
variety of consultation/ involvement mechanisms which might include inviting stakeholders 
from a range of equity groups to consultation events, and/or inviting written feedback on the 
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initial findings. The nature of the consultation and involvement will depend on the policy or 
function being impact assessed. 
 
We will publish the results of all initial screenings on our website. 
 
Following the initial screenings, we will be able to identify whether each policy or function 
needs to undergo a partial or full Equity Impact Assessment (either for its impact on all six 
equity strands, or for its impact on a particular strand e.g. disability equality). This will depend 
on whether the screening has shown that the policy/function has a high, medium or low (or 
unknown) impact on a particular equity strand or strands. 
 
We will undertake partial or full Equity Impact Assessments on the appropriate policies and 
functions identified through the screening process. To do this, we will follow the 
recommended staged process as set out in our impact assessment toolkit, including involving 
and consulting with key stakeholders throughout the process as appropriate. 
 
We will publish the results of all full Equity Impact Assessments on our website. 
 
We will make any necessary changes to policies and functions that have been identified as a 
result of the Equity Impact Assessment, to address or avoid any adverse impact on a 
particular equity group, or to better promote equality of opportunity. 
 
Actions and timescales for this process are set out in our Generic Equity Action Plan. 
 
Monitoring the impact of sportscotland’s policies on the 
promotion of equality of opportunities 
All three of the public sector duties on race, gender and disability equality require us to set out 
in our Scheme how we will monitor the impact of our policies on disabled people, women and 
men and BME people. By following the steps set out above to conduct Equity Impact 
Assessments on our policies, programmes and services, we will be engaging with people 
from all three of these groups, which will allow the impact of the policies to be monitored. 
 
In terms of ongoing monitoring of our policies, programmes and services, the following 
arrangements will apply. 
• Our investment in local authorities will be subject to monitoring – both formal and through 
the 
ongoing involvement of Partnership Managers – to ensure equality of opportunity for girls, 
disabled people and BME people. Progress reports to Partnership Managers, and data 
provided by local authorities will detail how closely targets have been met in line with agreed 
implementation plans, agreed targets, stated objectives and outcomes. 
• We will monitor our investment into SGBs through:  
– setting investment conditions – including those which cover the SGB’s requirements to give 
due 
regard to equality of opportunity for disabled people, women and men and BME people; 
– monitoring the fulfilment of these conditions on an ongoing basis through the provision of 
support via a network of SGB Partnership Managers; and 
– receiving and reviewing integrated investment reports from the SGBs twice a year. 
• We will monitor our investment into the Institute Network by ensuring we have robust 
investment 
agreements in place, and through regular area managers meetings held quarterly with the 
Area 
Institutes of Sport, and Board meetings held monthly with the Scottish Institute of Sport. 
• We will monitor our investment into sports facilities to ensure that they help to promote 
equality 
of opportunities for disabled people, women and men and BME people by ensuring, through a 
series of planned monitoring visits to each site, that the facility does carry forward the 
practices 
and principles as detailed throughout the application process. 
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• During the period of the Scheme, we will integrate equity criteria into the SGB Fit for 
Purpose audits. 
Particular criteria on the promotion of equality of opportunities for disabled people, women 
and girls and BME people will be developed as appropriate at this time. 
• Our support for governing bodies implementing the Equity Standard will be monitored and 
evaluated through the Sports Council Equity Group’s monitoring and evaluation framework. 
• The impact of Active Schools on disabled children, girls and BME children will be monitored 
as part of our ongoing arrangements to monitor and evaluate Active Schools. 
• The impact of our internal policies (for example, our car leasing scheme, our remote working 
policy and our IT policies) on the promotion of opportunities for our staff will be monitored and 
evaluated on an ongoing basis. Wherever possible, we will seek to gather and analyse 
information on these policies in terms of their impact on and differential take-up by women 
and men, and – if possible – their impact on and differential take-up by people from other 
equity groups. 
• A monitoring and evaluation framework to ascertain the impact of this Scheme will be 
developed 
in 2007, as set out in more detail below. Certain elements of the Scheme will also be 
monitored 
through our Corporate Plan and Business Plan monitoring arrangements. 
 
Procurement 
Each year, we enter into a number of contracts with external organisations to commission 
work on our behalf. When an external consultant undertakes work or provides services on our 
behalf, the obligation to comply with the public sector duties remains with us. However, this 
means that we will need to build relevant equity considerations into the procurement process, 
to ensure that we meet the public sector equality duties in relation to this function. 
 
The Statutory Codes of Practice for the Disability Equality Duty and the Gender Equality Duty 
set out a number of requirements that we must meet in relation to procurement. In order to 
comply with the duties, we need to: 
• provide guidance and/or training for all staff involved in procurement work so that they fully 
understand the provisions of the three public sector equality duties, and the relevance of 
these to 
their area of work; 
• review and, if required, revise our standard terms and conditions for contracting services to 
include information about the RRAA 2000, the DDA 2005 and the Equality Act 2006, ensuring 
that relevant Scottish Executive guidance on equality issues in procurement is considered; 
• include a requirement in every tender brief and contract that the contractor must comply with 
the  
relevant anti-discrimination provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations 
Act 
1976, and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (as well as other anti discrimination 
legislation that relates to the other key equity strands); 
• where relevant, specify what evidence the contractor may need to provide in order to 
demonstrate its compliance with the anti discrimination provisions of the applicable legislation; 
• ensure that race, disability and gender equity are appropriately reflected, and given due 
weight in the criteria for the selection of tenderers and the award of the contract, and in 
contract conditions, in a way that is consistent with EC and UK procurement rules and which 
is proportionate and reasonable to the contract; 
• ensure that contractors fully understand any race, disability or gender equity requirements of 
the 
tender brief or contract; 
• monitor fulfilment of race, disability and/or gender equity requirements as set out in the 
contract; and 
• seek legal advice if there is uncertainty as to how the duty might affect the design and 
process of a particular procurement. 
 
Our Generic Equity Action Plan sets out how we will meet these duties. Actions will be 
developed to take account of guidance on equity in procurement produced by the 
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Commissions for race, gender and disability (and their successor body, the CEHR) where 
appropriate. 
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Monitoring, reporting and review 
Monitoring progress 
sportscotland’s Equity Project Group, chaired by the Senior Management Team Equity 
Champion, will be responsible for overseeing delivery of, reporting on and reviewing the 
Scheme. It will meet regularly during the period of the Scheme. The Equity Project Group will 
work with monitoring staff in 2007 to discuss arrangements for monitoring progress towards 
delivery of the Scheme. This framework will consider how disabled people and other key 
stakeholders will be involved in the monitoring process, where appropriate. 
 
Reporting on progress 
Progress on delivery will be reported on a regular basis to the Senior Management Team and 
the 
Board. Any issues regarding non-delivery or other significant problems will be escalated to the 
Senior Management Team as soon as possible. 
 
We are required by law to publish annual reports on our Disability, Gender and Race Equality 
Schemes. An integrated annual report on the Scheme will be published by 4 December 2007, 
and then once every year after that. 
 
Reviewing the Scheme 
The three public sector duties require us to revise our Gender, Race and Disability Schemes 
within three years of their initial publication dates. Therefore, the entire Scheme will be 
reviewed and revised by 4 December 2009, and every three years thereafter. Towards the 
end of 2008, the Equity Project Group will develop a plan for the review and revision of the 
Scheme. Disabled people, women and men, BME people and key stakeholders representing 
the other key equity strands will be involved in this process as appropriate. 
 
Publication of the Single Equity Scheme 
• This version and subsequent versions of sportscotland’s Scheme are available on our 
ethics 
website www.sportscotland.org.uk/ethics 
• The Scheme is available primarily in electronic format to allow for regular updating, as 
necessary. 
• The Scheme can be made available in hard copy, alternative formats and languages on 
request. 
 
If you would like to order a copy of the Scheme in an alternative format, please contact a 
member 
of sportscotland’s communications team on 0131 317 7200. 
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Appendix A 
The Disability Discrimination Act 2005: 
The Disability Equality Duty 
1. The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA 1995) has been amended by the Disability 
Discrimination Act 2005 (DDA 2005) so that it now places a duty on all public authorities, 
when carrying out their functions, to have due regard to the need to: 
1.1 promote equality of opportunity between disabled people and other people; 
1.2 eliminate discrimination unlawful under the DDA 1995; 
1.3 eliminate harassment of disabled people; 
1.4 promote positive attitudes towards disabled people; 
1.5 encourage participation by disabled people in public life; and 
1.6 take steps to meet disabled people’s needs – even if this means treating disabled 
people 
more favourably. 
2. The totality of this duty, covering all elements, is referred to as the ‘Disability Equality Duty’, 
or ‘the general duty’. The overarching goal of the general duty is to promote equality of 
opportunity, and the other elements of the duty both support this goal and require due regard 
in their own right. 
3. Listed public bodies, including sportscotland, are subject to a further set of specific duties 
under the Act. Listed public authorities must: 
3.1 Publish a Disability Equality Scheme demonstrating how it intends to fulfil its 
general and specific duties, and which includes a statement of: 
3.1.1 the way in which disabled people have been involved in the 
development of 
the Scheme; 
3.1.2 the authority’s methods for impact assessment; 
3.1.3 steps which the authority will take towards fulfilling its general duty (the 
‘action plan’); 
3.1.4 the authority’s arrangements for gathering information in relation to 
employment, and,where appropriate, its delivery of education and its 
functions; and 
3.1.5 the authority’s arrangements for putting the information gathered to use, 
in particular in reviewing the effectiveness of its action plan and in preparing 
subsequent Disability Equality Schemes. 
3.2 Involve disabled people in the development of the Scheme. 
3.3 Within three years of the Scheme being published, take the steps set out in its 
action plan (unless it is unreasonable or impracticable for it to do so) and put into 
effect the arrangements for gathering and making use of information. 
3.4 Annually publish a report containing a summary of the steps taken under the 
action plan, the results of its information gathering and the use to which it has put the 
information. 
3.5 Review and re-publish the Disability Equality Scheme every three years. 
4. The first Disability Equality Schemes must be published by 4 December 2006. 
5. It is permissible to include the Disability Equality Scheme within another document (such as 
a 
business plan or a Single Equality Scheme) so long as the disability equality elements are 
clearly 
identifiable and it is clear how the authority shall meet both the general and the specific 
duties. 
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Appendix B 
The Equality Act 2006: 
The Gender Equality Duty 
1. The Equality Act 2006 amends the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to place a statutory duty on 
all 
public authorities, when carrying out their functions, to have due regard to the need: 
1.1 to eliminate discrimination that is unlawful under the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 or the Equal Pay Act 1970; 
1.2 to eliminate harassment on the grounds of gender; and 
1.3 to promote equality of opportunity between men and women. 
2. This is known as ‘the general duty’ and this came into effect on 6 April 2007. 
3. In addition to the general duty, listed public authorities – including sportscotland – will – by 
29 June 2008615 – be subject to a set of more detailed specific duties. The proposed duties 
require those authorities to: 
3.1 gather information on how their work affects women and men; 
3.2 consult employees, service users, trade unions and other stakeholders; 
3.3 assess the different impact of policies and practices on women and men and use 
this 
information to inform their work; 
3.4 identify priorities and set gender equality objectives; 
3.5 plan and take action to achieve gender equality objectives; and 
3.6 publish a gender equality scheme, report annually and review progress every 
three years. 
4. Listed Scottish authorities will also have a duty to publish an equal pay statement by 28 
September 2007, (if they have 150+ staff) and report on progress every three years. 
5. It is permissible to include the Gender Equality Scheme within another document (such as 
a business plan or a Single Equality Scheme) so long as the gender equality elements are 
clearly identifiable and it is clear how the authority shall meet both the general and the 
specific duties. 
6. In the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, unlawful discrimination is defined as: 
6.1 direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex; 
6.2 discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy and maternity leave; 
6.3 discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment; 
6.4 direct and indirect discrimination against married persons and civil partners; 
6.5 victimisation; and 
6.6 harassment and sexual harassment. 
                                                          
615
 This date applies to listed Scottish public bodies only. Listed public bodies in other parts of the UK were required to comply with 
the specific duties in April 2007. 
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Appendix C 
The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000: 
The Race Equality Duty 
1. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 places a general duty on a wide range of listed 
public authorities to promote race equality. This duty means that authorities must have due 
regard to the need to: 
1.1 eliminate unlawful racial discrimination; 
1.2 promote equality of opportunity; and 
1.3 promote good relations between people of different racial groups. 
2. Listed public authorities are also subject to a number of specific duties. 
 
The Duty to Produce a Race Equality Scheme 
3. The Race Relations Act 1976 (Statutory Duties) (Scotland) Order 2002 placed a duty on a 
number of listed Scottish public authorities to produce and publish a Race Equality Scheme. 
sportscotland was not one of these authorities. 
4. However, the 2002 Order was amended in 2006, with the result that sportscotland must 
publish a Race Equality Scheme by 30 November 2007. 
5. The Order states that a public authority’s Race Equality Scheme shall set out: 
5.1 those of its functions and policies, or proposed policies, which that body or person 
has 
assessed as relevant to its performance of the duty imposed by section 71(1) of the 
Race 
Relations Act (the general duty) and; 
5.2 that body or person’s arrangements for: 
5.2.1 assessing and consulting on the likely impact of its proposed policies on 
the 
promotion of race equality; 
5.2.2 monitoring its policies for any adverse impact on the promotion of race 
equality; 
5.2.3 publishing the results of such assessments and consultation, and of 
such monitoring; 
5.2.4 ensuring public access to information and services which it provides; 
and 
5.2.5 training staff in connection with the duties imposed by section 71(1) of 
the Race Relations Act (the general duty), and this Order. 
6. The race equality scheme can be part of a more general equality strategy or improvement 
plan, as long as it can be easily identified as meeting all the statutory requirements for this 
type of scheme. 
The Employment Duty 
7. In addition to the general duty, listed public authorities – including sportscotland – have a 
duty to monitor, by racial group, the number of staff in post and applicants for employment, 
training and promotion. 
8. Listed public authorities that employ more than 150 full time staff are also required to 
monitor, by racial group, the members of staff who 
8.1 receive training; 
8.2 benefit or suffer detriment as a result of its performance assessment procedures; 
8.3 are involved in grievance procedures; 
8.4 are the subject of disciplinary procedures; and 
8.5 cease employment with the organisation. 
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Appendix D 
Existing Research into Equity in Sport 
1. In 2001, sportscotland published the research report Sport and Disabilities: Aiming at 
Social 
Inclusion, which identified the key barriers facing disabled people in relation to sports 
participation. 
2. In 2001, sportscotland published the research report Sport and Ethnic Minorities: Aiming at 
Social Inclusion, which identified the key barriers facing BME people in relation to sports 
participation. 
3. In 2004, sportscotland published the research report Women in Sports Leadership which 
examined gender differences in the leadership structures within Scottish sport. 
4. In 2005, sportscotland published Older People, Sport and Physical Activity, which provided 
an 
overview of the key issues in relation to sports and physical activity participation by older 
people 
to inform future policy and programmes. 
5. In 2005, sportscotland and the Women’s Sport Foundation published Making Women and 
Girls More Active: A Good Practice Guide. Drawing on research conducted with a range of 
organisations promoting women and girls’ sport, this report identified a wide range of ways to 
practically tackle the key barriers to sports participation by women and girls. 
6. In 2005, sportscotland developed its Women, Girls and Sport Strategy, which sets out the 
steps that it will take to promote the development of women and girls’ sport over the coming 
five years. 
7. In 2006, sportscotland published Increasing Demand for Sport and Physical Activity for 
Adolescent Girls in Scotland. This research report and accompanying good practice guide 
(Exploring Issues, Suggesting Solutions) identified the key barriers facing adolescent girls in 
terms of participation in sport and physical activity, and offered a range of solutions to these 
barriers. 
8. All of these documents13 are available on the sportscotland ethics website 
www.sportscotland.org.uk/ethics 
9. sportscotland monitors sports participation in Scotland. Data is collected throughout each 
year 
and published annually. Figures can be produced on participation by adults (16+), children (8-
15), 
women, disabled people, white and BME people, people from a variety of age groups, and 
people 
from areas of social disadvantage (according to the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation) 
and 
urban/rural areas. It is possible to provide figures on participation by some individual sports in 
relation to some, but not all, of these groups. 
 
For further information on sportscotland’s participation data, please contact a member of the 
Research and Evaluation Unit on 0131 317 7200. 
 
 
